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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis is comprised of seven chapters in the following order: 
Chapter I 	Introduction 
Chapter II 	Kierkegaards' Background 
Chapter III 	Igbals' Background 
Chapter N 	Kierkegaard on Subjectty. 
Chapter V 	Iqbal on Subjectivity 
Chapter VI 	Comparison  
Chapter VII 	Critical Evaluation 
The chapter I `Intl. auction' starts with, the distinction between 
`Men of Faith' and `Men of Reason'; the former stressing • on action, 
commitment and values and latter stressing on method, argument, truth 
and understanding. It is pointed out that by espousing and advocating the 
approach of `Men of Faith', Kierkegaard and Iqbal provide a radical 
challenge to the assumptions of modern European philosophy and culture. 
The second chapter 'Kierkegaard's Background' provides a 
historical overview of Western philosophy. It starts with a brief account 
of pre-Socratic philosophers. It gives an outline of the epistemological 
and ethical views of Sophists, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Thereafter, it 
outlines the epistemological, ethical and religious views of such Judeau- 
Christian thinkers as Philo, Justin, Martyr, Clement, Origen, Augustine, 
St. Anselm, Peter Abelard, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns 
Scouts and William of Ockham. This chapter also provides a summary of 
epistemological views of such modem philosophers as Descartes, Pascal 
and David Hume. It also gives a summary of the epistemological point of 
view advanced by Kant. 
Chapter III `Igbals' Background' provides a historical account of 
Islamic philosophy. It starts with the Quranic emphasis on knowledge, 
reflection and understanding and its' method of interpretation. Thereafter, 
it provides a summary of Islamic sciences such as Ilm al-Tafsir', `Ilm al-
Hadith', 'Ilm al-Fiqh', 'Ilm al-Kalam', and Sufism. Subsequently, it gives 
an overview of the contribution of such Sufis as Hasan al-Basari, Rabia 
al-Basri, Dhun-Nun Misri, BayzaidBustami, Junaid Baghdadi, Mansoor 
al-Hallaj, Ghazali, SuharwardiMaqtul, IbnArabi, Rumi, MullaSadra, 
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Wali Allah. It also provides an outline 
of the contributions of such philosophers as Ikhwan al-Safa, Farabi, 
IbnSina, IbnRushd and Sir Syed. 
The fourth chapter 'Kierkegaard on Subjectivity' provides a 
detailed account of Kierkegaards' views on subjectivity. The first section 
`Subjectivity' brings out the distinction between science and philosophy 
as well as the distinction between religious faith and objective method. 
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This section also brings out Kierkegaards' basic insights and suggestions 
with regard to his commitment to the approach of `Subjectivity'. The 
second section `Attack on Hegel' attacks the Hegelian system for its 
failure to capture individual existence in the logical development of 
concepts. Kierkegaard brings out that religious faith is appropriated 
subjectively and it operates on a different plane which is. in radical 
opposition to logic and methodology of Hegelian rationalist philosophy. 
Hegel is utterly unacceptable to Kierkegaard for he avoids the subjective 
viewpoint of the existing individual. Hegel's so-called system is devoid 
of practical wisdom and ethical guidance. Such a philosophy can be only 
used as a ruse to excuse ourselves from making ethical and practical 
decisions. The third section of this chapter bring's out Kierkegaards' 
views on Christianity as a way of life. In this section Kierkegaards 
critique of conventional Christianity is outlined as well. Kierkegaard's 
rejection of rational appropriation to Christianity also figures in this 
section. Christianity, according to Kierkegaard is not a set of reasonable 
doctrines. It is rather anchored on the most essentially paradoxical and 
irrational doctrine, viz, historical incarnation of God into Christ. 
Therefore, a rational appropriation of Christianity is impossible. The 
fourth section of this chapter `Three Modes of Existence' provides a 
summary of Kierkegaards' existential dialectic. It gives an outline of 
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three modes of existence such as aesthetic mode, ethical mode and 
religious mode as advanced by Kierkegaard himself. While in aesthetical 
mode of existence man is pleasure-centric and in ethical mode of 
existence man is value-centric, it is in religious mode of existence that 
one becomes God-centric. At this stage man's sense of alienation and 
meaninglessness is overcome. 
The fifth chapter `Igbal on Subjectivity', firstly brings out Iqbals 
basic philosophical orientation, indicating his commitment to the basic 
vision and mission of Islam and his training in Western philosophy. 
Secondly, this chapter outlines Iqbals' critique of reason. This section 
brings out Iqbals' integrated epistemological position. Apart from 
summarizing Iqbals critique of reason, this section also brings out the 
characterizing features of religious experience as given by Iqbal in his 
`Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam'. In the next section, we 
give an outline of Iqbals' philosophy of Ego. This section provides a brief 
account of Iqbals' philosophy wherein the universe, man and God are 
deemed to be different gradations of Ego; the universe being a cluster of 
lower egos, man being an Ego at the intermediate level i.e. in between the 
universe and God and God being the Supreme Ego. This section also 
summarises Iqbals' critique of pantheistic philosophy of Ibn Arabi. The 
question of the relationship of human ego with • the universe is also 
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touched herein. It also brings' out Iqbals' emphasis on the stabilization of 
ego through facing challenges and obstructions, authentication of self 
through creating and positing of values and purposes and freedom of the 
ego with a view to recasting the world according to its' values, ideals and 
purposes. This chapter, subsequently, provides a summary of the role of 
love in the appropriation of Islamic beliefs and values,as well as, its' 
crucial contribution in the upkeep of human life. The last section in this 
chapter gives an overview of Iqbals `Man of Faith'. A brief account of 
Iqbals' three stages of human life is also provided herein. Other crucial 
features of `Man of Faith' such as his love of God, his contentment, his 
absolute faith and his transformative role are also brought out in this 
section. 
The chapter VI `Comparison' provides a summary of the basic 
philosophical positions of both Kierkegaard and Iqbal. Thereafter, it 
brings out the basic similarities between Kierkegaard and Iqbal. It 
provides a brief account of their differences or dissimilarities as well. 
The VII chapter `Critical Evaluation' provides a recapitulation of 
basic philosophical contention of Kierkegaard and Iqbal. This chapter 
also works out a critical overview of the basic philosophical positions 
upheld by Kierkegaard and Iqbal. It is brought out that Kierkegaards' 
excessive emphasis on `subjectivity' lands him in unnecessary and 
uncalled for irrationalism. Kierkegaards' excessive emphasis. on 
subjectivity also makes him forgetful of most important social and 
p[political questions. It also point out that Kierkegaard `Man of Faith' is 
excessively caught into vortex of despair. The chapter also brings out the 
limitations of Iqbals' approach to philosophy. His views on 'Sufism are 
not clear and categorical. His ambiguity on Sufism lands him into love-
hate relationship with sufi approach to religion and philosophy. His 
critique of IbnArabi'sontocosmological doctrine is also not necessarily 
corroborated by the Quran. Although his rejection of the classical proofs 
for the existence of God is in tune with the approach of subjectivity, his 
support of religion by recourse to contemporary scientific research 
violates his basic existentialist approach to religion. 
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CHAPTER - I 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophical interpretations have either been inspired by religious faith 
and spiritual imperatives or motivated by quest for scientific standardization 
and rational systematization. Broadly speaking, human beings are of two types: 
(a) Men of faith, conviction, action, commitment, values; men deeply imbued 
with a sense of good and evil and men with a strong vision of and mission for 
self-transformation and societal change and (b) Men of reason, truth, method, 
logic, argument, proof, verification; men who want to arrive at universal truth, 
men who passionately yearn for an understanding of Ultimate Reality. The 
former are men of action, the latter are men of contemplation. The former 
pursue the path of action and devotion, the latter pursue the path of knowledge. 
The former are in search of what is valuable, the latter are in search of what is 
truthful. The foremost concern of former is to figure out what righteous actions 
are, the foremost concern of the latter is to arrive at justified true beliefs rather 
indefeasible propositions. The former is concerned with practices, the latter 
with indubitable truth-claims. The former is concerned with right action, the 
latter with right thought. The former is driven by moral duty, the Iatter inspired 
by intellectual beauty. The former is pricked by pangs of conscience, the latter 
is motivated by the imperatives of consciousness. The ultimate concern of 
former is right conduct, the ultimate concern of the latter is right thinking. The 
former prefers moral virtues to everything else, the latter prefers intellectual 
virtues to everything else. The examples of former are Biblical prophets such 
as Moses, Jesus and Muhammad; the examples of latter are Greek philosophers 
such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
The Biblical Prophets taught unqualified obedience to the 
commandments of God with a view to attaining to the good-pleasure of God. 
They underscored the unconditional observance of rituals and prayers. They 
underlined the unconditional and absolute faith in and commitment to God. 
They emphasized on a spiritual relationship with God which is inextricably 
etched on the soul, mind and body of a believer. The essential teachings of the 
Prophets included stress on finitude and mortality of man, radical contingency 
of life and ineradicable human sinfulness. They did not teach intellectual 
detachment but personal or moral involvement. The Biblical man of faith was 
not in the Greek mould of "spectator of all time and all existence". Unlike 
Greeks, Biblical Revelationists did not deem the philosopher as the highest or 
the ideal type of man — one who can survey the realm of eternal and universal 
essences. 
The Biblical Prophets taught that the ideal man is the man of faith and 
not the man of reason — a detached intellectual or the philosopher. The Biblical 
ideal man is not conceptualized in universal abstractness. The Biblical vision 
concentrated always on the concrete, particular, individual man. It emphasized 
on commitment and passionate involvement of man; on human relationships 
and values. A man abstracted from commitments and involvements would be 
for Semitic people a complete distortion of the actual existing human person. 
For Semitics, the rational or intellectual man is essentially alienated from the 
real problems of life. It is foolish to pride on intellectual sophistication, for the 
intellect can never touch the real issues of life. The ultimate issues of life 
transpire at a plane that logical and intellectual sophistication can never arrive 
at. The ultimate issues of Iife can be resolved or dealt with only by recourse to 
ultimate depth of faith. The Biblical vision of and perspective on man was too 
pre-occupied with the existential features such as human imperfection, 
sinfulness and finitude to be grandiloquently discoursing on universal and 
eternal values such as Truth, Beauty and Goodness. 
On the other hand, for Greeks, the ideal man was the man of reason, the 
philosopher who as a spectator of all time and existence can rise above all 
existential imperfections. The philosopher, according to Plato, can understand 
the universal and timeless essences, forms and ideas. The ideal man was the 
7 
man of theory, the philosopher or the pure scientist, looking upon existence 
with complete detachment. Man is a rational animal who can discover universal 
and eternal essences through his intellect. 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the greatest rationalist trio of World 
philosophy, underlined the ultimate importance of discovering objective, 
universal and true knowledge by recourse to reason. Socrates critiqued sophists 
and advanced arguments in support of the conceptual character of all 
knowledge. Following Socrates, Plato advanced his theory of Ideas. For Plato 
Ideas were substantial, universal, immutable, essential, perfect, outside space 
and time and most importantly rational and real. While Socrates had 
emphasized on dialectical or conversational method with a view to arriving at 
objective truth, Aristotle invented a fully-fledged new science of Logic in order 
to arriving at true and objective conclusions. 
Following Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the ideal Greek man was 
conceptualized as a perfect rational philosopher who could, with absolute 
detachment and objectivity, discover or arrive at the perfect knowledge of such 
universal and eternal ideas as Truth, Beauty and Goodness. 
The Medieval European philosophy was basically dominated by debates 
pertaining to issues arising from appropriating the horizon of religious faith and 
commitment. However, eminent Medieval Christian theologians tried their best 
to reconcile the conflicting claims of Greek rationalism and Biblical faith. 
Muslim philosophers such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd also 
dedicated themselves to working out a reconciliation between the imperatives 
of the Qur'anic world-view and rationalist objectivist principles underlined by 
Greek philosophers. 
With the onset of Modern European era and with the rising tide of 
scientific research, the rationalist objectivist epistemology advanced by 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, directed the onward march of European 
philosophy. The continental rationalists such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz 
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and British empiricists such as Locke. Berkeley and Hume, despite 
disagreements on the origin and development of knowledge, were all inspired 
by Greek emphasis on objectivity and rationality. Kant, despite his 
epistemological reconciliations and hermeneutical concessions, substantially 
preserved intact, the Greek ideal of objective knowledge. Hegel identified the 
whole of reality with the manifestation of reason and declared whatever is 
rational is real and whatever is real is rational. 
In nineteenth and twentieth centuries, great scientific and technological 
achievements were registered by the application of rational or objective criteria 
of knowledge. The universal physical laws and chemical and biological 
discoveries were appropriated by recourse to rational, objective and 
experimental methods. This approach reached its culminating point in the 
semantic slogan of early twentieth century logical positivists, viz., "the 
meaning of a statement is the method of its verification". If there is no method 
of verification with regard to any proposition, it cannot be accepted either as 
true or false. It has to be declared as meaningless and nonsense. In view of the 
same, metaphysical and ethical propositions, having no method of verification, 
must be deemed to be neither true nor false but cognitively insignificant. 
Kierkegaard in the first half of nineteenth century and Iqbal in early 
twentieth century, advanced radical critiques of Modern Europe's strident 
espousal of objectivity. They with reference to their respective cultural 
matrices, launched powerful protests against the modern fetish for objective 
knowledge to the utter neglect of the power and relevance of human 
subjectivity. They revisited and recaptured the Biblical and the Qur'anic 
emphasis on human commitment, human action, human decision, human 
values and moral transformation of human society. 
As against the modern exclusivistic espousal of objectivity, the Clarion 
Call of Kierkegaard was that truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is truth. Man 
can never achieve objective certainty in the realms of philosophy and religion. 
We can never achieve rational sanction or certification of religious beliefs and 
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moral values. Christian beliefs and values are grounded on our faith in the 
absolute paradox that God intervened in temporal history in the person of 
Christ. Hegel's rational justification of Christianity is violative of the very 
purpose of religion. Religion is in no need of rational justificatory apologetics. 
What counts is man's ultimate depth of feeling or inwardness in relation to 
God. An existing individual can provide purpose and significance to his life 
through freedom, commitment and responsibility. An existing individual has. to 
negotiate deep and abiding moral dilemmas and take painful decisions 
involving courage of the highest order. The grand speculative formulations 
advanced by philosophers are pointless in the face of excruciating moral 
dilemmas. The existing individual faces critical choices and baffling 
alternatives. Philosophical arguments are of no avail during such critical 
moments. 
There is no royal road to salvation. Man has the choice either to lead an 
aesthetic mode of life or ethical mode of life. He can either maximize his 
pleasures or commit himself to ethical values. However, such modes of 
existence will not relieve him of his sense of finitude or guilt or alienation. The 
only course open to him for dealienation and self-integration is to appropriate 
God through a leap unto the darkness i.e. opt for a religious mode of life. 
Philosophy can illuminate the possibilities and choices available to man and 
orientate an individual to an authentic appropriation of his subjectivity. 
Iqbal too is an uncompromising advocate of subjectivity. An objective 
demonstration of religious beliefs and values is simply impossible. Like Kant, 
he repudiates all the proofs for the existence of God. Religious beliefs and 
values can be appropriated only subjectively. It is not possible to demonstrate 
existence of God by recourse to rational arguments. It is only through intuition 
and love that the reality of God and our own reality can be vouchsafed to us. 
An understanding of the Quran through classical exegetical principles or 
hermeneutical criteria is also not possible. The Quran needs to be always 
contemporaneously revealed to the depths of the conscience of its readers. The 
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truth of religion can be appropriated only by recourse to faith. The way to God 
is through self realization. Those who strive for the disclosure of the Ultimate 
Splendor of God must learn to appreciate their own spiritual beauty. In fact, 
search for God ends up in self-realisation and search for our own selves leads 
to God-realisation. The human ego is an irreducible ontic entity and the 
gateway to God. Understanding God entails plumbing the ultimate depths of 
our own self. 
The role of human personality, initiative and freedom, is powerfully 
underlined by Iqbal. It is through freedom or capacity for initiative that all 
possible changes, transformations and revolutions are possible. Man as a free 
personality is co-worker with God. Human freedom cannot only bring about 
change at personal, social and political levels but earn man liberation from 
finitude or immortality as well. It is through free spiritual struggle that man can 
earn his personality through increasing approximation to God. Man's quest for 
self-realisation and self-transcendence leading to the proximity and presence of 
Allah, entails excruciating challenges and insufferable obstructions. An 
authentic seeker is the one who can dismantle all the impediments in his 
onward march to salvation and fulfillment. 
Man's moral and spiritual authentication and fulfillment can only be 
teleologically conpcetualised and worked out. Man, according to Iqbal, does 
not exist because he thinks; he exists because he loves — he loves values, ideals 
and purposes, he loves God because He is the Ultimate Ground as well as 
Revelator of values, ideals and purposes and he loves the Prophet because he is 
the revelettee of values, ideals and purposes besides being the exemplar of a 
model code of conduct for the entire mankind for all times to come. It is 
through love and consequent and subsequent subordination to values, ideals 
and purposes that we earn the stabilization and authentication of our 
individuality. Our ceaseless spiritual struggle is anchored on our quest for 
values, ideals and purposes. We exist because we can ceaselessly create values, 
ideals and purposes and endlessly pursue them to the best of our ability. It is 
through subordination to divinely revealed values, ideals and purposes that we 
can launch ourselves on spiritual highways and byways across the spectrum. 
The next stage of the spiritual seeker is to undergo most authentic self-control 
culminating into highest state of ego or self-realisation. Nextly, it is through 
subordination to divine commandments and self-realisation through self-
control that we can attain to the highest stage of life i.e. vicegerency of Allah. 
This is the ultimate stage of man's spiritual quest. It is at this stage that man of 
faith becomes man of God. 
The development of religions some three thousand years back and the 
development of natural and social sciences in modern Europe, are two of the 
most important paradigms of understanding and interpretation. Religions 
provided man an interpretation of God, self and the universe. Three of the most 
important questions with regard to Ultimate Reality, status of the self and 
destiny of man were sought to be resolved by recourse to religious faith. With 
the rise of modern science and technology religious beliefs and reassurances 
were as much undermined as social, political and economic concerns accorded 
priority and paramountcy. The emphasis on scientific knowledge achieved 
through laboratorical methods captured the imagination of modern world so 
much that religion was consigned to the oblivion of cognitive insignificance. 
Scientific methods provided us objective knowledge and anything short of 
objective certainty became pointless, meaningless and futile in the eyes of 
modern man. Kierkegaard in Europe and Iqbal in Asia advanced powerful 
protests against this reductionistic maltreatment of religion. 
According to Kierkegaard the ideal of objective knowledge championed 
by the so-called enlightened minds, is blind to the inner life or subjective 
existence of the human individual. The objective theoretical knowledge is of no 
avail in our quest for understanding human life. Kierkegaard offered 
extraordinary insights and overwhelming suggestions with a view to 
underlining the fact that the standard of objectivity in the sphere of religion was 
not only not perplexing but misleading as well. It was through religious faith 
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and ethical subjectivity that modern man can reclaim his dignity, integrity and 
fulfillment. Igbal, like Kierkegaard appreciated the role of rational, scientific 
and technological advancement in the modern world. However, in his poetic 
and prose writings, he consistently and continuously, launched a strident 
critique of the rationalistic and objectivistic critique of religion carried out by 
modem philosophers. He underlined that it is through intuition, faith and love 
that complex ills of modem world can be taken care of and the future of 
civilization can be made safe. 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal, through subjectivity, commitment and faith, tried 
to revive the pristine vision of the Biblical and the Qur'anic Ideal Man. Their 
critiques of modem `Rational Man' as envisaged and advanced by the 
Enlightenment Philosophers, may not have necessarily and substantially 
demolished the pan-objectivist pretensions of modernist intellectual discourse. 
However, they have provided a mature and judicious corrective to modernist 
accounts of man, religion, morality and philosophy by figuring out the 
distinctive alternative logic and methodology of understanding and 
interpretation anchored on subjectivity. 
CHAPTER -II 
KIERKEGAARD'S BACKGROUND 
(A) GREEK PHILOSOPHERS 
Western philosophy started by early 6 h` century BC. The ionic 
philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes started Greek 
philosophy with the search for the ultimate stuff of the Universe. Pythagoras 
and his followers in sixth century BC worked out a way of life by recourse to 
their mystical, religious and ethical teachings. The Eleatics in sixth and fifth 
century BC, interpreted the universe as Being and advanced philosophical 
considerations with a view to showing all Becoming to be only apparent and 
not real and declaring change to be impossible. As against Eleatics, their 
contemporary Heraclitus advanced arguments with a view to bringing out that 
motionless and changeless Being is impossible and there is nothing but change. 
Only change is changeless. Empedocles advanced the view that the world is 
comprised of four elements; earth, air, water, fire. All its transformations and 
transmutations, are worked out by Primal forces of Love and Hate. The 
Atomists argued that the universe we are living in is ultimately comprised of 
indivisible units. These units or atoms are the ultimate constituents of the 
world. Anaxagoras also advanced his cosmological views and mainly grappled 
with the problem of change. He advanced the view that physical particles or 
atoms by themselves can not explain the law and order as well as the beauty 
and design of the universe. There must be a non-material, non-corporeal or 
intelligent principle which he called Nous, responsible for the order and 
purpose of the universe. The Nous is a teleological or purposive principle 
which animates all living beings; men, animals, plants. It is essentially the 
ground of all motion. Its function is not to create the world but to organize it 
into an ordered and purposive whole. 
ri 
(a) Sophists 
The Sophists were not a school of philosophers like Pythagoreans or 
Eleatics. They were not interested in metaphysical, ontological or cosmological 
questions. Their interests were rather practical. Originally, the term `Sophist' 
meant a wise and skillful man. Later on, it came to be applied to the 
professional teachers who travelled about teaching youngmen the art of 
thinking and speaking and preparing them for political life. In course of time, 
`Sophist' became a term of reproach both because they charged fees for their 
instructions and advanced highly radical epistemological, ethical and political 
views (Frank Thilly: A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, 
Allahabad, 1985, p. 55). 
In view of the great diversity of philosophical theories and intense 
disagreement between and within various schools of philosophy, Sophists' 
attention was directed to finding the cause thereof. They came to the 
conclusion that philosophical disagreement emerged and remained 
inconclusive because human faculties of understanding were incommensurable 
to the ineffability and profundity of philosophical problems. Philosophers are 
involved in widespread disagreement because human reason cannot penetrate 
to the reality of the universe even if there is one. Gorgias (483-375 B.C.) 
famously expounded that: 
(i) There is no reality whatsoever at all 
(ii) Even if there is reality, it cannot be known, and 
(iii) Even if we can know the reality, it cannot be communicated to others 
(Y. Masih: A Critical History of Western Philosophy: MotilalBanarsidas 
Publishers, Delhi, 2010, p. 34) . 
Sophists pointed out that philosophers variously accepted water, air, fire, 
earth, etc. to be the ultimate stuff of reality. One philosopher deems change to 
be impossible and another one rebuts that there is nothing but change. The all-
pervasive, perennial and radical philosophical disagreement persuades Sophists 
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to conclude that human mind isincapable of resolving the riddle of the 
universe.While human mind cannot deliver us universal, eternal and 
transcendental propositions, whatever knowledge we do have is relative to the 
capability, and direction of our mind. Knowledge depends upon the particular 
knower. What seems true to him is true for him. There is no objective truth. We 
cannot but have our subjective opinions. Protagoras brought out the crux of the 
sophistical philosophical position when he said "Man is the measure of all 
things" (Frank Thilly, op.cit. p. 57). Each individual man is the standard of 
what is true to himself. What seems true to me is true for me. What seems true 
to you is true for you. There is no objective truth, no truth independent of the 
individual subject. Knowledge is so much related to the knower that all 
opinions can be declared to be equally true or equally false. It amounts to a 
declaration that knowledge is impossible. If there is no objective truth, there 
cannot be any knowledge as well (W.T. Stace; A Critical History of Greek 
Philosophy; Khosla Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003, p. 116). 
The subjectivistic and relativistic account of knowledge advanced by 
Sophists led to their subjectivistic and relativistic account of morality as well. 
If it is impossible to have any objective knowledge, it is simultaneously 
impossible to have any knowledge of right and wrong. Just as conflicting 
accounts of reality and truth led Sophists to deny any account of objective 
knowledge, so conflicting customs, morals and traditions led them to question 
the validity of any absolute or objective standards of conduct. If there can be no 
objective account of morals then what seems right to each man is right for him. 
Whatever I think right is right for me. Whatever you think right is right for you. 
Similarly, there cannot be any objective laws or principles of governance. The 
laws of the State can be founded upon nothing except force, custom and 
convention. If there can be no objective laws, all talk of just and good laws is 
meaningless. There is only one law which prevails and that is law of force. 
Sophists were the first western thinkers who preached the doctrine that might is 
right (W.T. Stace, op.cit., p. 119). 
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(b) Socrates 
Socrates, a fifth century B.C. Greek philosopher, is considered to be one 
of the wisest men of history. Socrates was not attracted to large, wide and deep 
metaphysical, ontological and cosmological questions. He was not interested 
either in explaining the nature of Ultimate Reality or in figuring out the origin 
of the world. Such problems seemed to him to be finally irresolvable and 
therefore futile (Frank Thilly: op.cit., p. 68). However, he was profoundly 
concerned with questions pertaining to man. He was especially interested in 
taking up an analysis of the nature of ethical values and human duties. 
However, his perspective on values and duties was diametrically opposite to 
the ethical views of his contemporaries — the Sophists. In fact his philosophical 
analysis and ethical perspective were formulated as a critique of the 
subjectivistic and relativistic views advanced and underlined by Sophists. 
Socrates who's ethical teachings were founded upon his theory of knowledge, 
also offered his epistemological viewpoint in unqualified opposition to the 
epistemological views of Sophists. The Sophists had founded knowledge upon 
perception. Such an assumption militated against any possibility of arriving at 
objective standards of truth. Socrates attempted to found knowledge upon 
reason with a view to restoring the objectivity of truth. Socrates advances the 
view that all knowledge is knowledge through concepts, thus making reason 
the source of knowledge. 
By identifying knowledge with concepts and by making reason the 
organ of knowledge, Socrates was restoring the belief in objective truth. Such a 
truth was universally valid and universally binding as well. Socrates tried to 
work out the definitions of Knowledge, Truth, Beauty, Man etc., with a view to 
setting objective standards or criteria. By the process of fixing definitions we 
can attain objective standards of truth. For example, by working out a 
definition of the triangle we can compare any geometrical figure with that 
definition and understand or know which figure is triangular and which is not. 
Similarly, we can work out the definition of man and by comparison declare 
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who is a man and who is not. It can not be, as held by Sophists that any 
geometrical figure we deemed to be triangle is triangle and any object we 
declare to be man is man. Similarly we can work out a definition of virtue and 
then by comparison come to understand which act is virtuous and which is not. 
It cannot be that whatever act we choose to call virtuous is virtuous. 
Knowledge means knowledge of things as they objectively are. Knowledge is 
independent of individual or subjective impressions. 
Socratic theory of knowledge was oriented to practical ends. His central 
concern was to know what virtue is with a view to practicing virtuous life. 
Socrates came to believe and advocate that knowledge is virtue. We cannot 
lead virtuous life if we do not correctly understand or know the concept of 
virtue. A person who has no knowledge of virtue can notbe virtuous and a 
person who possess knowledge of virtue cannot do anything vicious. 
(c) Plato 
Plato's epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and political theories were 
in continuation with Socratic critique of Sophists and in accordance with the 
teachings or beliefs and values advanced by Socrates. He did not accept the 
epistemological, metaphysical and ethical views underlined by Sophists. To 
begin with, he discards the epistemological theory advanced by Sophists. 
Knowledge as Sophists held is not perception, for perception yields 
contradictory impressions. The assumption that knowledge is perception 
destroys the objectivity of truth. Furthermore, perception can not be accepted 
as a source of knowledge for in that case we will have to accept the perception 
of a child, of an idiot and of an animal to be equally valid with the perception 
of an outstanding scientist or scholar. More importantly, there is no such thing 
as pure perception. If we take any perceptual statement such as "this paper is 
white' or "that rose is red" etc., we shall find that even in such basic 
perceptions there are non-perceptual or rational components. In such 
statements, we already distinguish the entity `paper' from all other entities 
which are not `paper' and the entity `rose' from all other entities which are not 
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`rose' as well as colour white from non-white colours and the colour red from 
non-red colour. Making distinctions between these various entities are 
operations carried out by reason. Before the execution of any so called 
perceptual operation, there are several rational operations to be undertaken 
thereof. Perception assumes and entails, the ideas of identity and difference 
which are the contribution of the intellect rather than the senses. Even the 
simplest acts of knowledge are directed by or oriented to reason. Knowledge is 
also not opinion for any opinion may turn out to be true by chance and we may 
not be having appropriate justificatory grounds for an opinion. 
Following Socrates, Plato declares that all knowledge is knowledge 
through concepts. The concepts are permanent and not liable to mutation or 
revocation according to the subjective impressions of the individual. Concepts 
provide us objective truth and since reason is the faculty of concepts it means 
knowledge is founded on reason, Concepts, for Plato, are not merely ideas in 
the mind but have a reality of their own outside and independent of mind. Truth 
means the correspondence of one's ideas with the facts of existence. While, 
sense-perceptions are devoid of any reality, concepts are true, real and 
independent of subjective or individual impressions. While our senses furnish 
us, for example, the knowledge of individual or particular horses, our reason 
provides us the concept of the horse in general. For Plato, the individual or 
particular horses perceived by the senses have no reality of their own.This and 
that particular horse have no true being. Reality belongs only to the idea of the 
horse in general. Similarly, it is the intellect which furnishes us an 
understanding of such ideas or concepts as beauty, truth, justice, goodness, 
knowledge etc. For example, the idea of beauty is objectively, universally, 
eternally and transcendentally true and real whereas the beautiful objects such 
as a scenery or a rose or moonlight or a human face perceived by the - senses are 
particular instances of the idea of beauty and have no permanent objective, 
universal and transcendental reality of their own. They are beautiful in 
proportion to their extent of participation in the idea of beauty as such. The 
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idea of beauty is formed by including what is common to all beautiful objects 
and excluding those points in which they differ. 
Thus, for Plato, Concepts or Ideas are ultimately real and absolutely 
objective realities. All else can be explained by recourse to ultimate absolute 
and objective Ideas. These Ideas are substances. They are universal. They are 
objective thought which have reality on their own account, independently of 
any mind. Each class of objects have one Idea or we can say, each Idea is a 
unity. Furthermore, Ideas are immutable and imperishable. They are the 
essences of all things. Each Idea is, in its own kind, an absolute perfection. 
These Ideas are outside space and time. They are rational, that is to say, they 
are apprehended through reason (W.T. Stace; op.cit., pp. 177-90) . 
Plato's approach to religion emanates out of his critique of the 
mythological and superstitious character of the popular religion of his times. 
The basic contention of Plato's critique of popular religion was that this 
religion is devoid of any rational basis. It was mostly supported by priests and 
poets who did not offer any reasons in support of their beliefs. This mythical 
religion also fails to provide a true and adequate account of God. The mythical 
accounts of the popular religion show Gods to be engaging in all kinds of 
dubious behaviours. The poets and priests advance a childishly 
anthropomorphic account of God. The job of the philosopher is to debunk these 
mythological and anthropomorphic accounts of God. The philosopher has to 
demythologise the traditional theology and replace it by a true rational 
theology. A true religion has to be based upon rational convictions and beliefs. 
The job of the philosopher is also to bring out the limitations of materialistic, 
mechanistic and atheistic explanations and interpretations of the universe. He 
has to demonstrate that the world is an effect of an intelligible cause or of a 
principle. The job of the philosopher are also to bring out or illuminate the 
teleological character of the universe. He has also to provide an adequate 
V 
	
	 account of the Divinity. `Water', `air' and `fire' cannot be said to be the 
teleological principles or causes of the world. The basic stuff out of which the 
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world might have emanated or evolved can also not be said to be divine. For 
Plato, it is rather the immutable, eternal, universal objects of pure intelligence, 
the Forms -- that are divine in the strict sense. The totality of the intelligible 
Forms togather with the Supreme Intelligence that contemplates the Forms, 
makes of the divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the undissolable, the ternally 
identical realm. Furthermore, the Form of the Good upon which all the other 
intelligible realities depend, is the quintessence of Divinity. The Form of Good 
is Goodness itself, Being itself, Justice itself. It is not a member of the class of 
good things or the class of beings; rather it is that by which things are good, 
existent, just and so on. We can say that the Form of Good transcends existence 
in goodness, for that which is the principle of existence in goodness cannot 
itself be called existent or good. Again for Plato, the Form of Good is 
mysterious not because of any obscurity or unintelligibility attached to it but 
rather through its own excess of intelligibility. Just as we cannot look directly 
to Sun which is the source of the light by which we see other things, so also we 
cannot look directly at the source of intelligibility by which we understand 
everything else. Thus, according to Plato the Divine is not discontinuous with 
the rational order. The mysteriousness of the Divine is derived from an excess 
of intelligibility rather than from a break with the intelligible order. It is by 
carrying through the activity of intelligence to its ultimate limit or highest point 
that we reach the Divine. The philosophical ascent of the mind from the 
material world to the intelligible world is also at the same time a religious 
ascent. The Divine order and the rational order are coterminous and the 
universe is rational and good in so far as God's rational nature and goodness 
are imparted to it; it is irrational and bad in so far as God's rational nature and 
goodness are not wholly imparted to it. 
Plato's religion is philosophical or dependent upon philosophy. It is 
elitist in so far as only highly gifted intellectuals can understand it or arrive at 
it. On the other hand, the mythical religion is irrational and so is suitable only 
to the ignorant people who cannot rise above the world of dreams and illusions. 
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(d) Aristotle 
Aristotle is one of the greatest scholars, philosophers and scientists of 
human history. His impact on the development of religious, ethical, social, 
political and scientific thought has been phenomenal. He has been a source of 
inspiration for scholars and thinkers for the last twenty-three centuries. 
He was an ardent disciple of Plato and stayed with Plato at his Academy 
for a period of twenty years. So the problems of his philosophy and the 
concerns of his scholarship were powerfully directed by Plato's philosophical 
world-view and value-system. In his philosophical investigations, Aristotle 
started with the foundations laid by Plato. However, he attempted to overcome 
the difficulties and inconsistencies characterizing Plato's philosophical system. 
To begin with Aristotle could not accept Plato's absolute compartmentalization 
between the transcendental world of ideas and the actual world of experience, 
deeming former to be absolutely real and latter to be merely an appearance or 
imitation. 
Plato does not explain the existence of things. He does not explain the 
relation of ideas to things. Plato cannot also account for the motion of things; 
the world of change, life and becoming. The ideas of Plato are nothing but 
hypostatized sense of things according to Aristotle. As anthropomorphic Gods 
are nothing but deified men, so the Ideas are nothing but eternalized things of 
nature. Things are not copies of Ideas but in fact the Ideas are only copies of 
things. Ideas as essences of things cannot exist outside the things themselves. 
The starting point or the fundamental principle of Aristotle's own philosophy is 
that Ideas or essences or universals do exist only in particular objects. Thus, 
Aristotle retains the changeness eternal forms but rejects their transcendency. 
Forms or Universals are not apart from things, but inherent in them. They are 
not transcendent but immanent. Ideas and objects are not separate but eternally 
together. Individual things are constituted by the combination of matter and 
form. They move, change, grow or evolve under the control and direction of 
their forms. The phenomenal world is the real world; it's not a mere imitation 
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or shadow of the world of Ideas. It is not an appearance but a reality as matter 
is inseparable from its form and is co-existent with it. Matter assumes different 
forms. Form realizes itself in the thing, it causes the thing to move and to 
realize an end or purpose. Forms are purposive forces which realize themselves 
in the world of matter. Motion or change is explained in the union of form and 
matter. The Idea or Form is what causes motion in matter. The Idea operates as 
the mover and the matter cooperates as the moved. The eternally ongoing 
motion is the result of matter,ceaselessly striving to realize the Form. This 
eternal motion presupposes an eternal Unmoved Mover, a source or force of 
movement to which all motions can be traced but is not itself moved by 
anything. As there are unending series of motions, there has got to be the First 
Cause of series of motions, an Unmoved Mover or God. This argument from 
motion to Unmoved Mover is the first version of the cosmological argument 
for the existence of God. As the Unmoved Mover or God is the Final Cause of 
all that is and all that happens, He is the Highest Purpose or Highest Good of 
the world. He is the Directing Principle of the world. He is the goal towards 
which all things strive. He is the Principle which accounts for all order, beauty 
and life in the universe. He is the Pure Form. He is thought thinking thought. 
He is the Absolute Form (Samuel Enoch Stumpf; Socrates to Sartre, McGraw 
Hill Inc, New York, pp. 88-95) . 
(B) JUDEAU-CHRISTIAN THINKERS: 
(a) Philo 
Philo of Alexandria (30 BC — 50 AD) was a Jew and a senior 
contemporary of Christ. He was devoutly Jew and also an ardent fan of Greek 
philosophy. He attempted a synthesis between Judaism and Christianity. Philo 
saw the Greek philosophy as hinting obscurely at truths that were more fully 
and explicitly made known in Old Testament. He sharply distinguished 
between the truths revealed by God through Moses and the truths attained by 
human wisdom; the revealed truths being higher than philosophical truths and 
yet revealed truths being continuous with philosophical wisdom. Philosophy 
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can serve religion by discerning and explicating the true meaning of scriptural 
allegories. Another crucial job of philosophy can be defending religion in the 
face of skeptical attacks. Besides, philosophy can also find rational proof for 
the existence of God. 
The underlying assumption of Philo's philosophy of religion is that there 
cannot be any contradiction between the Law of Moses and philosophy for 
philosophical wisdom and divine wisdom emanate from the same God. They 
had this strong a priori conviction that apparently conflicting claims of 
revelation and reason can be harmoniously reconciled with one another. 
Scriptural texts or passages have both a literal and an allegorical meaning. If 
any passage of a religious text is not in accord with truth or spells 
anthropomorphic attributions to God or violates the dignity of Divine Wisdom, 
it need not be taken literally but understood and interpreted allegorically (H.A. 
Wolfson: Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam; Cambridge, Mass, 1948, vol. I, p. 116). The true meaning of 
scripture is that which is in accord with truths of human reason. The allegorical 
method may not tell us positively what the true sense of any scriptural text 
actually is but it does at least tell us negatively what the true sense is not. 
Philosophy can be allegorically and hermeneutically instrumental in resolving 
the apparent textual problems pertaining to the truth of religion. 
(b) Justin Martyr 
Justin Martyr is the second century Christian scholar and philosopher. 
He was deeply drunk into Greek philosophy. He was convinced of the 
fundamental harmony between Platonism and Christianity. He also saw Christ 
as the universal Logos or Reason in which human reason in its various modes 
participates. This Logos is the sole source of all man's knowledge of Divine 
things. It is also the one who in Christ made himself wholly known to 
believers. In Christ is incarnated the Truth in its full and definitive form. The 
philosopher can know this Truth only within the limited capacities of his 
rational investigations (Norris: 1965, 53). 
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(c) Clement 
Like Martyr, the third century Christian apologist, Clement of 
Alexandria, underscores the harmony between Greek philosophy and Christian 
faith. The partial intuitions of Platonism are fully worked out and realized in 
Christianity. Philosophical understanding and analysis prepare us for a fuller 
realization and appropriation of faith. Religion is anchored on faith for 
Christian doctrine can not be rationally demonstrated. However, it should not 
signify that religious faith or revealatory truths are irrational or blind. We 
believe in revealatory truth on the authority of God who is the Primal Truth. 
Reason is not the creation of devil but creation of God. Reason is the image of 
God in man. It is man's highest and noblest attribute. In view of the fact that 
faith can not be rationally demonstrated, knowledge is superior to faith. 
However, faith will give way to highest knowledge or gnosis in the life 
hereafter. 
(d) Origen 
Origen was a Christian thinker of third century. Educated at Alexandria, 
he was a master of Greek philosophical disciplines. He was well versed ' in 
Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophies. He was a biblical exegete and an 
outstanding hermeneutician of scriptural narratives. According to Origen, faith 
is laid down by the Apostles and the Church. However, they do not provide the 
rational ground presupposed by the articles of faith. The role of the theologian 
is to furnish the rational ground of presuppositions of faith. Reason is capable 
of defending faith and providing adequate grounds justifying the core articles 
and dogmas of religion. However, religion is radically distinctive from 
philosophical or scientific research and it is beyond the Ken of human reason to 
appreciate the real nature of God. God can be understood only by His grace. A 
highly distinguished or outstanding philosopher may find certain genuine clues 
with a view to appropriating God. However, common people can appropriate 
God through their faith and His grace. The God of faith is available to 
philosophers as well as non philosophers. It shows the superiority of the Divine 
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Logos of Christianity to the human Logos of philosophy. Only theological 
reflection can furnish us knowledge of God. However, we have to be aware of 
the distinction between the literal and allegorical meaning of the scriptural 
texts. Scriptural passages have obvious as well as hidden meanings. Behind the 
contents of Scriptures are certain divine mysteries. We need to distinguish 
between the apparent and real meaning of scriptural passage. Origen applies 
allegorical method and more often than not explains various scriptural passages 
by recourse to non-literal interpretation. 
(d) Augustine 
Augustine has also dwelt on the relationship of faith and reason. We 
could not believe unless we have rational powers. Reason can persuade the 
mind to rise to faith. Reason also seeks to understand what is believed by faith. 
If faith precedes reason in the case of certain great questions which can not be 
understood, there cannot be the least doubt that reason which persuades us that 
faith precedes reason, itself precedes faith. Unless we believe we cannot 
understand and unless we understand we cannot believe. Faith and reason are 
interdependent rather than contradicting each other. Augustine tries to 
demonstrate the existence of God by recourse to rational arguments and 
advocates that faith in God can be rationally justified. 
Soul, according to Augustine, plays an all-important role in the 
cultivation and attainment of knowledge. Soul is the locus of knowledge. Our 
bodily perceptions are a function of the impressions generated by the soul. The 
impressions and perceptions are subsumed by soul under concepts. The 
concepts of soul correspond to PIatonic Forms. These Platonic Forms are 
thoughts in the Mind of God. These Forms as Thoughts in the Mind of God 
have an objective existence. Human knowledge is an ongoing process and 
progress. In our quest for knowledge, we start with lower forms of knowledge 
and graduate to higher forms of knowledge. The pinnacle of human knowledge 
is our realization of God (Edward, 1967, vol. III, 15). 
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In the final analysis, truth is objective rather than subjective., It has a 
compelling and commanding character. It is independent of human projections 
and interpretations. The ultimate source of truth is God (Frank Thilly: op.cit., 
pp. 148-149) . 
(1 Auselm 
St. Auselm (1033-1109) was a theological rationalist of considerable 
sophistication. For him the doctrines of Christianity have got to be anchored on 
faith. However, they could in principle be rationally demonstrated by necessary 
arguments. The rational proofs of the existence of the God can not become the 
ground of the Christian's faith in God, they could be the logical ground of 
belief for the non-believer. Rational proofs can confirm what we already know 
by faith. However, they indicate the possibility of developing a systematic 
natural theology as well. 
For Anselm, our general concepts are real. The Universal Essences do 
not depend on our mind for their existence. All individual instances of a class 
share some common nature or identity. The Universals signify common nature 
of individual objects. They are also general concepts in our minds. They are 
objective for they eternally exists in the Divine Intellect. Our perceptual 
r 
	 knowledge is the basis of our rational knowledge. It is human reason which can 
understand the nature of universals. The universals have an existence 
independent of human minds. They have an objective existence (B.A.G. Fuller: 
A History of Philosophy, McMilan, 1976, p. 371) . 
Anselm advanced the ontological proof for the existence of God. He 
argued that our idea of God is an idea of an absolutely Perfect Being. God as 
Absolute Perfection must necessarily be an existent Being. A Perfect Being 
greater than which nothing can be thought must necessarily be of an existing 
being. A Perfect Being cannot lack existence. By advancing the ontological 
argument for the existence of God, Anselm attempted to prove Him by 11 
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recourse to rational demonstration (Y. Masih: A Critical History of Western 
Philosophy, Motilal Banarasidas Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Delhi, 2010, P.  156-57) 
(g) Abelard 
Peter Abelard's (1079-1142), Christian theologian and thinker, brings 
out the functions of reason with respect of faith: firstly, reason helps in 
understanding of the meaning of Scripture; secondly, it helps in refuting the 
objections of philosophers to faith; and, thirdly, it gives rational support to 
what is believed on God's authority. Abelard points out that God exceeds what 
can come under human discussion. He is beyond the powers of human 
intelligence. He is not accessible to human arguments or definable_ in human 
linguistic categories (J.R. McCallum: Abelard's Christian Theology, Oxford, 
1948, p. -68) . In view of the same, without denying the relevance and 
meaningfulness of rational arguments with regard to faith, Abelard underscores 
that faith has no merit in the eyes of God if it rests on human arguments rather 
than divine authority. Faith has to rest on Biblical revelations and declarations 
of Apostles rather than human arguments. While rational arguments and proofs 
can be supportive of Christian doctrines, they can never be necessarily 
demonstrative of the articles of faith. 
Revelation, according to Abelard, accords with reason. He underlines 
that theologians must be deeply grounded in the use of logical methods. 
Reason, according to Abelard, precedes faith. However, religious dogmas can 
not be confirmed by recourse to strict logical proofs, In the final analysis, we 
have to appropriate them through our free will. The believers, according to 
Abelard, are entitled to carry out deep reflection on and profound analysis of 
religious beliefs. In case, our rational analysis or reflection fails to arrest our 
skepticism, we must appropriate religious dogmos by recourse to faith (Frank 
Thilly: op.cit., p. 173) . 
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(h) Maimonides 
Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) also recognizes the transcendence of 
the realm of the faith with respect to that of philosophical reason and yet he 
acknowledges the possibility of rational demonstration of religious doctrines. 
There can not be conclusive demonstration for articles of faith; so however, 
cannot be any conclusive demonstration of philosophical . doctrines 
accomplished. One way of defending the doctrines of religion is to demonstrate 
the logical possibility of the falsehood of philosophical doctrines or show their 
logical unnecessity. The role of philosophy is to show that revelatory teachings 
are not impossible. Philosophy is not concerned to establish the positive 
possibility of the truths of faith. Maimonides also underscores the need for 
distinguishing between the apparent meaning of Scripture and its `spiritual' 
meaning (David Cooper: World Philosophies; Second edition, Blackwell, 
2003). 
(i) Aquinas 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) attempted synthesis of Christian philosophy 
and Greek philosophy. He was a philosophical theologian caught on the horns 
of a dilemma; pushed by challenges of reason and pulled by imperatives of 
revelation. He was categorical in his understanding that religious doctrines are 
not amenable to rational justification. He also distinguished between the 
ineffable reality of God and human understanding of God. To Aquinas, God 
was essentially inaccessible to the human mind: 
"Hence in the last resort all that man knows of God is to 
know that he does not know Him, since he knows that what 
God is surpasses all that we can understand him" (Karen 
Armstrong: A History of God; Ballantian Books, New York, 
1993, p. 294), 
However, as a philosophical theologian, Aquinas' tried to articulate 
Christianity through rational arguments. An excessive philosophical treatment 
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of religion may be damaging to faith. However, excessive fideism can also 
easily degenerate into indefensible obscurantism. In view of the same, Aquinas 
five proofs for God's existence are: 
(i) Movement ultimately impling a Prime Mover. 
(ii) Causes entailing an Uncaused Cause, 
(iii) Contingent beings demanding the existence of a Necessary Being, 
(iv) Less imperfect implying more perfect Beings and finally the Most 
Perfect Being, 
(v) The order and purpose in the universe necessitating the Ultimate 
Designer (Ibid.,, op.cit., pp. 205-206). 
(j) Duns Scouts 
John Duns Scouts (1274-1308) made sharp distinction between natural 
theology based on reason and revealed theology based on faith. Such a 
distinction was underlined by Scouts with a view to safeguarding Biblical 
dogmas or doctrines from unwarranted and unacceptable intrusons of reason. 
The Biblical doctrines or dogmos needed to be appropriated on faith as reason 
was incapable of dealing with the mysteries of religion. The abiding doctrines 
or dogmas of religion such as God, Predestination, Immortality of Soul, 
Creation ex nihilo, Purpose of the Creation, Incarnation etc. can never be 
appropriated on rational grounds. The proofs for the existence of God might, at 
best, prove the existence of God but they can never demonstrate the personality 
of God. Similarly, reason cannot understand the doctrine of creation, the 
universe having emerged out of the free will of God with the purpose of human 
beings reaching the final end of beatitude. It is only faith that can sustain a 
man's acceptance of or absent to religious dogmas. Reason can furnish us 
scientific and mathematical certainty which is basically propositional or 
theoretical. However, theological certainty is practical. 
Instead of being a rationalist Scouts was a voluntarist. He regards Will 
superior to Intellect. The Intellect presents choices before the Will. The Will 
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has full freedom to accept or reject any choice. The intellect is the precondition 
to the Will but is not determined by the intellect. It is through exercise of free 
will that we chose to believe in God and abide by His commandments. Through 
intellect we can, at best, contemplate God. However, Will through love can unit 
us with God. Intellect can never overcome the dualism of the worshipper and 
God. It is through love or Will that we can attain to mystical union with God. 
Faith, hope and love are the real gifts of divine grace (Y. Masih, op.cit., pp. 
172-75). 
(k) William of Ockham 
William of Ockham (1280-1347) was a 14th century English priest and 
theologian. He was a radical nominalist and is credited with a principle known 
as `Ockham's razar'. It means that entities are not to be multiplied without 
necessity. It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer, Ockham was 
an empiricist and accepted the necessary truth of deductive reasoning. 
However, human knowledge is basically anchored on sense experience. 
Therefore our knowledge has to remain confined to the world of particulars. 
We cannot have any knowledge with regard to the transcendent entities.We 
cannot have any demonstrative knowledge of God. By recourse to an 
examination of the phenomenal objects of the world, we can at the most have 
only probable knowledge of God. The Biblical doctrines or dogmas are neither 
defensible nor intelligible by reason. The religious dogmas can be appropriated 
only on the basis of revelation (Y. Masih, op.cit., p. 176). 
(C) MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS 
(a) Descartes 
Rene Descartes(1596-1650) is widely regarded as the father of Modern 
Western philosophy. He was an advocate of radical rationalism in European 
philosophy. His philosophical project was inspired in contradistinction to 
Medieval European metaphysical and theological polemics and apologetics. He 
was fascinated by clarity and certainty of mathematical propositions and 
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accordingly attempted the application of mathematical method with a view to 
achieving clarity in his philosophical deductions and conclusions. He thought 
philosophical disagreements can be dissolved if philosophy is anchored on 
mathematical method. In his quest for philosophical results which are 
indefeasible and beyond all possible doubts, he prefaced his philosophical 
system by his famous method of doubt. He doubted everything till he reached 
clear and self-evident results (Joseph Burgess: Introduction to History of 
Philosophy, McGraw Hill Book Company, London, 1939, p. 199). His method 
of doubt aspired for certainty of knowledge, unfalsifiable results and complete 
truth (Paul Edward (ed), op.cit., p. 17). 
Descartes was a rationalist who regarded reason to be primary source of 
knowledge. The most reliable knowledge is not arrived at by recourse to sense-
experience. It has to rest on innate ideas which we are born with. The axioms 
of mathematics, the laws of thought etc. are such innate ideas which are neither 
produced by mind nor inspired by external objects. Our own self is revealed to 
us by method of doubt, the idea of perfection necessitates the existence of 
Perfect Being and God's absolute trustworthiness entails the reality of external 
world. God exists and exists necessarily. The external world is also real and not 
an illusion. The Perfection of God implies that as the Creator of the universe he 
could not have deceived us. The physical world, thus, is not a magic but an 
objective reality (Ibid., p. 17). Descartes believed in the capacity of reason to 
know all things. From his method of doubt he gets the criterion and from the 
criterion he establishes the existence of God. From the veracity of God he 
establishes the reality of external world, the permanent self and knowledge. 
(b) Pascal 
Pascal (1623-62), a French philosopher has advanced deep, profound 
and insightful considerations with regard to role and relation of reason to 
religion. He has tried to expose the limitations and even dangers of philosophy 
and reason in the domain of religion. The fundamental argument advanced by 
Pascal is that man is a finite creature and a nonentity in comparison to the 
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Infinite God. As a finite being he can understand what is finite and what is 
infinite is beyond his comprehension. The origin and the destiny of the cosmos 
are impenetrably hidden form his observations, calculations and deductions. He 
cannot understand his own origin or appreciate the Infinite he is votexed into. 
The unbridgeable chasm between man and God cannot be overcome by finite 
human reason. Our inability to have any natural, rational knowledge of God is 
rooted in our ontological finitude. The supernatural order is excluded from our 
purview by our very ontological condition. Even if reason can admit the 
possibility of a suprarational and supernatural, it can never show whether such 
a possibility is actually realized; for there is no common ground or affinity 
between the rational and suprarational or between the natural or supernatural 
orders. God isInfiniteand Incomprehensible. We can never be capable of 
Knowing His Nature or Existence. Whether God exists or not is the most 
baffiling and perplexing question for us. It is impossible to take sides in such 
an infinite and perennial debate. Reason here is literally and figuratively on the 
horns of an infinite dilemma. Such a dilernmaic situation leads Pascal to 
advance his famous wajer. If we cannot decide about the actuality of God's 
existence we must calculate the advantages and disadvantages of our 
affirmative or negative responses and stances in this regard. Pascal suggests 
that the respective possible consequences of our belief or disbelief in God's 
existence are very high. Therefore, it is better to believe rather than disbelieve. 
We cannot do anything in this regard for human reason can arrive at 
blunderous conclusions even with regard to mundane matters. It's possible 
blundrous with regard to metaphysical or teleological interpretations which can 
not even be dreamt of by us. The natural order we are living in is radically 
ambiguous about God's existence. It does not provide an unequivocal 
affirmation or negation so that we could take sides in the God-debate. God's 
Existence as well as Non-Existence are beyond human comprehension. 
Furthermore, our epistemological limitations in conjunction with our moral 
limitations, make the appropriation of God of Christianity all the more difficult. 
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There is lot of wishful thinking with regard to our conceptual or definitional 
accounts of God. 
Even if there were cogent reasons or proofs for the existence of God, 
they would never prove God of the Bible. Objective reasons or proofs will 
necessarily furnish us with the remote, abstract and impersonal God. Pascal 
underlines that it is not the job of reason to understand God. It is rather the 
assignment of the heart to experience God. God understood by recourse to 
reason does not constitute Christian faith. Faith signifies belief in God 
appropriated by the feeling of our heart. Religious faith signifies a personal 
commitment to God. It involves a direct experiential contact with God. The 
reasons of heart are not known to reason (David Cooper: World Philosophers, 
Blackwell, 2003, pp. 254-57). Human heart can have a direct intuitive and 
personal knowledge of God as against the inferential and impersonal rational 
knowledge. In fact reason can have a critical estimate of its' own powers and 
can appreciate its limits. This self-abnegating function of reason is 
indispensable to religious faith. Reason while appreciating its own limits does 
allow space for revelation and faith. 
(c) Hume 
David Hume (1711-1776) was a radical empiricist, his empiricism 
ultimately culminating into wholesale skepticism. He did not accept the 
assumptions of rationalist epistemology and underscored the primacy of sense 
experience in our quest for attainment of knowledge. By recourse to empiricist 
epistemology, Hume derived radical conclusions. He was a thoroughgoing 
empiricist. Refuting all a priori principles, Hume advocated that the content of 
mind is wholly the product of sense-experience or perception. These sense-
experiences or perceptions do not provide us any knowledge of substance 
whether material or spiritual. The sense experiences can provide us only 
probable knowledge. In keeping with the sources and conditions of knowledge, 
human beings are destined to arrive at probable knowledge only. The 
philosopher's search for certainty is both mistaken and misleading. 
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The knowledge of Substance is beyond human appropriation. Substance 
is an ideal fiction of imagination. The so-called substance is derived neither 
from sense-experience nor from any other mode of reflection. A Substance as 
understood by philosophers is an unintelligible chimra. Hume accepts 
Berekelay's refutation of material Substance. However, in his turn, he 
vigorously refutes the notion of spiritual Substance as well. Hume argued that 
there are no impressions or sense experiences from which the idea of a 
permanent Soul-Substance or self can be derived. The identity of the self is 
purely fictitious. The fiction of personal identity is a work of imagination. The 
subject, self or mind for Hume, is just a construct of sensations. It is nothing 
but a heap or collection of passing sensations. Whenever we try to enter what 
we call ourselves, we always stumble or some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love on hatred, pain or pleasure. We can never 
catch ourselves at any time without a perception and never can observe 
anything but the perception. 
Similarly, Hume underlines that `causal connection' or `causal relation' 
is also totally unwarranted. `A' may be a precedent and `B' may be a 
consequent. However, it is impossible to establish or discover any necessary 
connection between the two. We have no reasons for believing in a necessary 
and universal causal relationship. The notion of such a relationship is a 
function of habit, custom or need. There are no empirical grounds that can 
demonstratively prove our belief in a necessary causal connection. Empirically, 
we can always observe `A' preceeding `B' or `B' following `A'. However, we 
can never demonstrate that whenever `A' then `B' (Y. Masih: op.cit., pp. 322-
24) . 
The inductive generalizations are also not anchored on any necessary 
grounds. Empirically we can observe repeatedly that `A' is `B', `A' is `B', `A' 
is 'B'... etc. However, we can never have any necessary grounds for 
generalizing that all `A's are `B's'. All human enquiry is comprised of (i) 
relations of ideas and (ii) matters of facts. The mathematical propositions are 
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demonstrated as relations of ideas whereas scientific propositions are examples 
of matters of facts. The counterpropositions to mathematically established 
propositions can spell contradictions. On the other hand, the counter- 
propositions to scientific propositions do not spell any contradictions. Besides 
relations of ideas and matters of fact, there are metaphysical, theological and 
other such propositions which, logically and methodologically speaking cari 
contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. However, fortunately enough, we 
are guided by principle of custom and habit in establishing our 'inferential 
relationships. All human inferences are effects of custom and not of reasoning: 
We are guided by custom in the highways and byways of life. It is the custom  
that orientates us to expect similar results or conclusions from similar 
operations. Epistemologically speaking, we are condemned to skepticism[ 
There have no rational grounds for such notions as substance, causality or 
induction. 
Hume's philosophy of religion is radically agnostic. While being 
religious, Hume thinks, we are quite beyond the reach of our faculties. Faith 
entails a total suspension of judgement. A man of faith has to be conscious of 
continuous miracle in his own person. Only a miracle can give a man of faith 
the determination to believe what is contrary to reason and experience. 
(d) Kant 
Kant (1723-1804) is one of the greatest philosophers of all time and the 
most prominent among modern European thinkers. He was well versed in the 
mathematical and physical sciences of his time and was oriented to deep 
reflection on metaphysical, theological, epistemological and ethical questions 
raised by western philosophers since ancient Greeks. In his younger days Kant 
was orthodox Christian and an avide student and fervent follower of Liebniz. 
However, when he studied British empiricists especially David Hume, he 
awakened from his dogmatic slumber. His rationalist smugness 
complacency where radically undermined and he embarked on an architect( 
restatement of western philosophy. Pure rationalists seemed to him to 
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dogmatists and pure empiricists seemed to him to be weltering into 
unnecessary skepticism. His choicest philosophical project emerged to be the 
working out of grand reconciliation between dogtmatic rationalism and 
skeptical empiricism. Accordingly, he worked out his critical and 
transcendental philosophy. In his critique of rationalist dogmatism, he brought 
out the limits of the jurisdiction of pure reason and in his simultaneous critique 
of empiricist skepticism he advanced his transcendental method of doing 
philosophy pointing out the forms or ways in which the human mind by virtue 
of its constitution, reacts to our sensible experience. The transcendental forms 
of mind are not built up from experience or influenced by it but are a priori, i.e. 
existing independently of experience and prior to it, They are rather the agents 
by which experience is influenced and built up into the shape in which it is 
presented to us. The analysis and exposition of this transcendental 
epistemological standpoint became the driving force or mission of Kant's 
philosophy (B,A.G. Fuller: op.cit., p. 219). 
In his exposition of limitations of reason and transcendental powers of 
mind, Kant argued that all knowledge begins with experience but all 
knowledge does not arise out of experience. Our empirical knowledge .is, 
without doubt, received through impressions. However, it is supplied by our 
faculties of cognition. Our knowledge is not entirely a priori as maintained by 
rationalists nor entirely aposteriori as assumed by empiricists. It is a synthetic 
function of a priori and aposteriori factors. Sense experience provides us the 
matter of knowledge; the forms of knowledge are, however, supplied by 
reason. Knowledge is a joint processing of the operations of perception and 
understanding. Knowledge is always obtained through interaction of 
experience and reason. However, knowledge always appears in the form of 
judgements. Following the lead of Leibniz and Hume, Kant accepts that there 
are analytic apriorijudgements and synthetic aposteriorijudgements. The 
analytic a priori judgements are independent of experience and their predicate 
terms are always already contained in their subject term. Judgements such as 
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"All bachellors are unmarried" or "All triangles have three angles" can be 
understood without any reference to sense-experiential data and their predicate 
terms are already contained in their subject term. On the other hand, 
judgements such as "Oxygen helps in the burning of fire" or "Those roses are 
red" etc. are synthetic a posteriori judgements. They are ultimately verifiable 
by recourse to sense-experience or sense-experiential data and their predicate 
terms provide new information about their subject terms. Analytical 
judgements, according to Kant, are universal and necessary. They can not be 
derived from sense experience. On the other hand, synthetic judgments are 
contingent and probable. Their truth value is dependent upon experience. 
However, in addition to analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori judgements, 
Kant also postulates synthetic a priori judgments. These judgements are 
synthetic because their predicates state something about their subjects that is 
not already contained in them and that which is predicated is nevertheless 
necessarily true and universally valid (Y. Masih; op.cit., pp. 338-341). These 
judgements are synthetic because they depend upon observation and experience 
and they are a priori because they are universally and necessarily true. Such 
judgements as "7+5 = 12", "A straight line is the shortest distance between the 
two points", "Every event has a cause" are deemed by Kant to be the examples 
of synthetic apriori. The principles of natural sciences such as the law of the 
conservation of energy, law of universal gravitation or the laws of motion etc. 
are, according to Kant, synthetic a priori judgments. Scientific knowledge is 
possible because of this very possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. 
Mathematical proposition are possible because space and time are 
preconditions of all experience. Scientific laws as empirical propositions are 
possible because of the operations carried out by our categories of 
understanding on the raw material supplied by sense experience. In response to 
Hume's skepticism Kant tries to demonstrate how synthetic a priori 
propositions are possible and how they are synthetic, universal and necessary 
propositions. The universal and necessary character of these propositions is 
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determined by the structure of the mind itself. Locke and other British 
sensationalists had wrongly assumed mind to be an inert block of wax 
passively receiving and recording the impressions of sense-experience. As 
against both Continental rationalists and British empiricists, Kant held mind to 
be a creative, dynamic and active process. The mind is bestowed with certain 
innate forms with a view to ordering and interpreting the sense experiential 
data (J.G. Brennan: The Meaning of Philosophy, Harper and Row Publishers, 
London, 1953, pp. 142-43). The data supplied by sense experience are first 
oriented in space and time. Space and time, according to Kant, are forms of our 
intuition and have no objective existence independent of us. Space and time as 
forms of intuition impress themselves on all human experience. The 
coordination of experiential data in space and time preceeds their 
categorization by our understanding. Kant assumes human understanding to be 
possessing twelve innate forms or categories. Apart from other qualities, it is 
from these categories that our experience derives its universality and necessity. 
The universality and necessity of judgements are the products of the operations 
of the categories of the mind upon the stuff of experience. The perceptual and 
conceptual elements both make knowledge possible. While percepts are 
furnished by experience, the concepts, as Kant assumes, are formed by the 
internal structure of mind itself. In any act of knowledge, both perceptual and 
conceptual elements are indispensable. While "concepts without percepts are 
empty, percepts without concepts are blind". The advancement of the 
knowledge necessitates interpretation of percepts by concepts. Any concept 
formed without basis in sense-experience will be little better than fiction (ibid., 
pp. 143-44). Conceptual knowledge, according to Kant, is subjective as 
concepts are products of the categories of our mind.. Our percepts are derived 
from an objective external source, but they are organized by concepts which 
owe their nature to the structure of mind. In view of the same, our knowledge is 
unavoidably and inevitably coloured by our cognitive faculties. 
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The above summary of Kantian epistemology tantamounts to saying that 
we can never know the world as it is in itself. We can know the external world 
as it appears to our faculties of understanding and interpretation. Things as they 
are i.e. noumena, are unknowable and forever hidden from us. We know only 
the appearances or phenomena made available to us by the operation of the 
forms of mind upon the sense-experiential data. Our minds operate like 
ordering glasses. The world as an ordered, connected and rational whole is a 
function of our minds for it is through our mental lenses that the flux of the 
external world filters in an ordered way. Our mind is the source of space and 
time and the natural order as a whole. Rationalist and empiricist philosophers 
both had postulated external world to be dictating terms to human mind. Kant 
worked out an epistemological paradigm-shift. Kant complimented himself for 
having accomplished this paradigm-shift which he characterized to be a 
Copernican revolution in philosophy. Kant, to the best of his satisfaction, tried 
to demonstrate the possibility of human knowledge. However, he could not 
help accepting the impossibility of metaphysics, theology and psychology. The 
metaphysical claims with regard to self, universe and God were rationally 
inadmissible and unjustifiable. The so-called metaphysical, theological, 
cosmological and psychological truths attempted or worked out by pure reason, 
are nothing short of transcendental illusions. Pure reason, on its own, can 
germinate paradoxical and antinomical doctrines which are equally amenable 
to verification and falsification (Ibid. pp. 145-146). 
In view of the above considerations, Kant refuses to accept any of the 
classical proofs for the existence of God; ontological, cosmological and 
teleological. All attempts to prove the existence of God cosmologically or 
ontologically or teleologically do not add up to any proof for the existence of 
God. The ontological argument involves an illicit transition from the 
conceptual to the real order. The cosmological argument involves an illicit 
extension of the principle of causality beyond the world of experience. The 
teleological argument may prove that there is a designer or programmer who 
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manages the show but it does not prove God as such. However, Kant also 
underscores that pure human reason is fatally tempted to use understanding 
beyond all possible experience. This transcendent use of reason is all the more 
plausible with respect to the concept of God. He tries to expose the illusory 
character of this kind of reasoning and the deeply pathological structure of the 
illusion. The pure reason cannot advance even a shred of evidence for believing 
in the existence of God. Given the constitution of human mind, it is impossible 
for us to know God speculatively. We can neither affirm nor deny the existence 
of God because God is beyond the reach of speculative reason. However, for 
Kant what is beyond the reach of speculative reason is not thereby beyond the 
reach of all reason and so meaningless. 
Thus, one of the crucial conclusions of Kant's philosophy is that human 
reason can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God. In fact it cannot 
establish anything at all about religion. Reason is inherently agnostic about 
God. However, religion is not something to be theologically demonstrated but 
something to be practically or morally appropriated. Our being religious does 
not depend upon assertion of certain tenets or confirmation of certain 
propositions but on orientation of our lives in a certain way. Religion is not the 
domain of intellectual demonstration. Religion is a matter of will or a matter of 
the practical reason which recognizes that certain acts ought to be done. We 
appreciate the meaningfulness of God through moral endeavour or struggle. It 
is through the lived experience of the moral life that we can appropriate the 
relevance of God. The theoretical reason can not describe the reality of God but 
practical reason can intimate to us reality by prescribing how we ought to act. 
Given the epistemological limitations we are operating within, we can never 
have a speculative or theoretical knowledge of God. It is in the living out of the 
moral life through prescriptions of practical reason that reality of God becomes 
clear to us.. Our hope of attaining the highest good and of becoming morally 
perfect and happy is justified by God. 
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CHAPTER — III 
IQBAL' S BACKGROUND 
(A) THE QUR'AN 
The Quran is the springwell or fountain-head of Islamic culture 
philosophy, beliefs, values, norms, laws and injunctions. It is a revolutionary 
perspective on our quest for knowledge, search for reality and yearning for 
guidelines and values in our social, political and economic spheres of 
operation. It advances a holistic perspective on knowledge, faith, reflection and 
contemplation. Of all the scriptures across history of mankind, the Qur'an has 
most powerfully underlined the significance and relevance of knowledge. The 
Qur'an refers to 11m' and its other cognate concepts too repeatedly to be easily 
or summarily tabulated. The entire atmosphere of the Qur'an is both 
intellectual and mystical. In its more than six thousand verses, the Qur'an 
exhorts us to reflect upon the 'Ayat' of the universe and 'Ayat' of the Qur'an as 
well. The Qur'an repeatedly asks us to appropriate reflective testimony of God 
by reflection upon the phenomenal signs of the universe as well as the signs 
incorporated into the Qur'an. The signs of Allah are strewn across the physical 
Cosmos or Nature, History and human consciousness. The Qur'anic verses are 
also signs of Allah. These phenomenal and discursive signs of Allah ought- to 
inspire deepest and profoundest possible reflections and interpretations. Only 
those blessed with great understanding can decipher the hidden meanings of the 
signs of the Qur'an or only they can understand that an understanding of the 
allegorical verses of the Qur'an is beyond the ken of human capacities or 
faculties (Qur'an: 3-7) . The phenomenal signs of the Cosmos and discursive 
signs of the Qur'an are deeply ontogenetic, axiogenetic and epistemogenetic. 
The following verses from the Qur'an will authenticate the same: 
"Behold, In the creation 
Of the heavens and the earth, 
And the alteration 
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Of Night and Day, 
There are indeed signs 
For men of understanding, 
Men who celebrate 
The praises of God, 
Standing, sitting, 
And lying down on their sides, 
And contemplate 
The (wonders of) creation 
In the heavens and the earth, 
(with the thought)"; 
Behold! In the creation 
Of the heavens and the earth; 
In the alternation 
Of the Night and the Day; 
In the sailing of the ships 
Through the Ocean 
For the profit of mankind: 
In the rain which God 
Sends down from the skies, 
And the life which it gives 
To an earth that is dead; 
In the beasts of all kinds 
That He scatters 
Through the earth, 
In the change of the winds, 
And the clouds which they 
Trail like their slaves 
Between the sky and the earth; 
Here indeed are signs 
For a people that are wise (Qur'an, 2, 164) 
Do they not look 
At the sky above them? 
How we have made it 
And adorned it, 
And there are no 
Flaws in it? 
And the earth 
We have spread it out. 
And set thereon mountains 
Standing firm, and produced 
Therein every kind of 
Beautiful growth (in pairs) 
To be observed 
And commemorated 
By every devotee 
Turning (to God) . 
And we send down 
From the sky Rain 
Charged with blessing, 
And we produce therewith 
Gardens and Grain for harvests; 
And tall (and stately) 
Palm trees, with shoots 
Of fruit-stalks, piled 
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One over another; 
As sustenance for 
(God's) Servants; - 
And We give (new) life 
Therewith to land that is 
Dead: thus will be 
The Resurrection. (Qur'an: L-6-8) 
Among His Signs is this, 
That He created you 
From dust; and then, - 
Behold, ye are men 
Scattered (for and wide) ! 
And among His Signs 
Is this, that He created 
For you mates from among 
Yourselves, that ye may 
Dwell in tranquility with them, 
And He has put love 
And mercy between your (hearts): 
Verily in that are Signs 
For those who reflect. 
And among His Signs 
Is the creation of the heavens 
And the earth, and the variations 
In your languages 
And your colours: verily 
In that are Signs 
For those who know 
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And among His Signs 
Is the sleep that ye take 
By night and by day, 
And the quest that ye 
(Make for livelihood) 
Out of His Bounty; verily 
In that are Signs 
For those who hearken 
And among His Signs 
He shows you the lightening, 
By way both of fear 
And of hope, and He sends 
Down rain from the sky 
And with it gives life to 
The earth after it is dead: 
Verily in that are Signs 
For those who are wise. 
And among His Signs is this, 
That heaven and earth 
Stand by His command: 
Then when He calls you, 
By a single call, from the earth, 
Behold, ye (straightway) come forth. 
(Quran, Surah-Rum 20-25) 
The Qur'an brings out that the absolute knowledge is the prerogative 
and privilege of God only. Man, more often than not, is caught into .the vortex 
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of his own conjectures. These conjectures can not be a substitute for truth or 
cannot be of any avail against truth (Qur'an: 4-157, 53-28, 10-36). Man 
generally follows his conjectures. His conjectures often lead to confusions, 
misunderstandings and distortions. His conjectures cannot lead him to an 
understanding of reality (Qur'an, 53-78). God is Absolute Reality and His 
knowledge is also universal, transcendental, eternal and absolute. - However, 
such knowledge is impossible of human understanding and articulation. God is 
All-Knowing and well-acquainted with everything (Qur'an 6-73). Man can not 
understand anything except as God will's or permits (Quran: 2-255). God 
taught man the Quran and also taught him speech (Qur'an: 55-1,2,3,4). It is 
only men of knowledge and understanding who can appreciate the message of 
the Quran and also appropriate the realization of Allah. The Qur'anic 
revelations can be understood only by those who are well-grounded in 
knowledge (Qur'an: 4-162). While God, by definition is Omniscient, man is 
caught into his own conjecture, doubts and uncertainties. While human 
knowledge does start with conjectures, man through revelation is capable of 
graduating to highest certainty. Man is destined to start with conjuncture and 
stop at certainty. While God has unqualified knowledge man, at best, can strive 
for humanly highest possible state of realization. It is through realisation that 
man appropriates certainty, which certainty, according to the Quran, is of three 
degrees. Firstly, man can achieve intellectual certainty or what Quran calls `Jim 
al yagin'. Secondly, he can achieve perceptual or intuitive certainty or what 
Qur'an calls `Ain al yagin'.And thirdly man can achieve authentic certainty or 
what Quran calls `Haq-al-Yagin'. 
The Qur'an repeatedly exhorts man to understand the phenomenal signs 
of the universe as well as verses of the Quran by application of his reason. It is 
through reflection and understanding that the meaning, of the Qur'anic verses as 
well as of the features of the phenomenal world will be revealed to us. Man is 
asked to reflect upon the countless features of the cosmos. It is men of 
reasoning and reflection who can understand the divine origin and destiny of 
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the cosmos. Secondly, man is asked to reflect upon the rise and fall of various 
civilizations across history. They should visit the sites of great civilizations and 
observe what has been the fate of high and mighty people at different periods 
of time. Understanding great historical events or momentous periods of history 
and periods of raise and fall of various civilizations can provide great social, 
political and moral lessons to man with a view to conducting his affairs in 
keeping with natural laws and as well as divine commandments (Qur'an: 12-
111; 14-5, 15; 30-9; 33-62; 35-44). Thirdly man has been asked to appreciate 
the depth and profoundity of his inner experiences. The inner experiences 
furnish us the highest degree of certitude (Sharif (ed), (2001), 150). The 
Prophets of God appropriate divine revelation through inner or personal 
experience. All our instinctual, intuitional and inspirational modes of 
knowledge are appropriated through inner or personal experience (Ibid., p. 
150). In view of the same, the Quran lays great emphasis on understanding of 
or on reflecting upon our inner experiences. Such an understanding and 
reflection can impart to man his essential non-physical, non-chemical and non-
biological origin and destiny. Men of faith can appreciate vital signs of Allah in 
their own selves. Therefore, it is obligatory on them to reflect upon themselves 
(Qur'an: 50-20, 21). 
The Qur'an itself is the ultimate criterion or standard and truth. The 
Qur'anic revelation is a criterion separating true beliefs from false beliefs and 
values from disvalues (Qur'an: 25-1). God communicates to man through 
revelation and seat of revelatory communication is the heart of man. The 
revelation is sent down on the Prophets with a view to providing guidance to 
the man in his social, political and economic spheres of operation. The 
Qur'anic revelation is comprised of two types of verses; Muhakamat or verses 
of established meaning and Mutashabihat or allegorical verses. While the 
meaning of Muhakarnat is clear and categorical, the allegorical or analogical 
verses can be interpreted in various ways. However, an authentic interpretation 
of an allegorical verse would be to bring out its meaning which is in accord 
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with Islamic Weltanchauung. Scholars of Islamic Studies developed various 
sciences with a view to understanding the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet. The science of understanding of the Qur'an was designated as `Jim al 
Tafsir , the science of understanding of the traditions of the Prophet was 
designated as '11m ai Hadith',the science of demonstrating legal deductions or 
arriving at legal inductions, was designated as 'Jim al Figh', the science of 
understanding the hidden or inner or implicit meanings of the Qur'an and 
Sunnah or the role, purpose and function of religion through inner or personal 
experience was designated as 'Ilm al Tasawwuf' and the science of rationally 
debating the truth and validity of the Qur'anic doctrines was designated as `Jim 
al Kalam'. Besides these sciences Muslim philosophers tried to reconcile the 
Qur' anic Weltanchauung with Greek rationalist philosophy. 
The problems pertaining to the understanding and interpretation of 
Qur'anic Verses led to the emergence and development of 'Jim al-Tafsir. The 
Quran encapsulates a highly developed world-view and value-system. Its 
verses are full of philosophical ethical, socio-political and legal wisdom. 
Besides, its style is highly sophisticated; it constitutes the peak of eloquence in 
Arabic literature. Its multidimensional implications were not understandable to 
Arabs who were mostly unlettered during seventh century A.D. Even some 
highly distinguished men of learning during that period could not fathom all the 
intricacies and complexities emanating out of the Qur'anic verses, Such a 
situation necessitated the development of a methodological science which 
could lead to clarification of the difficulties faced by the people in their quest 
for understanding and interpretation of the Qur'an. During twenty-three years 
of his Dispensation, the Prophet would himself clarify the difficulties and 
ambiguities faced by people in grasping the Qur'an. The Companions of the 
Prophet and their successors also carried out this clarificatory role after the 
demise of the Prophet. During the first and second centuries of Islam various 
scholars clarified specific problems faced by people in their engagement with 
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the Qur'an. It was only in third century of Islam that a fully-fledged exegetical 
science of the Qur'an was worked out. 
Obviously, there is no royal methodological road to understanding of the 
Quran. There can be various approaches to our understanding of the Qur'an. 
However, there is no universal or eternal interpretation which can be 
appropriated by one and all. Our understanding of the Qur'an is bound to be 
inspired and determined by the imperatives as well as methodologies of each 
age. In modem times the Qur'an can be understood or interpreted from several 
perspectives; philosophical, historical, sociological etc. 
Classically, scholars have brought out that Qur'an can be either 
interpreted by the Qur'an itself, i.e., some difficult verses of the Qur'an can be 
understood and interpreted in the light of other verses of the Quran, or it can be 
interpreted by recourse to Ijtihad or independent opinion. A person who is an 
advanced scholar of Arabic language and literature and well-versed in Arabic 
culture and history and is also an authentic Muslim, can undertake an exegesis 
of the Qur'an in the light of his own conscience or, thirdly, an exegesis or 
interpretation of the Qur'an can be worked out which contrary to apparent 
meaning of the verses can lay stress on the hidden meanings of the Qur'an. 
Such an exegesis has been popular among Sufi, Ismaili and Batini circles 
across the Islamic world. However, such an exegetical approach has been 
unacceptable to the orthodoxy who underline that such an approach 
unnecessarily proliferates mystical interpretations of the Qur'anic verses. 
(B) ISLAMIC SCIENCES 
(a) Jim al-Hadith 
Jim al-Hadith was one of the most original, significant and impactful 
sciences developed by Muslim theologians, scholars and historians. The 
science has been worked out within the framework of historical scholarship or 
research. It is concerned with the sayings and at a wider level even with the 
doings of the Prophet of Islam. I1m al-Hadith has been deeply and intimately 
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connected with the origin, rise, explication and validation of social, political, 
economic, ethical and legal scholarship in Islamic lands. 
I1m al-Hadith developed in response to proliferation of the traditions of 
the Prophet owing to sectarian and denominational polarization within Islamic 
world and the consequent need for sifting authentic traditions of the Prophet 
from the superious ones designed at times to bolastor up sectarian convictions 
and commitments and at times fabricated with the best of intentions. Mostly 
scholars of `Ilm al-Hadith have devised two methods with a view to 
demarcating authentic traditions from the inauthentic one's; namely (i) 
`Rawayat', (ii) `Darayat'. 
Rawayat signifies historical research with regard to the narration and 
transmission of the traditions of the Prophet. The authenticity of each reported 
tradition of the Prophet was tested through the method of Rawayat. Each 
tradition was sought to be authentically traced back to the Holy Prophet 
through a trustworthy chain of narrators. The character, truthfulness and 
integrity of each narrator was examined by the traditionist. They disregarded 
those reported traditions of those narrators whose memory was weak, whose 
trustworthiness or truthfulness was not beyond doubt, who were accused of any 
crime and negligence, who could not give a complete chain of narrators from 
the last link up to the Prophet, who's reports violated otherwise established 
historical evidence or went against the established empirical and scientific 
facts. The traditionists accepted only those traditions of the Prophet who's 
narrators were men of great understanding, learning, piety, caliber and capable 
of most faithfully reporting the traditions of the Prophet in keeping with the 
strictest norms and cannons of historical objectivity. Accordingly, the 
traditionists developed the science of Asma al Rijal', bringing out the 
biographical details of all narrators that could add up to further authentication 
of the traditions of the Prophet. 
As against Rawayat which method traces the authenticity or correctness 
of the reported traditions of the Prophet by application of the norms or canons 
of historical objectivity, the method of Darayat is applied with a view to 
examining the reasonableness of the reported traditions of the Prophet. The 
traditionists applied the method of Darayat so as to examine the textual 
accuracy of the reported traditions of the Prophet. The crux of the matter was to 
ascertain whether the Prophet could at all have uttered the tradition under 
consideration and whether it accorded with the principles of humanity, justice, 
equality, brotherhood etc. By the application of method of Darayat, the 
traditionists rejected a tradition if it was in contravention to established 
historical facts, against reason, against commonsense, against the doctrines of 
Islam, against the teachings of the Qur'an etc. A tradition was rejected if it did 
not accord with the general letter and spirit of the traditions of the Prophet or 
did not fit in with the style and syntactic of Arabic language. The traditionist 
did not accept a tradition if it violated the universally accepted traditions of the 
Prophet. They also rejected a tradition if it violated and contradicted the letter 
and spirit of anyone of the verses of the Qur'an for they accepted the Qur'an to 
be the ultimate criterion of the rationality, justification and validity of any 
tradition of the Prophet under consideration or investigation (Hanifi: (1992), 
17-18). 
(b) JIm at Fiqh 
IN a]-Faqh is an important Islamic science crucially impacting our 
understanding and conduct of social, political, economic, educational and 
cultural affairs. The term Faqh literally signifies understanding. Technically it 
means, a deep understanding of the principles of Islamic law and their 
application to concrete problems faced in various areas of human operation. 
Thus, Ilm al-Faqh means science of jurisprudence. There are two most 
important sources of Islamic law; (i) The Quran, (ii) Prophets' sayings and 
doings. The Quran provides a wide framework of basic beliefs and values and 
directive principles of law. It is in keeping with the letter and spirit of this 
framework that Jurists or Doctors of Islamic Jurisprudence do derive specific 
legal injunctions or can revisit the same framework from time to time _to 
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reinterpret or redesign legal injunctions in accordance with the imperatives and 
challenges of any given Era or Age. As against the general and universal 
ambience of the Qur'anic propositions, the sayings and the doings of the 
Prophet serve as concrete examples of what is legal or illegal, allowed or 
prohibited, warranted or unwarranted, prescribed or proscribed. The traditions 
of the Prophet in their totality provide a concrete direction as to how Muslims 
ought to be conducting themselves in social, political, economic, educational 
and cultural areas of operation. The propositions Prophet uttered, the 
pronouncements he made, the additions and alterations he carried out, the 
actions he performed, the decisions he implemented, the affirmative and 
negative judgments he formulated, the reservations and exceptions he 
intimated, the agreements and disagreements he arrived at etc., furnish the 
fundamental data for the emergence and development of Ilm al-Fagh or Islamic 
Jurisprudence. The scholars of Islamic jurisprudence have even interpreted 
Prophet's silences as allowing or disallowing certain actions and practices 
(Hasan: (1970), 1). 
In addition to the Quran and the Sunnah various schools of Islamic 
Jurisprudence have also accepted Lima (consensus), Qiyas (analogical 
reasoning) and Ijtihad (reinterpretation) as sources of Muslim Law, jma 
signifies hammering out a consensus with regard to a legal disagreement. 
However, there is disagreement as to who's consensus can be deemed to be a 
source of Muslim law. Some scholars point out that Ijma signifies consensus 
among the Companions of the Prophet only while others bring out that 
consensus signifies an agreement by scholars of any given time with regard to 
any controversial point of law (`Ali: 1973, 106). The Qur'an asks us to obey 
Allah, obey the Prophet and obey those who have authority over you (Qur'an: 
.......). The Prophet asks us to decide any given controversy or conflict firstly 
in the light of the Qur'an; secondly, in the light of the Sunnah of the Prophet 
and thirdly, unanimous agreement. In the light of these commandments or 
exhortations Muslim Jurists have devised the principle of `Ijma with a view to 
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meeting out the requirements or facing the challenges of an ongoing 
progressive society from time to time. In view of the same a consentual 
agreement with a regard to any legal controversy at any given point of time can 
be amended or even repealed by a fresh consensus arrived at by a subsequent 
consensus among the Doctors of Islam (Hanifi, op.cit., p. 35). Secondly, Qiyas 
or analogical reasoning is a method of resolving a legal disagreement by 
subsuming it under a similar case previously resolved with reference to the 
Quran, Sunnah and Ijma. While Ijma is a method of resolving legal 
disagreements by recourse to consensus among various scholars, Qiyas can be 
done by a single jurist. Broadly speaking, Qiyas has been accepted as a valid 
source of Faqh, although the infallibility of analogical reasoning or deduction 
has always been subjected to critical searchlight by highly competent and 
advanced scholars of jurisprudence. In view of the same, the analogical 
deductions of one generation can be always revoked, recast and reformulated 
by the upcoming generation. Nevertheless, the technique of analogical 
deduction has been applied by all outstanding Jurists throughout the history of 
Islam. All along the annals of Islam, the principle of analogical deduction has 
been of great avail in designing the legal injunctions, in keeping with the 
challenges and imperatives of newly emerging conditions in Islamic lands 
(Hanifi, op.cit., pp. 36-37). Thirdly, the principle of Ijtihad has been all the 
more important in resolving the legal difficulties, especially in radically 
different or new conditions of society, polity and economy. I tihad means 
exerting the faculties of mind to the maximum possible extent with a view to 
hammering out or arriving at the solution of legal dilemmas. The Qur'an 
repeatedly asks us to exercise faculties of our understanding to their fullest 
possible level with a view to solving the difficult challenges and imperatives of 
life. The Prophet asks us to go in for I tihad in case there is no clear cut 
guidance from the Qur'an and traditions of Prophet while dealing with a 
difficult question in any sphere of human operation. The Companions of the 
Prophet and their successors, all exercised jtihad with a view to resolving 
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difficult situations. The principles of Qiyas (Analogical Deductions), Istisaan 
(Equity), Istislah (public good) and Istiddal (inference) etc. are some of the 
numerous strategies employed by Doctors of Islam and all such strategies are 
actually various modes of Ijtihad. The contemporary social, political and 
economic problems of Muslims can also be resolved by recourse to I tihad 
only such an I tihad cannot be carried out in violation of explicit directives of 
the Quran and the Sunnah (`Ali: op.cit., 113-14). 
(c) Mutazilites and Asharites 
The seventh century A.D. was the century of Islamic revolution. The 
Qur'anic revelations and the Prophetic sayings and doings from 610 A.D. up to 
632 A.D. promulgated and prescribed the basic world-view and value-system 
of Islam and set the agenda for the historical and institutional implementation 
of Islamic way of life. The Companions of the Prophet including His four 
rightly guided caliphs struggled throughout seventh century A.D. for the 
implementation of Islamic beliefs and values and expansion of Islam around 
and beyond Arab lands. It was only in eighth century A.D. that thinkers of 
Islamic community started understanding and interpreting the basic sources of 
Islam at various centres such as Madina, Macca, Kufa, Basra, Baghdad and 
Damascus. Accordingly, various sects of interpretation and schools of thought 
came into existence across Islamic lands. There were Kharijites, Murajites, 
Quadarites, Jabarites, Mu'tazilites, Ash'atites etc. Here, we shall give an 
outline of Mu'tazilites and Ash rite views on reason and revelation in so far as 
belief in the primacy of reason or revelation directs and determines our 
onto cosmological and axiological perspectives or standpoints. 
The Mu'tazilites and Ash'atites were both believers in and advocates of 
Islamic world-view and value-system. However, their understanding and 
interpretation of Islamic beliefs and values led them to the espousal of 
divergent doctrinal positions. The Mu'tazilites were radical innovators in so far 
as they attempted to offer rational explanations of Islamic doctrines. Their 
fundamental self-definition was that they were `People of Unity and Justice'. 
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They called themselves People of Unity because of their denial of the attributes 
of God as separate and different from the Divine Essence. They held this view 
because they thought that if the attributes of God are not considered to be 
identical with His Essence, the unique and simple unity of God would have_to 
be given up. They called themselves People of Justice because they held that it 
is incumbent on God to reward the faithful and virtuous and also to punish men 
without faith or persons committing vicious deeds (Sharif: (2001), 200). From 
this basic standpoint of Unity and Justice Mu'tazilites worked out their other 
beliefs: God's justice necessarily implies that human will should be absolutely 
free and man should be the author of his own actions. The justice of God makes 
it incumbent upon Him not to do anything contrary to justice and equity. God 
can only do what is good and salutary for His servants. He cannot bring into 
effect evil deeds. He cannot ask His servants to do that which is impossible 
(Sharif: (2001), 200-201). Mu'tazilites also holds that good and evil are 
inherent in things themselves. They do not become good or evil because God 
declares them to be so. Human reason can distinguish good from evil on its 
own, independent of divine revelation which only confirms what can be 
rationally grasped by man himself. The Ash'atites,• on the other hand either 
qualified the doctrinal positions of Mu'tazilites or forwarded radically different 
doctrines of their own. For example, Ash'atites do not agree with the 
Mu'tazilites view that acceptance of divine attributes as separate from His 
Essence violates the absolute unity of God. Attributes of God are eternal but 
they are neither identical with His Essence nor are they quite different from His 
Essence. The Ash rite argued that if all the attributes of God are deemed 
identical with His Essence, the Divine Essence will become a combination of 
contradictory qualities. However, they could also not maintain that the 
attributes of God are absolutely different form His Essence, for such a thesis 
would have led to the acceptance of multiple eternals and violated the 
simplicity of God's unity. Ash'atites, as against Mu'tazilites, held that human 
will is not free and man is not the author of his own actions. Man is merely 
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invested with certain subordinate powers of appropriation and acquisition. 
While all actions are predetermined by Allah, man's intention to work them out 
makes him the locus of responsibility and accountability. Man, on his own, can 
not originate any action, for God is the originator of all objects, events, actions 
and accidents (Nadvi: p. 32). 
However, here we shall confine ourselves to bringing out the basic 
epistemological standpoint of Mu'tazilites and Ash'atites. Mu'tazilites and 
Asharites were basically differing on the criterion of validity and justification; 
the former vying for the primacy of reason and later espousing the ultimacy of 
revelation. For Mu'tazilites, it is reason which can serve as a criterion of what 
is true and what is false. For Ash'atites the criterion of truth and falsehood is 
revelation. For Mu'tazilites, the revelatory commandments are subject to 
rational scrutiny. For Ash'atites, the so-called rational judgments or 
propositions are subject to revelatory commandments. More importantly, 
reason and revelation respectively served as criteria of what is ethically 
acceptable or unwarranted according to Mutazalites and Asharites. According 
to Mu'tazilites it is reason which does guide us in demarcating good from evil. 
Revelation can only confirm the commandments of reason. Reason dictates that 
every meritorious and profitable action must be rewarded and every 
demeritorious and harmful action must be punished. We can also appreciate the 
significance of religion or revelation only through reason. God repeatedly 
underlines that we believe in His Existence or follow His commandments 
because we are rational beings. The Quran asks us to reflect, to ponder over, to 
understand, to probe, to interpret, to derive lessons from the features of the 
cosmos, from the rise and fall of civilizations and from mysteries of our own 
self by recourse to application of reason. Accordingly, Mu'tazilites hold actions 
to be inherently meritorious or demeritorious and consequently rewardable or 
punishable. For example, mercy is inherently good and not because it is 
prescribed by the revelation. On the other hand, cruelty is inherently evil and 
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s only not because it is proscribed by the revelation. 
what is naturally available to the innate light of our reason (Ibid., pp. 43-45). 
Ash'atites advance radically divergent views on the respective roles of 
reason and revelation. They point out that all revelatory commandments, 
injunctions, prescriptions, proscriptions, allowances, disallowances, 
jdugements and propositions can not be rationally explained. Nor are they in 
need of rational sanctification. That Quran prohibits prayers and fasting at 
certain points of time or on certain days, that it forbids eating of pork, that it 
disallows contracting marriages with certain persons, that it prescribes 
sacrificing animals and so on and so forth cannot be rationally explained or 
justified. The very process of revelation is beyond the ken of rational 
understanding and justification. Therefore, human reason cannot be allowed the 
role of ultimate criterion of justification. It is revelation which guides us as to 
what is true and what is false and what is good and what is evil. We can never 
know through reason as to which actions are rewardable and which are 
punishable. Actions may be inherently good or evil. However, only revelation 
can intimate to us that we shall be rewarded for our good actions and punished 
for our bad ones. Only revelation can intimate to us the moral, spiritual and 
eschatological significance of human action (Sharif, op.cit., 230-31). Moreover, 
Asharites underlined that the assumption of ultimacy of human reason negates 
or annuls the very need and efficacy of Divine Revelation. The assumption of 
ultimate justificatory, directive and illuminative role of reason makes all the 
Prophetic Missions questionable and devoid of justification. 
(d) Sufism 
The origins and emergence of Sufism within the Islamic world-view and 
value-system grounded on the Qur'an and Sunnah and Traditions of the 
Prophet, have been widely debated by historians of Islam, Muslim scholars of 
Sufism and Orientalists. Scholars have given divergent accounts of the impact 
of non-Islamic sources of Sufism. The Islamic theologians have mostly 
questioned its Islamic credentials and its validity with reference to basic 
55 
sources of Islamic beliefs and values. The debate continues till date, opponents 
of Sufism citing numerous verses from the Qur'an and various traditions from 
anthologies of Hadith with a view to questioning the legitimacy of Sufism and 
proponents of Sufism citing as many Qur'anic verses and traditions of the 
Prophet with a view to bolstering up the authentic Islamic credentials of 
Sufism. Notwithstanding what historians and scholars of Sufism have to say the 
Sufis themselves were not interested in any intellectual or methodological 
analysis of the Qur'anic verses or Prophet'straditions. The early Sufis 
especially were not interested in doctrinal disputations or philosophical 
debates. Inspired by basic beliefs and values of Islam, they were in search of 
self-realization and God-realisation. They were, however, not satisfied with a 
purely literalist understanding of Islam and ritualistic approach to God -as 
advocated by theologians. The Shari'ah or Islamic law was also concerned 
with the resolution of social, political or economic affairs, mostly emphasizing 
on distribution of property and authentication of marriage. However, as seekers 
they were intensely interested in exploring their spiritual self-authentication or 
discovering God. In view of their strong spiritual commitments they were 
averse to legal rules and regulations. The legal, instrumental and institutional 
aspects of Islam could not be of any great help in their quest for God-
realisation which could be accomplished only by recourse to love of God. The 
love of God entailed rather necessitated detachment from worldly power, 
property and pleasures. Instead of engaging in mundane pursuits or being 
oriented to legal and ritual aspects of Islam, Sufis appropriated Tariqah 
(spiritual method or way of life). This method or way of life lead's Sufis to 
seeking guidance from a Preceptor or Murshid who belongs to a line of 
Preceptors who trace their basic spiritual vision or insight into the Reality from 
the Prophet of Islam (Smith: (1950), 1-5). 
Sufis claim that self-realisation and God-realization cannot be 
successfully accomplished by approaching Soul or God through reason, sense-
experience, analysis, research, argumentation or experimentation. God is 
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beyond thought or intellectual understanding. The Ultimate Reality of God 
cannot be deciphered or fathomed by logical, philosophical, dialectical or 
rhetorical devices and strategies. We can approach God through Qalb (heart), 
Ruh (Spirit) and Sir (innermost ground of the soul) and by recourse to love and 
contemplation. When heart is illuminated by faith, every divine quality is 
reflected through the mirror of our heart. When the heart is liberated from 
mundane attractions and sensual contamination, it becomes capable of 
reflecting the glory of God. The `Marifat' or Gnosis appropriated by a Sufi: is 
finally a grace of and gift from God rather than a function of a Sufi's 
intellectual and spiritual struggle. God-realisation is a favour of God bestowed 
as a gift upon His chosen seekers. The `Gnosis' of a Sufi is an overwhelming 
experience of Divine Grace leading to one's total transformation and complete 
transmutation (Nicholson, (1975) , 68-72) . 
Sufis have been oriented to powerful absorptionistic or annihilationistic 
tendencies. Many prominent Sufis have defined mystical experience to be a 
profound consciousness of an All-Pervading Unity transcending all mundane 
experiences of individuality, particularity and multiplicity. The spiritual 
struggle of the Sufis culminates into liberation from unreal selfhood and 
mundane attachments and reunion with the Infinite Being. At this stage, the 
Sufi is liberated from all objects of desire and will, all objects of understanding 
and knowledge and all worldly pulls and pressures. He transcends the 
imperatives of power, property and pleasure. His ultimate delight of 
communion with or nearness of God is anchored on his complete divestment of 
or detachment from worldly concerns (Ibid. 83-94) . 
Sufis have been methodologically sagacious and wisenedall along and 
have been especially critical of all rationalistic, philosophical and theological 
constructions. All philosophical and theological exploration can culminate into 
agnosticism. While agnosticism can be the end of philosophy, theology and all 
rationalistic and methodological explorations, it is the beginning of Sufi 
understanding, interpretation, enlightenment and wisdom. The end of theology 
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is the beginning of theosophy or philosophy in the classical Greek sense. The 
Sufi is the real theosopher or philosopher in so far as love of wisdom and 
Divine wisdom do coincide or can be reconciled with each other. While God is 
impervious to all methodological approaches, His understanding or vision- is 
vouchsafed to Sufis or Gnostics through intuitive or mystical ecstasy — the 
divinely blessed or bestowed rapturous experience, The Sufis or Gnostics 
confirm the existence of the universe and their own selves through their 
knowledge of God (Nicholson: op.cit., 85). 
Hassan al Basari (d. 1101728 A.D.), was possibly the earliest 
theologian and scholar who is deemed to have pioneered the Sufi way of life. 
He was a man of exceptional piety and deeply oriented to ascetic mode of life. 
Scholars and historians of Sufism consider him to have been the first Sufi. He 
underlined the foundational importance of the purification of heart by recourse 
to fear of Allah and abstinence from mundane temptations. Only a Sufi of pure 
heart can eventually appropriate the vision of Allah which is the ultimate end 
of Sufi spiritual struggle. 
Rabia al-Basri (d. 185/801 A.D.), is perhaps the most outstanding 
woman mystic of Islam who laid emphasis on the spiritual significance of love 
of God. Her concept of love later became a characterizing feature of Sufi 
philosophy. Love, in course of time, acquired great ontological, axiological and 
even epistemological significance. Rabic was fully conscious of the importance 
of fear of Allah. However, she laid unqualified emphasis on love of God in Sufi 
struggle for attainment of good pleasure as well as vision of Allah. The Sufi 
must cultivate pure and unalloyed love of Allah: a love that is neither dictated 
by fear of hell nor inspired by the prospects of paradisal pleasures of hereafter. 
Rabi'ah said: 
0 God! If I worship thee in fear of Hell, burn me in Hell; and 
if I worship Thee in hope of paradise, exclude me from 
Paradise; but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, withhold-
not Thine Everlasting Beauty"! (Nicholson: 1963, 115). 
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Dhun-Nun Misri (d. 296/859) was an outstanding Egyptian Sufi. He 
was the founder of first Sufi sect in the history of Islam. He was the author of 
several treatises on Sufism wherein he expounded such doctrines as Hal (state) , 
`Maquam' (stage) and 'Wajad' (ecstasy). He was the first Sufi author to have 
elaborated upon Marifah (gnosis) and brought out its characteristics in 
comparison to intellectual and analytical types of knowledge. According to 
Dhun Nun Misri, Marifah or gnosis is of three types: (i) Gnosis of scholars who 
have a rational or intellectual understanding of God, (ii) Gnosis of common 
Muslims who believe in Allah on the basis of faith and (iii) the Gnosis of 
mystics who know Allah through their inner and authentic light. It is the 
mystical Gnosis which constitutes the perfect faith and most authentic 
certitude. However, such a Gnosis is not appropriated by recourse to any kind 
of rational demonstration but through intuition (Hai; 1966, 136). He was 
oriented to pantheistic approach for his doctrine of love of God entailed 
absorption into the Being of Allah. 
Bayzaid-Bustami (d. 874) was one of the foremost radical thinkers of 
9th century A.D. He was the first Sufi philosopher who presented the doctrine 
of Fana (passing away in Allah). This doctrine was widely appropriated by 
subsequent Sufi's as the ultimate ideal of their spiritual struggle or end of their 
way of life. Apart from introducing the doctrine of annihilation of self - or 
absorption in Allah, he introduced the concept of sukr (intoxication) in Sufism. 
Bayzaid's concept of intoxication entailed unqualified love of God; it is in the 
rapturous love of God that the seeker loses all his attribute so that only those 
faculties survive in him that do not belong to human genus. Such a rapturous 
absorption and intoxication is not a function of one's spiritual endeavour or 
struggle but purely a gift of God. At this stage man's activities are attributed to 
God. At this stage, man in ` Sukr' strands through God. At this stage the seeker 
is completely annihilated or absorbed into God. Such an absorption is through 
self-surrender to God and the process starts with unqualified subbordination to 
the commandments of Allah (Nabi, 1977, 17-18) . Bayzaid also pointed out that 
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one's love of God is analogous to a human love-affair. However, through his 
introspective discipline he could transcend this personalized conception of 
God. While approaching the core of his identity in his spiritual explorations, 
Bayzaid felt that nothing stood between God and himself: indeed, everything 
that he understood as 'self' seemed to be melting away: 
I gazed upon [al-Lah] with the eye of truth and said to Him: 
"who is this?" He said, "This is neither I nor other than I. 
There is no God but I". Then he changed me out of my 
identity into His Selfhood... Then I communed with Him 
with the tongue of His Face, saying: "How fares it with me 
with Thee?" He said, "I am through Thee; there is no god but 
Thou". (Armstrong: 1994, 226). 
Thus Bayzaid discovered God to be identified with the inmost self. 
According to Bayzaid it was the destruction of ego that led to sense of 
absorption in a larger ineffable reality. 
Junaid Baghdadi (d. 298/910) is famously called Shaikhh al-Tariqa 
(chief of the Sufi way of life) or Syed-a]-Taifah (leader of the Tribe of Sufi's) 
in the history of Sufism. He was one of most original Sufi thinkers and 
intellectuals. He brilliantly defined 'Tauhid' as separating what is eternal from 
all that what is temporal (Nasr, 1964, 83). However, Junaid did not agree with 
Bistami's notion of `intoxication'. Instead he advanced the notion o.f sobriety. 
According to Junaid, our union with God should not signify destruction of our 
natural capabilities. Rather such a union must ensure greater fructification of 
our faculties and capabilities. A Sufi who can transcend egotism with a view to 
discovering the divine presence at the heart of his own being should become 
capable of higher self-realization and greater self-control. Junaid while 
accepting the notion of Fana (annihilation) as advanced by Bistami, added that 
Fana must be succeeded by Baqua (revival), a return to an advanced and 
upgraded self. While experiencing Fana and Baqua, the Sufi's passes through a 
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process of divinization or deification. The fundamental purpose of Sufi 
spiritual struggle, according to Junaid, was to return to man's primordial state 
on the day of creation. It was a return to the source of their being. It was an 
experience of separation and alienation followed by reappropriation and 
reunion with their Original source. It was the end of separation and sadness and 
a reunion with the deeper self. A reunion with the immediate presence of God. 
In such an experience, the Sufi realizes that God was not an external reality but 
somehow one with the ground of person's being (Armstrong; op.cit., 227). 
Mansoor al Hallaj (d. 921), is perhaps the most famous Sufi who 
sacrifices his life for the courage of his convictions', viz, for exclaiming 
"Ana 'lHaq " (I am the truth) . In his ecstasy, al-Hallaj would cry aloud: "I am 
the truth". He expresses his sense of union with God that was so close that it 
felt like identity. In one of his poems he said : 
I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I: 
We are two spirits dwelling in one body. 
If thou seest me, thou seest Him, 
And if thou seest Him, thou seest us both. 
(Nicholson, op. cit., 151) . 
Ghazali is an integral epistemologist. The knowledge of physical or 
external world is basically acquired by sense-experience or perception. Along 
with perception, reason plays a very crucial role in our quest for knowledge. It 
is through reason that we understand the logical and mathematical entailments 
and implications. Reason also is our capacity to grasp and master theoretical or 
abstract sciences. Reason also acquires knowledge through historical and 
collective experience of mankind and through individual's own experiences at 
different stages of his life. Man extends the frontiers of his knowledge through 
rational inductions and deductions or inferences. Human understanding or 
cognition has multiplicative, even exponential growth. When we understand 
something, that understanding becomes the basis of other possible 
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understandings and this process is never-ending and ever-expanding. Fresh 
cognitions are added to previous understandings and frontiers of knowledge are 
perennially extended (Faris: 1962, 231). 
Ghazali also accepts the epistemological authority of the Quran and of 
Prophet. The knowledge gained through the verses of the Quran and traditions 
of the Prophet are morally purificatory and spiritually therapeutic. Necessary 
knowledge can be absorbed or internalized only by unquestionably following 
the Qur'anic revelations and Prophetic traditions. The revelations that- a 
Prophet receives are divinely initiated or ordained. The revelations vouchsafed 
to a Prophet are like heat and light of the Sun received by the Earth without 
asking as well as without mediation. The Prophet through Divinely ordained 
revelations is bestowed with Ultimate Spiritual Certitude. The knowledge of 
the Prophet is of the highest rank for it is not a function of learning or 
scholarship but emanates from Divine Guidance and Grace (Smith 1938, 365). 
In addition to perception, reason and authority of the Qur'anic 
revelations and Prophetic traditions, Ghazali also accepts intuition or more 
specifically mystical experience to be the most crucial and vital source of 
knowledge and understanding or realization. The judgments pertaining to 
Ultimate Reality can never be authenticated by recourse to theological, 
philosophical, scientific or experimental methods of validation. It is through 
mystical experience that we can authenticate such judgments in the depths of 
our soul. Human soul is capable of reflecting the light of God and attaining to 
direct vision of the truth if it is liberated from the distractions of worldly 
concerns. It is through mystical experience that we can attain to the highest 
certitude and finally dissolve our doubts and hesitations. Mystical experience is 
finally anchored on or rooted in our soul, which has foundational role in the 
processing and acquirement of our knowledge. The soul is the tablet or abode 
of knowledge. Human soul has been blessed with knowledge at the very time 
of creation. This knowledge can lapse into forgetfulness due to the impact of 
our passions but it can not altogether disappear. When the soul purifies itself, it 
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returns to its original state. The knowledge which potentially exists in human 
soul is recovered in its original shape whenever soul is liberated from 
behavioural imperfections or mundane engagements. The mystical experience 
needs to be cultivated through purification of soul. We need to transcend the 
imperatives of power, property and pleasure. Once we liberate and elevate our 
soul, we are bestowed with sufficient light leading to authentic God-realization. 
The knowledge gained through mystical experience is essential to our spiritual 
perfection. The realization of God is essential to love of God and love of God is 
essential to realization of God. The realization of God and love of God are 
essentially interdependent (Karim: 1982, 255). 
Ghazali's quest for certainty entailed a wide and large process of 
explorations and evaluations. He evaluated knowledge-claims based on 
authority or * tradition, perception and reason etc. However, he found all 
theological, philosophical, Batinite and legal doctrines to be characterized by 
radical uncertainty. Ghazali underlined that indubitable knowledge could be 
achieved only through mystical states. Such states could be vouchsafed to us 
only by intuition which is supra-empirical, supra-rational and supra-traditional. 
While the certitude of theologians is based on Istldlal (reasoning) and Qfyas 
(analgy) and the certitude of common people is based on Iman (faith), the 
certitude of al Marifun (Gnostics) comprising of al-Mu qarrabun (mystics who 
are proximate to God) and al-Siddigun (mystics who have spiritually authenticated 
and testified to God) is based on al-Mukashifah (unveiling) or a1-Mushahidah 
(direct witnessing) and Zauq (spiritual tasting) (Ismail: 1996, 100-2). 
Ghazali divides certitude into two types; (i) negative certitude and (ii) 
positive certitude. The logicians, philosophers, scholastics and theologians are 
capable of negative certitude. For them certitude at best, signifies lack of doubt. 
The negative certitude is achieved through valid inferences from certain 
premises or through demonstration involving inputs from such channels of 
understanding as discursive reasoning, perception, instinct, authentic narration, 
empirical experience etc. The positive certitude is mystical or experiential 
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certitude. An all-out skeptical standpoint or disbelief constitutes pure darkness 
according to Ghazali. While negative certitude is objectively demarcating, 
Positive certitude is subjectively intensifying. The logical or demonstrative or 
negative certitude is the lowest level of certitude which can be continuously 
upgraded until it reaches through Kashf (unveiling) and Ilham (inspiration) to 
the highest level of experiential certitude. It's at this level of certitude that 
Gnostics have a direct encounter with Ultimate Reality. This level of certitude 
leads to overpowering transformational and transvaluational impact on the 
mystics or seers. At this level, the mystic appropriates a degree of realization 
which can positively orientate him to unexceptional commitment to values and 
disorientate him to espousal of disvalues. This highest experiential certitude is 
itself limitless in range. Its numerous gradations are appropriated by Gnostics 
in proportion to their spiritual achievements, the spectrum ranging from al-
Muqarrabun up to al-Siddiqun (Ibid., pp. 107-8). 
Ghazali also talks of a priori propositions (al-Alwwaliyat,, sensory 
propositions (al-Mahsusat), empirical propositions (al-Tajrlbiyyat), impeccable 
transmissions (al-Mutawatarat), certified propositions (al-Musallamat), 
famous propositions (al-Mashhurat), accepted propositions (al-Magboolat), 
probable propositions (al-Muznunat), ambigious propositions (al-
Mushabbihat), imaginative propositions (a1-Wahlmiyyat), imaginary 
propositions (al-Mukhayyalat) etc., culminating into various types of certainty 
such as; (1) Demonstrative certainty, (ii) Dialectical certainty, (iii) Rhetorical 
certainty, (iv) Sophistical certainty etc. However, the highest certitude, 
according to Ghazali, is achieved through intuitive or mystical experience. 
Such a certitude encompasses the Absolute Truth and Ultimate Reality of the 
Universal and Eternal God (Ibid., p, 124). 
Ghazali, a Persian scholar, philosopher, theologian, jurist and stiff, was 
one of the most original thinkers of Islam. His life-long quest for certainty had 
an abiding impact on Muslim philosophy and culture. His powerful 
philosophical investigations presaged many doctrinal positions espoused 
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centuries after him by such modern western philosophers as Descartes, Hume 
and Kant and even by twentieth century linguistic analysts such as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. 
Ghazali's understanding of role of religion and discernment of the 
function of philosophy in diverse fields of human culture ensconsed him on the 
horns of a dilemma. While religious beliefs and values seemed crucial and 
fundamental for a civilized life, certification or authentication of religion by 
rational philosophical criteria or methods seemed to be an impossible task. 
Ghazali was too mystical or spiritual to ignore the need for faith and too liberal 
and intellectual to ignore the role of philosophy. In view of the same, Ghazali 
tried to do what seven hundred years later was attempted by Kant. He came to 
the conclusion that imperatives of religion and challenges of philosophy 
demand to demarcate and figure out the respective jurisdictions or provinces of 
religious faith and philosophical reason. The role of reason was unavoidable 
and inevitable in astronomical, physical, chemical, biological, logico-
mathematical fields of research and investigation. However, reason could not 
furnish us indubitable spiritual or religious certainty. The application of 
rational criteria with a view to achieving absolute certainty with regard to 
doctrines or dogmos of religion was doomed to frustration. There is no way to 
empirically or rationally test the truth of the propositions with regard to `God', 
`Soul' or `After Life'. How could philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle or 
Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina rationally demonstrate the existence of God or opine 
about the nature of His knowledge or prove the eternality or creaturliness of 
the world or comment upon the possibility or impossibility of `bodily 
resurrection' etc. How can we know that the conclusions of philosophical 
arguments were not conceptual delusions or argumentative illusions. 
Accordingly, Gliazali developed a very powerful critique of 
philosophical doctrines or positions originally espoused by Plato, Aristotle and 
Plotinus and later on grafted upon Islamic beliefs by such Muslim philosophers 
as Kindi, Farabi and.Ibn Sina with a view to working out a synthesis between 
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Greek rationalism and the Qur'anic doctrines. In his `Tahafut al Falasifah' 
Ghazali especially rebuts arguments of philosophers, firstly, for their belief, in 
the eternity of the world; secondly, for their belief that God's knowledge does 
not encompass individual objects and thirdly, for their belief in the 
impossibility of bodily resurrection. For example, Ghazali accuses philosophers 
of accepting the Greek dogma of the eternity of the world on questionable 
grounds. The Greek assumptions are neither demonstrable nor self-evident. The 
assumptions of Greek philosophers that every effect has a cause, •that cause 
must be some action of external force and that cause when executed must 
immediately lead to the effect, are not logically compelling or coercive. Why 
should it be accepted that God's Will has a cause or has a cause that is external 
to it? Where is the logical compulsion to assume that an effect should follow a 
cause within no time? There is no logical contradiction to assume that a cause 
can have a delayed effect. If we accept that God's Will is eternal and the object 
of that Will has occurred at a particular point of time, we are not being caught 
in a logical contradiction. There is no logical contradiction in upholding the 
orthodox position that God eternally willed to create the world at a particular 
point of time (Sharif op.cit., 423). We can believe that God's Will is eternal 
and yet the object of His Will can occur at a particular point of time. The 
eternity of God's Will cannot be confused with the eternity of object of His 
Will. If they believe that God has eternally Willed that the world should come 
into being at a particular point of time, they are not violating any fundamental 
principle of logic (Kamali, 1958, 186). God's Supreme Will is absolutely free. 
Ghazali brings it out in his analysis of notion of causality. Ghazali radically 
challenges the alleged necessity of the causal connection subscribed to by 
philosophers. There is logical entailment between the two. There is no 
necessary relation between burning of fire and blowing up of smoke. Logical 
inductions can never attain certainty and anybody can doubt them, at any point 
of time. If objects constantly succeed one another, it proves succession not 
causation or conjunction not connection. The effect happens with the cause and 
not through it (Sharif: 1995, 615-16). The necessity is implied only in logical 
relations such as identity, implication, disjunction etc. Causal relations are only 
contingents and may or may not happen. Such happenings entirely depends on 
the Will of God. Causal necessity is psychological not logical. The happenings 
of miracles, for example, is logically possible. God can turn a rod into a serpent 
or resurrect bodies on the Day of judgment. In philosophy nothing may be 
acceptable unless it is logically necessary. In religion, nothing is impossible 
unless it is logically contradictory (Sheikh: 1994, 121-25). 
After Ghazali, Suhrawardi Maqtul is a prominent Sufi thinker. Like al-
Hallaj, Suhrawardi Maqtul was also put to death in 1191 for his radical 
mystical and philosophical views and ideas. Suharwardi's mission was to work 
out a synthesis between Islam and what he called the original "Oriental 
Religion". All the ancient sage's and mystics, according to Suhrawardi, had 
preached the same Oriental religion. The ancient Prophets and Greek 
philosophers such as Pythagoras and Plato had preached the tenets of this 
original Oriental religion. The Zoroastrian and Magian seers advocated the 
same religion. The Sufi's too transmitted it to one another and Suhrawardi 
claimed it to have received through Bistami and Junaid. The Hlkmat-al Ishxaq 
or Oriental Enlightenment outlined by Suhrawardi is the perennial philosophy 
which was mystical and imaginative but did not wholly abandon reason. 
Suharwardi realizes the importance of intuition in our approach to truth but also 
advocated the unavoidablity or necessity of intellectual rigour. Truth and 
wisdom are revealed by God and could be retrieved from any source; 
Zoroastrianism, Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Pythagorean 
philosophy, Platonic philosophy, pre-Islamic Iranian philosophy, Ptolemaic 
cosmology and Neoplatonic Emanationism etc. The dogmatic religions were 
often susceptible to sectarian disputations. The Oriental Mystical philosophy of 
Suhrawardi would underline the authenticity and meaningfulness of all possible 
approaches to God. Suhrawardi attempted to discover the imaginative core that 
lay at the heart of all religion and philosophy and despite his keen awareness of 
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the limitations of reason he always accepts its right to probe the deepest 
mysteries. The esoteric mystic and scientific rationalist were equally entitled to 
seek truth. However, he was not satisfied with the wholly rational and objective 
orientations of philosophers. An authentic sage had to be both philosophical 
and mystical. Our world has always been blessed with such a Sage or Spiritual 
Leader. He is the true pole (Qutb) who's presence was absolutely essential for 
the continuance of the world (Armstrong: op.cit., 230-31). 
The Ishraqi philosophy of Suharwardi posits the symbol of light as the 
perfect synonym for God. In his emanationist cosmology the Light of Lights 
corresponded to the Necessary Being of the philosophers. In his emanationistic 
cosmological account, Suhrawardi brings out that a succession of lesser lights 
is generated in a descending hierarchy; each light, recognizing its dependency 
upon the Light of Lights. It also develops a shadow self which was the source 
of material realm. It metaphorically expressed the predicament of the human 
kind. Each and every human being was similarly a combination of light and 
darkness. It is through this light embedded in each of us that we can 
appropriate an authentic spiritual illumination. It is through this authentic 
spiritual illumination that we can experience God within ourselves (Ibid., pp. 
231-32). 
Ibn Arabi 
Ibn Arabi is one of the greatest Sufi philosophers of all time. However, 
he is neither a philosophical constructor nor a reconstructor but a deconstructor. 
He is deeply critical of all theological dogmatisations or so-called philosophical 
systematizations. He is one of the most profound critics of rationalist theology 
and metaphysics. He is not attached to any particular school of thought. His 
penetrating critiques, devastating rejections and demolishing dismissals are 
directed against all; Mu'tazilites, Ash'atites, Materialists, Corporealists, Jews, 
Christians, Idolaters, Tarnscendentalists, Immanentists, Atheists, Agnostics. 
Sceptics etc. 
Ibn Arabi believes that no thinker or system of thought can provide a 
definition of what is Ultimately Real (al-Haqq). Philosophers and theologians 
try to trap God in rational or argumentative pigeonholes. God is without limits 
or confines. Philosophers and theologians try to confine him within their 
theological or metaphysical frameworks. They suffer from delusions of 
argumentative grandeur. They surreptitiously inject some supposed 
correspondence between their beliefs and the reality of God. They try to catch 
the Absolute through their relative conceptual frameworks. 
Ibn Arabi critiques both affirmative and negative schools of theology. 
The affirmative theologians such as Ash'atites insist that the content of Divine 
Reality can be vouchsafed to us through His affirmative attributes. On the other 
hand, negative theologians such as Mu'tazilites insist that nothing can 
ultimately be predicated of God - at best, He can be only negatively delineated 
as to what He is not. He critiques both the fully-fledged anthropomorphism of 
Ash'atites and nanomorphism of Mu'tazilites. His argument against them both 
is that the advocates of Tashbih and proponents of Tanzlh are mutually 
reinforcing and their rationallmetaphysical formulations are tethered on 
adversarial dialectics. 
For Ibn Arabi, there is an unknowable and unthinkable God beneath all 
the constructs and concepts of God we design for ourselves. He is beyond 
names and attributes. He is the source of everything and yet reducible to or 
exhaustible into nothing. He is beyond the propositional gestalt of all cultures. 
The error of the rational thinkers is to mistake their constructs as 
isomorphically corresponding to the Real or God. Such a so-called isomorphic 
correspondence amounts to implicit or explicit conceptual idolatry born out of 
a confusion wherein the theologian or the philosopher may develop the 
unquestioning conviction that his construct is somehow self-sufficient and self-
justifying. The Real is conceptually uncontrollable. He is really unthinkable. 
He is beyond all possible empirical comparisons and conceptual constructions. 
He is limitless and infinite. Therefore, all rational theologies, ontologies, 
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cosmologies and epistemologies cannot encompass the Real. Rational 
theologies and philosophies are blissfully ignorant with regard to the infinity of 
the Real. All theological and philosophical reductions pale into insignificance 
in the face of inexhaustible Plenitude of the Real. Any exclusive theological or 
philosophical appropriation of the Real is also impossible of realization in view 
of its infinite replenishbility in an eternal series of nanoseconds. No conceptual, 
cultural, theological, ontocosmological, epistemological or hermeneutical 
account of the Real can pretend to any exclusive proprietary rights. It is 
impervious to all cultural, theological and philosophical appropriations and 
formulations. The Real is eternally and omnipresently manifesting itself in 
endless and inexhaustible ways. All rational theologies and philosophies are 
condemned to failure and frustration in trying to fix a rational square peg in a 
transrational or suprarationalround whole. All rational explanations or 
interpretationsof the Real are trying to arrest or control what is forever 
unarrestable or uncontrollable. He just cannot fix any rational theological 
construction unto Allah for no attribute or signifier can be Mailed to Him to the 
exclusion of inexhaustible versions germane to His irreducible ontic plenitude. 
All rational constructions fixed unto God even in the face of our utter 
unfathomability of Him arc not only intellectually idolatorous but morally 
slanderous as well. The knowledge of God is not possible through reason or 
reflection. The attainment of God-realisation can be obtained only through 
Kashf (unveiling or divulgement). 
Thus, instead of resorting to theological apologetics or sponsoring an 
objectively all-pervading Universal God, Ibn Arabi made the very ultimate 
depth of man the locus of God. Divinity and humanity were thus two sides of 
the same coin. This locating of divinity in the ultimate depth of each human 
being instead of encompassing God in a set of theological propositions or 
doctrinal statements makes ibn Arabi one of the greatest spiritual Immanentists 
of all time. It cuts across all religious fundamentalism and spiritual chauvinism. 
The inexhaustible ontic plenitude of God cannot be captured by rational or 
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reflective prognostications of any cultural tradition or religious legacy but 
infinitesimally apportioned by each one of us in our unique and unrepeatable 
ways. This is the philosophy which cuts across all vertical and horizontal lines 
of prejudice, hate, anger, intolerance and unfreeddm. It cuts across all specialist 
and superioristic lines of spiritual arrogance and intellectual intolerance. It is a 
philosophy of liberation, freedom and tolerance. It cuts across all kinds of 
holier than thou attitudes. No religion had the whole truth about God. No 
religious, cultural or denominational chauvinism was intellectuallytenable or 
morally acceptable. The culturally sponsored, politically convenient and 
communally charged `Gods' were created byrespective denominational 
theologies. They are sponsored by religious and cultural prejudices. These 
theologically orchestrated `Gods' are societally divisive. It is the mystics or 
men of spiritual enlightenment who realize that such versions of `God' or 
purely symbolic. They realize that different religions are equally valid 
theophanias. The historically drawn-out societal polarization on religious 
grounds was uncalled for. Religious intolerance and fanaticism have no place 
in Ibn Arabi's world-view and value-system. 
As against a rational appropriation or explanation of God, we have to 
realize our essential divinity. We have to realize that we have been created in 
the image of God Himself Like other Sufis, IbnArabi was fond of quoting 
Hadith Qudsi: "I was a hidden treasure and I yearned to be known. Then I 
created creatures in order to be known by them". It was God's longing for self-
introduction which acted as a creative force and brought the whole of our 
cosmos into existence. This creative divine longing not only brought the entire 
coir and furniture of the cosmos into being but also exhaled human beings. 
These human beings act as logoi, words that express God to Himself. Every 
human being is a unique expression of God, a unique epiphany of Hidden God. 
Every human being is a manifestation of God in a particular and unrepeatable 
manner. Each one of us as logoi is a divine presence. However, the reality of 
God being eternally inexhaustible, the revelation that God has made in each of 
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us is unique and innumerable human beings reveal God in their own different 
and unique ways. Each human being in his or her unique way delivers the 
Hidden God from his solitude. 
Philosophy is an epistemo-ontocosmo-axiological complex. True 
propositions are correspondences with what is onto cosmologically real as good 
values are accordance with it. Truth corresponds to reality and goodness 
accords with it. True propositions represent reality while good values stem 
from it. The reality is verificatory of truth while it is justificatory of values. A 
world-view as a gestalt of propositions is true in so for as it depicts which is 
ultimately real and a value-system is good in proportion to its' accordance with 
the beliefs or doctrines constituting a world-view. There are thinkers who 
maintain that our need for an axiological order leads to the formulation of an 
ontocosmological system. Our need for a value-system leads to the formulation 
of a world-view. Axiology precedes ontocosmology and not vice-versa. 
However, mainstream philosophical traditions have historically maintained that 
it is the ontocosmological accounts of reality that have been verificatory of 
truth and justificatory of good. 
Rumi 
Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi (1206-1273), the thirteenth century poet 
philosopher of Khurasan is globally acknowledged to be the greatest Sufi-poet. 
He was a man of great intellectual achievements and greater spiritual 
accomplishments. His poetry is profoundly informed by the Qur'anic world-
view and value-system. He was also convinced of the overwhelming and all-
pervading role of love underlined by Jesus and other Christian and Muslim 
mystics. His Mathnawi creatively transcends contradictions and harmonises 
diversities. As a philosophical spiritualist, Rumi postulates the ground of Being 
akin to ourselves as Spirit or Ego. The universe is a constitution of infinite egos 
emanating from the cosmic Ego or God — the Universal Monad (Sharif, (1995) 
vol. II, 827). Although committed to Semitic beliefs and values, Rumi feels 
oriented to emanationistic cosmology rather than the creationistic one. All 
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beings have emanated from the Self-Existent God, from the overflow of the 
Divine Spirit. However, every being or ego nurses the irresistible urge to return 
to its origin. This universally and eternally operating urge is called love by 
Rumi — the love that is the principle of universal evolution. However, the 
evolution is not physically, chemically and biologically or mechanistically 
driven by natural selection but teleologically pulled by God who is the Alpha 
and Omega of the universal evolution. God is the goal of cosmic evolutionary 
process. Life is evolved out of matter but matter is potentially spiritual (M.M. 
Sharif, op.cit., 827). The evolutionary process according to Rumi started with 
the atomic particulars, it negotiated inorganic matter, crossed over to botanical 
realm, then stopped into animal kingdom, culminating into human order. The 
evolutionary process will have to ultimately culminate into with God. 
Rumi as a philosophical integrationist accommodates rationalist, 
empiricist and intuitionist theories of knowledge. Sense experience, according 
to Rumi, is a crucial source of knowledge. However, our perceptual powers 
cannot appreciate the transphenomenal dimensions of reality. Understanding 
the transphenomenal reality is not within the purview of sense-experience 
(Iqbal, A: 1956, 222). Apart from sense experience or perception, reason is the 
most important source of knowledge, according to Rumi. In logical and 
mathematical investigations and deductions, the role of reason is all-important. 
One of the crucial tasks of the reason is to work out the limitations of sense-
experience. In view of the dichotomy between appearance and reality, reason 
rejects the claim of sense-experience to arrive at any certainty. In view of the 
limitations of sense- experience reason volunteers its own arguments with a 
view to arriving at sure and certain knowledge about Reality. However, Rumi 
points out that reason is blissfully ignorant of its limitations. It sets out to 
accomplish what is beyond its capacity. It is inextricably controlled by 
infrarational dimensions of our existence. Besides even the most powerful 
rational arguments generate as well as invite counter-arguments. In this 
argumentative crossfire reason unavoidably and inevitably proliferates riddles, 
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puzzles, paradoxes and contradictions, Thus rational arguments can get 
pathologically dialectical and philosophers can knot themselves in hair-splitting 
debates leading to inseparable and irresolvable difficulties. Moreover, reason is 
powerfully oriented to utilitarian calculations or considerations of profit and 
loss. Human reason can guide us only up to an extent. It has finally to 
subordinate itself to the divulgements and disclosures of intuition or love. 
Love or intuition plays the most crucial role in the epistemological, 
onto cosmological and axiological accounts advanced by Rumi. Just as 
phenomenal features of the universe can be grasped through perceptual 
encounter and logico-mathematical deductions and scientific inductions can be 
carried out by recourse to application of reason, so can intuition or love furnish 
us an appreciation or realization of Ultimate Reality or God. God is 
personification of Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Perfection. Love is the 
universal principle of appropriation, absorption, evolution, assimilation, growth 
and reproduction. While reason or intellect is ineradicably votexed into 
calculations and considerations, love is a madness oriented to an appropriation 
of Ultimate Reality. It is the Ultimate cosmological principle, the principle of 
the genesis and evolution of the Universe. Reason can orientate us towards a 
realization of God but it cannot explain the relationship between God and man, 
It is so because reason is descriptive and analogical and anchored on 
conjunctions and disjunctions whereas there is no uniting and separating in the 
realm of spirit (Rumi: Mathnawi; (1966) Book IV, Verse, 3696). The intellect 
cannot fmd the way to man's divine connection for it is in bondage to 
separation and union (!bid, verse 4699). 
Rumi is more of a teleologist and evolutionist than that of an 
epistemologist or metaphysician. As a teleological seer, he is thoroughly 
cognizant of turns and twists and vicissitudes of life; inorganic matter dying 
unto itself, becoming organic and living a higher life in the plant; plant dying 
unto itself and living into still higher life in the animal and the entire 
evolutionary process illustrating the principle of dying to live or vindicating the 
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paradox of love, viz., it is by giving we take and by dying we live, For Rumi 
the principle of growth and development through the organic power of 
assimilation is the highest principle of explanation. It is impossible to explain 
mind body relationship by recourse to physical causation. The evolution of life 
exhibits qualitative transformation. We cannot have a causal explanation as to 
how fuel turns into fire or bread turns into life or life turns into consciousness. 
Rumi brings out that we may not have a causal explanation of man finally 
connecting with the Divine but it seems possible that through a new qualitative 
transformation man might actually turn into or become identical with God 
(Hakim, 1959, 49-50). 
It is only through intuition or love that we can appreciate this 
perennially ongoing and ascending evolutionary process. Reason being 
essentially a principle of differentiation and separation can analyse, dissect and 
split reality into many parts but cannot take holistic view of reality. While 
reason cannot take any integral view of reality, language is opaque to an 
understanding. and expression of metaphysical and spiritual verities of life, Life 
and existence are impervious to linguistic expressions. And even when we 
formulate whatsoever expression with regard to life and existence, we can not 
simplify them or analyse them into complete clarity or transparency. Further 
linguistic clarifications, interpretations and explanations would all the more 
mystify the original linguistic positions so that we can go on advancing 
linguistic substitutions or replacements without ever resolving the controversies 
or clinching the issues under consideration. Our apparently attempted rational 
solutions and linguistic encapsulations would only lead to multiplication or 
proliferation of ever-going and never-ending complications. The rationally and 
linguistically designed mystifications, obscurities, confusions, bewilderments 
and obfuscations could be seen through, clarified and resolved by recourse.to 
intuitive divulgements and disclosures. They cannot be illustrated or 
illuminated by substitutive rationalisations and linguistifications. The following 
lines from Rumi's Mathnawi would be in order: 
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"Would that Being had a tongue, that it might remove the veils 
from existent beings. 
"0 breath of (phenomenal) existence, whatsoever words thou 
mayest utter, know that thereby thou hast bound another veil 
upon it (the mystery) . 
"That utterance and (that) state (of existence) are the bane of 
spiritual understanding; to wash away blood with blood is 
absurd, absurd" (Rumi, Mathnawi; Book III, Verses 4725-
4727) 
The normal modes of understanding, explanation and interpretation such 
as sense-experience, reason and language suffer from inseparable limitations. 
In view of the same, philosophical systems and theological interpretations can 
not furnish us an appreciation of Reality. For Rumi, only a man of intuition or 
man of love can be the real criterion of knowledge, truth and reality. Even the 
doubt of the man of love has the scent of certainty. Even his infidelity has a 
ring of true religion. Even his falsehood smells true. The irresistible onward 
march of love can be consumed only in the fire of love (Hakim, op.cit., 55-56). 
It is not the man of learning and intelligence who inaugurates revolutionary 
turnarounds in history. It is the men of love, intuition and revelation — the 
Prophets; who direct and execute breakthroughs in our onward march of 
spiritual evolution. Hundreds of thousands of lances of Pharaoh were shattered 
by one staff of Moses. The great medical achievements of Greece were a 
laughing stock in the presence of the breath of Jesus. Great poetical 
achievements of Arabs paled into insignificance in comparison to the 
revelations of an illiterate Prophet (Rumi, Book 1, Verses 527-29). A man of 
love, intuition and revelation realizes his divinity and becomes the source of 
infinite power and knowledge. Such a realized soul is like Christ, the spirit of 
God-realising our transcendental or eternal self is the end and goal of life. He is 
the ideal Man clothed with the attributes of divinity. He is identical to Logos or 
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the Universal Reason. His eyes pierce every veil because he sees with the light 
of God: 
"The spiritual insight is the gift of God; it is a fountain in the 
midst of the soul". (Rumi: Mathnawl; Book IV, Verse 1964). 
"Whosoever has a door opened in his breast sees the Sun in 
every item" (Khalifa Abdul Hakim, op.cit., p. 100) 
"The Sufi's book is not composed of ink and letters: it is 
naught but a heart white as snow" (Rumi: Book II, Verse 159) 
"He who has an impressionless and clear breast becomes 
mirror for the impression of the Unseen (Hakim: op.c p   
100) f' ,. 	No....._........... 
Rumi stresses that propositional knowledge cannot furn''  
certainty about what is Ultimately Real. In order to =' 
authentically appropriate the certainty with regard to Reality of 
God the seeker will have to actually burn into the fire of love 
of God. It is only the love of God which can culminate into the 
vision of the Splendour and Beatitude of God, 
Mulla Sadra 
Mulla Sadra (1571-1640 A.D.), an outstanding Iranian Sufi philosopher 
was inspired by Greek Masters, the Quran and Sunnah, and esoteric teachings 
of the Imams. He was also profoundly inspired by the mystic philosophy of 
Plotinus philosophical weltanchauung of Ibn Sina and gnostic wisdom of Ibn 
Arabi. He synthesized religious revelation, philosophical demonstration and 
mystical illumination with a view to achieving integral truth in all its gradations 
and manifestations. As a multidimensional and integral genius he was open to 
the challenges and imperatives of religion, philosophy and mysticism. In his 
intellectual achievements and spiritual accomplishments, he was as impressive 
and influential as Ghazali, Ibn Arabi and Rumi, 
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Mulla Sadra classifies knowledge into various schemes: ' there are 
Theoretical Sciences and Practical Sciences. There are also science of words 
(Jim al-Agwal), the science of act (lrlm a]-Afal) and the science of 
contemplation (Jim al-Ahwal). There are also worldly sciences and other-
worldly sciences. Broadly speaking, there are mainly two types of knowledge; 
(i) formal knowledge, and (ii) intuitional knowledge. Formal knowledge can be 
acquired through schooling and training. Intuitional knowledge is the privilege 
of the Prophets and the Saints who attain to this knowledge through intellectual 
illumination and spiritual purification. 
Mulla Sadra's philosophy is anchored on the unity and gradation of 
Being. While Being's fundamental quiddities are nothing but accidents, they do 
not have a reality independent of Being. Metaphysics is an investigation of 
Absolute Being which is unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity and 
essentially indivisible and beyond all contradictions. While God is self-
subsisting. Being, everything beside God is a part of collective Being. While 
God is Necessary Being, the universe is possible Being. There are particular 
quiddities and universal quiddities. The terrestrial world is the home of 
particulars and the universal quiddities are as archetypes in the spiritual world. 
The activities of the human and non-human species are governed by their 
respective archetypes (Kazmi, (2003, 59-65). 
The universe is a manifestation of Being. However, there are degrees 
and stages of manifestation. While God is Absolute Being, things besides God 
can be hierarchized in a chain of respective relativity ranging from the pure 
potentiality of.the matter to the highest realm of Pure Intelligences. Becoming 
is nothing but recreation of the accidents as well as the substance of the 
universe at every instance. The velocity of the change is so rapid that the all-
pervading substantial motion gets imperceptible. The Being of the universe is 
renewed at every moment through substantial motion. The world is created at 
every instant. The first determination of Divine Essence is the reality of 
Mohammad, the pure intelligences emerging subsequently. The Prophets and 
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Saints are given revelations and intuitions through the Last Intelligence which 
determines and govern the terrestrial world. Knowledge is the very substance 
of cosmic manifestation itself. Knowledge and Being or the Knower and 
Known are essentially the same. God's knowledge of things is identical with 
their being. God's Being and Essence are identical. While knowing His 
Essence, God is simultaneously the Knower, the Knowledge and the Known. 
Mulla Sadra presages Hegel in the espousal of the identity of Thought and 
Being. 
Soul passes through an evolutionary process starting through material, 
vegetative and animal stages. It finally emerges unto human plane. It is 
invested with perceptual, imaginative and intellectual faculties through which 
human knowledge is acquired and appropriated. 
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi 
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, qualified or critiqued the doctrine of Wandat-al 
Wujud (Oneness of Being) advanced by Ibn Arabi. Sirhindi's doctrine was 
designated as Wandat-al-Shuhud (Oneness of appearance) . The doctrine of 
Wandat al-Wujud of Ibn Arabi advances the view that Being is One and that 
only that One Being or Allah exists. What appears, universe is manifestations 
of His Attributes. Thus, the universe is merely nominal, unreal, imaginary, 
objectively non-existent and God alone exists. The world of multiplicity exists 
only as the modes of His Unity (Faruqi, 1977, 86-9 1). 
Shaikh Sirhindi launched a powerful critique of Ibn Arabi's 
ontocosmological position. As a mystic or Sufi seer Sirhindi claims to have 
negotiated three stages of realization: firstly, he experienced the stage of 
Wujudiyat or pantheism, secondly, he passed through Zilliyat or adumberation 
and thirdly, he negotiated the stage of Abdiyyat or servitude. At the first stage 
of Wujudiyat or pantheism, Sirhindi intimately experiences the surety or 
certainty of God. At this stage, like Ibn Arabi, he also experiences the identity 
of God and the Universe. The second stage of his spiritual experience intimates 
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to him the realization that the universe has a measure of reality of its own even 
though it is just a shadow or adumbration of the reality of God. At the third and 
final stage of Abdiyyat or servitude, Sirhindi comes to realize that two of his 
previous realizations or experiences were purely subjective or unreliable. At 
this stage, Sirhindi finds no scope for the identity of God, man and universe. In 
the process, Sirhindi questions the very epistemic validity of mystical 
experiences and claims. Finally, Sirhindi realizes the utter impossibility of 
grasping God through mystical experience. Sirhindi becomes categorically 
convinced that God is beyond the categories of human understanding and 
interpretations. He is absolutely outside the cognitive faculties human beings 
are blessed with. He is absolutely transcendental and we can realize or 
appropriate him only through faith (Farauqi, op.cit., 98) . Accordingly, Sirhindi 
questions all the mystical claims advanced by Ibn Arabi. He questions the 
modus operandi, locus stands and raison de'tre of Ibn Arabi's mystical 
weltanschauung. 
Firstly, he questions Ibn Arabi's claim that Attributes of Allah are 
identical with His Being and world is the emanation of His Attributes. The 
Divine Attributes are perfect whereas the world supposed to be their emanation 
is radically imperfect. There is, for example, no resemblance between Divine 
Knowledge and human knowledge and it is absolutely questionable to regard 
human knowledge in whatsoever sense an emanation of or manifestation from 
Divine Knowledge. 
Secondly, Mujadid says that Ibn Arabi's basic contention that only God 
exists and nothing exists apart from God is a function of the mystical stage of 
Fana (annihilation of self). At this stage, the mystic is so much absorbed in the 
God that he becomes utterly oblivious of the phenomenal features, objects and 
events of the world. However, it does not mean that the world does not exist. 
Stars in the sky do disappear from sunrise to sunset but it doesn't mean that 
they no longer exist. Our experience of concentration on or absorption into God 
can for a while eclipse the phenomenal world but it doesn't mean that the world 
as such does not exist or stops existing at all (ibid: p. 103). Only a higher 
mystical experience which goes beyond the stage of Fana can furnish us the 
realization that assumption of the unreality of the world is a pernicious mistake. 
Thirdly, Sirhindi contend's that Ibn Arabi's ontocosmological position 
does not accord with two of the fundamental teachings of the Quran viz; God's 
being absolutely distinct from the world and the world itself being a reality and 
not something unreal, imaginary or nominol. The entire Qur'anic 
commandments, injunctions, propositions, promises of reward, warnings of 
punishment etc., assume the reality of the world. In case, God forbidding, the 
world is unreal, the entire Qur'anic world-view and value-system becomes' 
infructuous and pointless (ibid: 104) . 
Fourthly, Ibn Arabi's basic contention of the identity of God, man and 
the universe is a function of the mystical stage of Tajalli Y-Dhati (vision of 
Being). At this stage, the mystic feels that he is directly vouchsafed the 
plenitude and beatitude of God. However, this is only a feeling or appearance 
of the divulgement of God's reality to the mystic. Only when a mystic 
outgrows this mystical stage, can he realize that God is wholly other and cannot 
be approached through any experience. It is at this stage that the mystic can 
grasp the utter futility of the identity-thesis. Ibn Arabi's uncompromising 
espousal and radical advocacy of identity-thesis has got to be appreciated 
against the backdrop of his failure to graduate from a lower mystical stage to a 
higher one (ibid: 104) . 
Fifthly, Sirhindi contends that Ibn Arabi's doctrine of adumbration- is 
highly untenable. Firstly, the world is not an adumbration of God. Now, even if 
we accept the world to be an adumbration of God, it does not necessarily 
establish their identity. Ibn Arabi's contention of identifying man with God is 
also a fabrication or concoction of his fertile imagination. Quran does bring out 
that God is nearer to man than his jugular vein or God has made man in His 
own image. However, it does not prove the identity of man with God. At best, 
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it establishes that God and human soul are non-spatial and thus resemble, in 
this respect, with each other (Ibid., pp. 105-117). 
Sixthly, Sirhindi questions Ibn Arabi's ontocosmology by pointing out 
that his position is antithetical to the teachings of the Prophet. The Prophets do 
not teach Oneness of Being; they, instead teach Oneness of God. The 
fundamental proposition advanced by Prophets is that there is no God but Allah 
but they do not teach that nothing exists besides Allah. The basic assumption of 
the religion of Prophets is the duality of God and world. The doctrine of the 
identity of God and world is a contradiction of the teachings of the Prophets. 
Instead of proclaiming the identity of God and world, Prophets underline that 
God is the creator of the universe and the universe is His creation. 
Seventhly, Ibn Arabi's doctrine is unacceptable to Sirhindi for it's 
espousal of relative evil and denial of real evil. If universe is deemed to be a 
manifestation of God then there is no scope for evil in this universe for it is a 
manifestation of the Perfect God. However, Islam categorically brings out 
unconditional evil such as heresy— which is an unqualified evil. Ibn Arabi's 
doctrine can at best explain or accommodate relative evil but it cannot explain 
or give a coherent account of absolute evil. However, the unacceptability and 
inexplicability of absolute evil is an unqualified negation and contradiction of 
Islamic value-system. 
Eightly, Ibn Arabi's doctrine of Oneness of Being cuts at the very roots 
of man's moral agenthood. Consequently, it demolishes the very notion of 
moral responsibility and abolishes the very concept of our eschatological 
accountability. It is so on account of the fact that Ibn Arabi's doctrine implies 
that whatever action is carried out by any human being at any point of time is, 
in fact, carried out by God. Sirhindi contends that such an implication 
tantamounts to demolishing of one of the cornerstones of Islam, viz; the moral 
agent-hood and freedom of man (Mir: 2008, 57-9). 
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Ninthly, Sirhindi criticizes Ibn ARabi's doctrine of Oneness of Being for 
violating some continuously held beliefs and practices of Muslim community. 
By identifying world with God, Ibn Arabi is seamlessly getting 
omnijustificatory, Any beliefs and any practices; whatsoever, whensoever, 
wheresoever, can be justified by recourse to Ibn Arabi's ontocosmology. For 
example, Ibn Arabi can provide justification for Idol worship. It can be argued 
that worship of any object as manifestation of God can be construed as worship 
of God (Ibid., p. 58). 
Tenthly, Sirhindi criticizes Ibn Arabi for presenting a doctrine which has 
not been advanced by any of the outstanding Sufi's from the advent of Islam 
since the early seventh century A.D. to the end of twenty century A.D. i.e. for 
almost first six hundred years of Islamic history. In view of the same, Sirhindi 
declares Ibn Arabi's doctrine to be totally incompatible with authentic beliefs 
and values of Islam (Ansari, (1966), 106-10). 
In view of the above considerations, Sirhindi stresses that Ibn Arabi's 
doctrine of Oneness of Being is untenable, groundless and false. The mystic 
experience of Oneness of Being is a function of the institutional training and 
conditioning of seekers. We just cannot know God by recourse to intuition or 
mystical experience. God has created the entire universe out of absolute 
nothing. The world has an existence besides God. Of course, the world has no 
genuine reality of its own. It is not more than an appearance. However, it's 
appearance does not depend on our fancy or imagination. It does exist 
independent of us. For all its reflected glory, the world nevertheless is a 
creation of God. Man too despite his spiritual immanence is a worshipper and 
servant of God. Accordingly man has to be guided by the commandments of 
Allah. Only through faith in and obedience to Allah can man achieve the 
supreme felicity, as man is incapable of knowing God by whatsoever means. 
The path to Allah is that of devotion and not that of knowledge (Farauqi, 117-
139) . 
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Shah Wall Allah 
Shah Wali Allah was an outstanding Sufi philosopher of eighteenth 
century India. He had a special acumen for what may be called hermeneutics of 
reconciliation. He tried to workout reconciliation among (1) various schools of 
jurisprudence, (ii) various Sufi Orders, (iii) Shari'ah and Tariqqah and (iv) 
Wandat al wujud and Wandat al-Shuhud. 
Shah is especially famous for his reconciliation between Wujudi and 
Shuhudi ontocosmological standpoints. Shah Wali Allah's reconciliation 
between Wandat ai-Wujud and Wandat al-Shuhud starts with the assumption 
that God created Nafs-i-Kulli or the Universal Soul ex-Nihlo. The 
differentiation of this Universal Soul constitutes our universe. The Universe we 
are living in manifests the Universal Soul in various modes. When Sufis talk*of 
Unity-in-diversity, they are talking of the unity of the Universal Soul. It should 
not be construed to be the unity of the world and Divine Being, although, 
explaining the distinction between God and Universal Soul is impossible of 
formulation. It is beyond the grasp of human faculties of understanding to 
clearly and categorically distinguish between the Divine Being and Universal 
Soul. Confusing one with the other by Sufis can be highly misleading. The 
following words are worthy of serious consideration: 
Shah Wall Allah contends that pantheists have failed to grasp 
the real nature of God. The failure has been mainly due to 
deficient intellect and immature faculties. They could not 
understand the transcendent and independent nature of God 
owing to their preoccupation with the nature of Divine 
manifestation. Unlike, the common pantheists Shah Wall Allah 
believed in the transcendental nature of God. However, he also 
believed in His Immanence. In fact, Shah Wali Allah maintains 
that Wandat al-Wujud and Wandat a] Shuhud are two related 
terms used at two different places in an argument on Divine 
Being." (Islamic Culture, 1952, 12). 
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According to Shah Wali Allah, the Universal Soul is the source of all 
forms of existence. The primordial process of origination brings about the 
emergence of the Universal Soul. From this Universal Soul originates the 
multiplicity or the multi-complexity of the entire universe. The Universal Soul 
subsists by itself. It is simultaneously the cause of the subsistence of everything 
other than itself. It is both immanent and transcendent and pervades the entire 
universe. The human faculties of understanding and interpretation can not 
graduate beyond a consideration of the Universal Soul to the original Sanctum 
Sanctorum or realm of Divine Existence or realm of Allah. Our highest 
spiritual progress is limited to a realization of the Universal Soul (Jalbani, 98). 
Shah Wali Allah works out a crative synthesis or reconciliation between 
the doctrine of Wandat al-Wujud as formulated by Ibn Arabi and doctrine of 
Wandat al-Shuhud as outlined by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi. Both these doctrines, 
according to Shah Wali Allah try to explain the relationship between the 
Absolute and its manifestations or revelations in the light of their respective 
mystical intuitions. The mystical intuition of a Sufi seer like IbnArabi 
orientates him to perceive all existent phenomenon as modes of Being. The 
mystical intuition of a Sufi seer like Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi orientates him to 
view phenomenon as autonomously and independently existing (Rizvi, 1978, 
258). The apparent differences between the Wujudi and Shuhudi doctrines are 
occasgned by differing linguistic expressions employed by their exponents. 
When Ibn Arabi says that the names and attributes of Universal Soul signifies 
the realities of the existing things and when Shaikh Sirhindi says that existing 
things are totally devoid of any reality and their reality if any is granted to them 
through the reflection of the lights of name and attributes of the Universal Soul, 
they are essentially saying the same thing (Jalbani, 99). There is no substantial 
difference between these two doctrines. The Mujadid and Ibn Arabi relate the 
same fact in two different languages. But the short-sighted critiques look upon 
these matter of vital difference (Sharif : (1995), 1572). 
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(C) PHILOSOPHERS 
(a) Ikhwan Al-Safa 
By late tenth century A.D. an association of men of science, religion, 
mysticism and philosophy was formed at Baghdad. The scientists, religionists, 
mystics and philosophers comprising Ikhwan al--Safa were committed to a 
rational discussion and critical evaluation of all that was under the Sun. In their 
fifty two treatises they discussed physical, chemical, biological, geographical, 
astronomical, mystical, metaphysical, mathematical, logical, social, political 
and anthropological questions and issues of fundamental significance. They 
were highly eclectic and derived their philosophical elements from Hebraic, 
Syriac, Christian, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Islamic and Greek thought. More 
importantly, Pythagoreas, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus were their philosophical 
heroes. They were guided by the assumption of the ultimate compatibility 
among religious, scientific and philosophical pursuits. 
In keeping with the Platonic and Neo-Platonic mysticism, they assumed 
the purification of the soul to be the ultimate purpose of knowledge or gnosis. 
Along with body, man is also blessed with rational and spiritual elements 
which constitute his soul. The soul in its search for purification graduates from 
consideration of the concrete to the assimilation of the abstract. While sense 
experience furnishes us the knowledge of the phenomenal world, logical and 
mathematical propositions are intuitively grasped by our soul. The soul belongs 
to the realm of rational and super-sensible. This realm is also the abode of 
Universals of Plato, Laws of Logic, Axioms of Mathematics, Absolute Values 
and Religious Verities etc. The soul, spirit and reason belong to the same 
realm. Absolute values such as Truth, Beauty and Goodness also belong to this 
realm. Human soul is primordially and innately endowed with all actual and 
possible knowledge. If we can realize our innate potential, we can achieve all 
actual and possible knowledge. All knowledge is recollection of the laws of 
pure reason by our soul (De Boer, 1985, 84-5). 
Ikhwan al-Safa, in deference to Pythagoreas, Plato and Aristotle 
underlined the importance of studying mathematics and logic with a view to 
purifying our soul. They also laid great emphasis on the righteous conduct and 
religious life as measures for the purification of soul. The ontological, 
cosmological and metaphysics orientation of Ikhwan al-Safa was directed by 
Neo-Platonic views. For them, as for Plotinus, human thought and knowledge 
can never encompass God. Common people tend to develop sensuous and 
pictorial conception of God. 
Philosophers, in view of their advanced spiritual endeavours 
correspondingly developed a higher or advanced conception of God. For 
Ikhwam al-Safa God is beyond all material and mental distinctions and 
oppositions. The world is derived from God by recourse to an emanatory 
process. While all individual souls return to the World Soul, the World Soul 
will also finally return to God. All individual souls have to pass through the 
purificatory process in view of their material entanglements. Every Soul has 
been blessed with various faculties or powers. The highest faculties. according 
to human soul are philosophical and religious powers. The highest 
accomplishment to be worked out by religion and philosophy is complete 
moral and spiritual transformation of man. 
(b) Farabi 
Farabi (870-950 A.D.) is one of the most celebrated philosophers of 
Muslim world. He was an outstanding logician, metaphysician, cosmologist 
and epistemologist. He was also one of the greatest political and ethical 
philosophers of all time. Besides being a profound Islamic scholar, he had 
mastered Greek philosophical sciences as well. Plato, Aristotle and Plotinous 
had especially impacted his philosophical development. He struggled all along 
his philosophical career to working out a creative synthesis between Greek 
philosophical doctrines and the Qur'anic beliefs and values. 
For Farabi, Being is the most universal and most indefinable of 
concepts. There are two types of Being: Necessary Being (Wajib al-Wujud) and 
Possible Being (Mumkin al-Wujud). The Necessary Being is substantial and 
independent of all possible beings. The non-existence of Necessary Being is 
inconceivable and unthinkable. The Necessary Being has to necessarily exist; it 
cannot but exist. The Necessary Being is universal, eternal, substantial and 
such a Being cannot be anything but God according to Farabi. What exists 
beside God is contingent and may or may not exist. Farabi's proof for the 
existence of God are from Motion, Cause and Contingency. Firstly, the alI-
pervading movement across the spectrum implies that there has to be a Prime 
Mover. The causal chain across the spectrum implies that there has to be an 
Ultimate First Cause. The chain of contingent existents implies that there has to 
be a Necessary Existence. That Prime Mover, that First Cause and that 
Necessary Existence is God. 
In his epistemological investigations, Farabi is both an empiricist and 
rationalist. The knowledge of individuals and particulars are furnished to us 
through five senses. However, the conceptual or universal knowledge is 
provided to us through our intellect. We are also blessed with imaginative, 
cogitative and recollecting powers. Even our instincts have innate cognitive 
functions. For example, animals are instinctively oriented to dangers from 
predators and accordingly conduct themselves to safety. Our intellectual 
powers are characteristically human powers by recourse to which wejudge true 
from false, good from evil, real from unreal, significant from insignificant and 
beautiful from ugly. Man is blessed with (i) a speculative intellect and (ii) a 
practical intellect; the formal understanding the universal and eternal principles 
and later governing the operations within the sensible world. The speculative 
intellect is comprised of four faculties: (i) the Passive Intellect, (ii) the Active 
Intellect, (iii) the Acquired Intellect and (iv) Actual Intellect. The Passive 
Intellect is potentially the source of intelligibility of phenomenal features or 
objects. It graduates from mere potentiality to actuality when it sifts the 
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individuating notes from the essences of objects. The Active Intellect is the 
cause of the Passive Intellect's passing from potentiality to actuality. The 
Passive Intellect has the potentiality which is actualized by the Active Intellect. 
The Acquired Intellect has the function of comprehending abstractions. The 
Acquired Intellect is the agent of actualization. The Agent or Actual Intellect is 
that principle which makes that essence which was in intellect in potentiality, 
an intellect in actuality and which makes the intelligible in potentiality into 
intelligible into actuality. It is treated as an immaterial, eternal substance that 
functions as the efficient cause of human intellection enabling universal 
concept to be abstracted from sensible images (Nasr & Leaman: 1990, 186). 
Parabi also brings out an account of the Prophetic revelation. The Prophet with 
a supremely powerful imagination can commune with the Active Intelligence 
and can attain to most authentic inspirations and visions. The revelations are 
emanations from God which the Prophet negotiates through the intermediation 
of Active Intelligence. The mystics are also blessed with visions and 
inspirations through contact with the Active Intelligence. Every person is 
potentially capable of communing with Agent Intelligence through 
imagination. However, only privileged and chosen people have such a powerful 
imagination. The Prophets can commune with Active Intelligence through 
imagination and philosophers are too capable of doing the same through 
contemplation. Thus religious truth and philosophical truth are both radiations 
of Divine Illumination. 
(c) Ibn Sina 
Ibn Sina was one of the foremost philosophers and creative thinkers in 
the history of Islam. He is inspired by Aristotle and Plotinus. He is also deeply 
impacted by Farabi. Like Farabi his main philosophical mission was working 
out a reconciliation between Islamic world-view and assumptions and 
principles of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic systems of philosophy. . 
Ibn Sina's metaphysics, theology and ontocosmology are a synthesis of 
Greek philosophical doctrines and the Qur'anic beliefs. For Ibn Sina, God is 
eternally and supremely transcendental. However, God's relationship with the 
world is negotiated by intermediary links. These links relate Absolute Eternity 
and Necessity of God with a world of pure contingency. Following Neo-
Platonic theory of emanation, Ibn Sina argues that the First Intelligence alone 
flows from God. He being an Absolute Unity, only one thing can emanate from 
Him. The First Intelligence gives rise to two entities: (i) The Second 
Intelligence and (ii) the First and Highest sphere. This dual emanatory process 
continues down to Tenth Intelligence which presidesover sublunary world. The 
existence of God, according to Ibn Sina does not require any metaphysical or 
theological proof. God is the ground of Being. His Existence is Self-Evident. 
Given God we can understand the existence of the world. Ibn Sina advocates 
mind-body dualism. For him, soul is a substance capable of existing 
independently of body. The soul is an independent substance and is our 
transcendental self, a pure spiritual entity. However, at the phenomenal level 
there exists a mystic link between each soul and body which renders them 
exclusively appropriate for each other. Ibn Sina advocates that soul is capable 
of transcending its own body. At this level, the soul becomes akin to Universal 
Soul. It is of the nature of mind to influence matter and it is of the nature of 
matter to obediently follow the instructions of mind (Sharif : (1995), 487-492). 
According to Ibn Sina, human thinking, in its' raw form, is ultimately 
linked to errors of appearance and desire and epistemic and moral limitations. 
It needs great intellectual struggle to elevate the representations of the sense-
experience to the pure truth of Reason. It is through reason that we can gain 
necessary knowledge with regard to respective propositions in their different 
permutations and combinations. The existence originates in the mind of God 
and when existents appear in material forms, we are confronted by plurality 
and multiplicity. It is only at the human intellectual level that universal ideas 
are established. 
Ibn Sina classifies soul into three kinds: (a) the vegetable minds or 
souls, (b) the animal minds or souls and (c) the rational or human minds or 
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souls. The vegetable mind possesses three faculties: (i) nutritive power, (ii) 
power of growth and (iii) power of reproduction. The animal mind possesses 
two faculties: (i) motivative faculties and (ii) perceptive faculties over and 
above the three faculties they share with vegetable mind. All the faculties of 
vegetable and animal minds are shared by the human mind. However, man is 
also blessed with reason or intellect. The human rational soul can be divided 
into (a) practical and (b) theoretical faculties. The practical faculties or the 
principle of movement of the human body, motivate the body to actions 
characterized by deliberation and purposive consideration. The function of the 
theoretical faculty is to attune to the higher realm of ideas. This faculty receives 
the impressions of the Universal Forms. IbnSina classifies Theoretical Intellect 
also as (i) Habitual Intellect, (ii) Actual Intellect and (iii) Acquired Intellect. 
Man is also bestowed with various kinds of perceptions such as perception by 
sense, perception by imagination and perception by estimation. 
Reason stands at the apex of the intellectual powers of the soul. The 
Unity of Reason is exhibited in self-consciousness. Reason lifts up the lower 
powers of the soul and refines sense-perception. Reason at first, a mere 
capacity for thought becomes elaborated by the finished material conveyed to it 
by the external and internal senses. Real essence of man lies in his rational soul 
to which is given the higher enlightenment by the world-spirit (De Boer: 141-
142) . 
Ibn Sina also brings out the necessity for divinely ordained Prophetic 
revelation. The Prophet, without much formal instruction, can by his very 
nature become the repository of truth. He must be an exceptionally endowed 
man who has a total contact with reality which translates itself into propositions 
about the nature of reality and about future history. It is simultaneously 
intellectual and spiritual. It is on the basis of his spiritual insight that the true 
Prophet creates new moral values and influences human history, The Prophet 
has a deep and unalterable self-assurance and faith in his own capacity for true 
knowledge and accurate moral judgment. His faith in himself makes others 
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believe in him. The creative knowledge of the Prophet is christened by Ibn Sina 
as Active Intellect and identified with the angel of revelation. The Prophet qua 
Prophet is identical with the Active Intellect. The Prophetic revelation impels 
people to action. The Prophet can express his moral insights into definite 
purposes, principles and indeed into socio-political structure. The Prophet 
therefore has to be a law-giver and a statesman par-excellence. The philosopher 
is gifted with a special tablet to appreciate the real meaning and significance of 
the Law given by the Prophet. For non-philosophers who can not attain to 
philosophical understanding of the Law, the letter of the Law must remain the 
litteral truth (Sharif: (1995) 498-501). Ibn Sina's epistemological perspective is 
deeply embedded by mystical elements as well. Through allegorical strategies 
he tries to explain the ascent of human soul or spirit to the sanctam sanctorum 
of Divine Beauty and Light. 
(d) Ibn Rushd 
Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) was possibly the foremost Arab Spanish 
philosopher and the foremost rationalist philosopher amongst Muslim 
philosophers. His Arabic commentaries on Aristotle's treatises passed on to 
Europe in Latin translation and were instrumental in disseminating Greek 
scientific and philosophical culture to Mainland paving the way for 
Renaissance and subsequent advanced intellectual and cultural achievements 
across the Continent. Following Farabi and Ibn Sina, he worked out 
reconciliation between Islam and Greek rationalism with consummate 
hermeneutical skill and intellectual daring. He advanced forceful arguments in 
his Tahafat a] Tahafah (Incoherence of the Incoherence) which he wrote as a 
critical response to Ghazali's Tahafat a] Falasifah (Incoherence of 
philosophers), in defence of the philosophical approach to an appropriation of 
Islam. 
Ibn Rushd underscores that philosophy far from being antithetical to 
Islam, is actually proactively recommended, prescribed and ordained by the 
Quran. Scores of verses underlining the relevance and significance of 
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philosophy can be cited from the Qur'an indicating that the general Muslim 
aversion to philosophy is driven more by the Mullah than by the Allah. 
Dogmatic theologians brimming with their pointless literalism and bereft of the 
requisite hermeneutical nuances and sophistication, advance accounts both of 
philosophy and Islam which are confused and confusing. Philosophy is nothing 
more than speculating on the beings and considering them in so far as they lead 
to the knowledge of the Creator. As against dialectical, rhetorical and 
sophistical methods of deduction, the Qur'an asks us to appropriate God 
through rational consideration and demonstrative method (Sharif: (1995), 545). 
The Quran exhorts us to cultivate rational approach with a view to deciphering 
the significance of the cosmos. It exhorts us to derive appropriate lessons from 
the rise and fall of civilizations and from the various states of our own soul. 
In working out a reconciliation between the beliefs outlined in the Quran 
and rational philosophical claims advanced by Greek philosophers, Ibn Rushd 
underlines the truth of both religion and philosophy. He emphasized that both 
religious beliefs and philosophical propositions were true. Any conflicts 
between religion and philosophy were apparent. There is no basic disharmony 
between philosophical propositions and scriptural revelations. The apparent 
contradiction, if any, can be removed by recourse to appropriate hermeneutical 
response (Watt; 1962, 140). 
The following assumptions of Ibn Rushd's method of interpretation 
bring out his strategy aimed at reconciling the apparent conflict between 
religion and philosophy: 
(i) "Whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the 
apparent meaning of scripture, that apparent meaning admits of 
allegorical interpretation" (Ibn Rushd: Fasl al-Ma gal, p. 292). 
(ii) "Philosophy is in general true and unalterable and the work of 
reconciliation has to be effected chiefly through finding harmonious 
interpretation of scriptures" (Montgomery Watt: op.cit., p. 140) . 
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(iii) "If the traditional (al-Manqul) is found to be contrary to the rational (al-
Maqul), it is to be interpreted in such a way as to be in harmony with the 
rational" (Sharif,  op.cit., 546). 
(iv) "Although Averroes believed that religion and philosophy are in two 
different orbits, he nevertheless felt the necessity of reconciling the two 
and of so stating the philosophic doctrines as not to offend religion and 
of so conceiving the religious dogmas that they would not conflict with 
philosophies" (Paul Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. IV, 
1967, 222). 
According to Ibn Rushd, philosophical mode of grasping the truth is 
demonstrative whereas religious mode of grasping the truth is figurative or 
allegorical. Philosophy and religion are alternative modes of understanding the 
same truth. It is imprudent of theologians to publicly circulate the apparent 
conflicts between philosophical arguments and scriptural revelations that can 
easily be resolved by appropriate interpretation. It is equally imprudent of 
philosophers to reveal their esoteric interpretations for public consumption as 
such an approach proliferates sectarian polarisation. Philosophers can carry out 
and carry on their demonstrations. However, the people at large who are not 
inclined to demonstrative reasoning but are temperamentally oriented to 
dialectrical or rhetorical modes of presentation or persuasion should not get 
embroiled in philosophical disputations. As a matter of fact, philosophers 
endeavour to arrive at truth as it is and common people appropriate truth as 
they themselves are. Philosophers strive for objective truth. Common people 
appropriate truth that is subjective. The common people can imaginatively and 
subjectively arrive at the same basic beliefs which philosophers can arrive at 
through rational deliberations. It is impossible as well as unnecessary to strive 
for a universally acceptable conception of God. We have different emotional 
and intellectual needs. Common people can feel more satisfied by imagining 
God somehow somewhat pictorially. The philosophers can conceive. Him on a 
highly sophisticated and abstract plane. The purpose of the Quran is to 
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orientate masses to belief in the Oneness and Supremacy of Allah, belief in the 
authenticity of the Prophethood and belief in the reality of the Day of 
Judgement and accountability. The inculcation and stabilization of religious 
beliefs would hardly have been buttressed up or reinforced by recourse to fine-
spun philosophical sophistications. 
(e) Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
Sir Sayyid was an outstanding Muslim thinker of nineteenth century 
India. Following Mu'tazilites and Ibn-e-Rushd, Sir Sayyid is an 
uncompromising radical rationalist who advanced a thoroughgoing rationalist 
explanation or interpretation of Islamic beliefs and values. Of course, as a 
believing Muslim, Sir Sayyid does not and cannot offer a rational explanation 
of the Qur'anic beliefs which beliefs are to be appropriated by recourse to 
unconditional and unexceptional faith. Sir Sayyid too accepts God as Self 
Existent, One, First, Last, Hidden, Manifest, Eternal, Universal, Truth, Beauty, 
Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent. However, in his 
articulations and justifications, Sir Sayyid sides with Mu'tazilites. His 
philosophical approach and theological outlook is rationalist. Sir Sayyid refers 
to teleological arguments advanced by the Quran as indicative of a Divine 
Designer or Planner behind the cosmic situation. However, he does not entirely 
depend on teleological considerations with a view to proving the existence of 
God. In order to prove the existence of God, he also advances the cosmological 
argument. Sir Sayyid discerns universal causal nexus across the entire space-
time continuum. All phenomenal features are casually interlinked. Sir Sayyid 
brings out that this causal chain cannot go on forever and has to stop 
somewhere. At the end of the chain there has to be a cause which is itself 
uncaused. This Uncaused Cause is the First Cause. This First Cause is God 
(Magalat-i-Sir Sayyid , 1962, 15) . 
The Universe, according to Sir Sayyid, is governed by universal and 
eternal astronomical, physical and chemical laws. The laws governing the 
Universe are immutable, irreversible and inviolable. There is no scope for 
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anything happening capriciously or whimsically. There is no , room for 
suspension of laws governing the Universe. Similarly and analogously, Sir 
Sayyid advances the view that there is a moral order which is perennially 
governed by fixed moral laws. The moral laws are as inviolate as physical laws 
are immutable. Human actions are necessarily followed by their respective 
consequences whether pleasurable or painful. As man sows so shall he reap. 
God's interventions, favourable or unfavourable, in this regard cannot even be 
thought of for such an interference would constitute the violation of His own 
promises to the effect that He never violates His own promises (Sir Sayyid: 
Tafsir al Quran; vol. III, 1885, 28) . 
The fact that God is Omnipotent does not signify that He is arbitrary. 
God can do anything, However, He will not do anything and everything. No 
external limitations can be placed on God's undertakings. However, He is 
absolutely self-determined. He is regulated by His own plans and purposes. In 
view of the same, the possibility of miracles is ruled out both logically and 
actually. Miracles as occurrences going against the laws of nature are ruled out 
by the Qur'an as well (Ibid., p. 33). The immutability of natural laws also 
impinges on the efficacy of our prayers. According to Sir Syed, our advantages 
or disadvantages are directly proportional to the righteousness or viciousness of 
our actions. Prayers only relieve the individual of his anxiety. They have a 
directive or orientative function. However, such a radical interpretation of the 
efficacy of prayers was condemned by orthodoxy (Sharif (ed.) (1961) 1605). 
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CHAPTER - IV 
KIERKEGAARD ON SUBJECTIVITY 
(A) SUBJECTIVITY 
Kierkegaard's approach to philosophy underlines that philosophy is not 
an exercise in speculative system building. It is rather a systematic and 
sustained reflection upon the concrete problems of human existence. As against 
profound logical, mathematical and scientific investigations for the solutions of 
the problems under consideration, the nature of theological and philosophical' 
problems is radically and categorically different. Logicians, mathematicians 
and scientists can achieve great levels of concentration in their respective fields 
of operation. However, a theologian and a philosopher can experience a sense 
of incomparable engagement while reflecting upon issues such as existence of 
God and soul or a set of values leading to good life etc. The theological or 
philosophical problems are existential in the sense that a sustained reflection on 
such problems can culminate into a deep and abiding self-transformation and 
self-authentication. 
While being engaged in philosophical problems our whole mode of 
existence is at stake. A discussion on existence of God or the acceptability of a 
set of values can not be carried out with geometrical detachment or 
experimental objectivity. If we accept the existence of God or the moral 
efficacy of a set of values, there have got to be corresponding changes in our 
mode of being and style of conduct. The theological beliefs and philosophical 
ideals entail a pursuit, a struggle, a programme or a plan of action. Scientific 
research may also lead to action such as manipulation or explanation of 
external spatio-temporal objects. However, unlike our philosophical 
engagements it can never touch our depths, our values, our aspirations and our 
hopes. Philosophical thinking entails need for self-integration and self-
transformation. It entails need for total commitment corresponding to a set of 
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beliefs and values. Such characterizing features of philosophical engagement 
are totally absent from scientific or mathematical involvements. 
Philosophical questions at their core are existential questions as they 
deeply impact our attitudes, aspirations and responses. Crucial philosophical 
questions are intimately linked to the choice of way of life. What way of life 
should we adopt critically depends upon the choice of our beliefs and values. 
There are alternative sets of beliefs and values and there are no logical and 
experimental grounds that conclusively clinch one particular set of beliefs and 
values. Our ontological, cosmological, axiological, teleological, eschatological 
and sortoriological accounts push us to different or alternative directions and 
no particular direction can be proved to be the right one. The choice of goal of 
life or of an ideology or of a value system or of a way of life, is always open-
ended and the dilemma arising out of making such choices can never be 
resolved by recourse to logico-mathematical demonstration or experimental 
verification. One can make such choices in consultation with our inner voice or 
echo of conscience or whisper of our ultimate depth, so to say. Such questions 
are inextricabily subjective in character. Answers to such questions can never 
be demonstrable or verifiable. Such questions are decisional and they are 
characterized by faith, commitment and choice. Such questions touch the 
depths of our existence for they can never have definitive answers and often 
lead us into perplexity and bafflement. In such face of the perplexity and 
bafflement any response to such questions entails great courage and profound 
faith; characteristics totally absent from our appropriation of objective truths. 
The Kierkegaardian critique of academic philosophy brings out that the 
apparently non-existential theories such as Materialism, Monism, Dualism, 
idealism, Rationalism etc. are basically rooted in existential questions with 
regard to meaning of human life, place of man in the universe or man's relation 
to the universe etc. These so-called metaphysical theories have been debated 
and formulated by academic philosophers as if they could be established by a 
confirmatory set of arguments or methodologically clinched this or that way. 
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Therefore, the most fundamental and radical charge against metaphysical or 
academic philosophy by Kierkegaard is that it is abstract and general and its 
formulations are worked out in isolation from the concrete problems of life. 
Historically speaking, western philosophers have been debating highly general 
and abstract questions about reality, truth, knowledge, meaning etc., and in this 
exercise the finite human person engaged in struggle and withdrawal, hope and 
despair, courage and fear, love and hate etc. has been completely forgotten. 
The technical questions of philosophy have so much engaged 
philosophers that the practical problems of life have been almost totally 
ignored or sidelined by them. Existentialism of Kierkegaard is a protest against 
philosophical abstractions and conceptualizations which have deposited 
throughout the historical development of western philosophy. The job of 
philosophy is not analysis or construction of concepts or essences. It's function 
is to intensify an individuals' awareness of his own deeper self, his reality as an 
existing being. In there profound philosophical investigations, aiming at the 
discovery of Ultimate Reality, academic philosophers or metaphysicians have 
forgotten the far more important project of self-discovery and self-illumination. 
The Kierkegaardian approach to philosophy underlines the central significance 
of the individual as the subject of all philosophical reflections. For Kierkegaard 
philosophy is not an exercise in abstract arguments but a depth analysis of total 
human personality with a view to transforming him through a set of freely 
chosen values. The function of philosophy is the awakening or illumination of 
the individual existence. 
Rationalist philosophers have been, by and large, essentialists, Plato was 
an essentialist of the highest order. The father of Modern Western Philosophy 
Descartes was also a hardcore essentialist by recourse to his famous method of 
Doubt. Descartes eventually tried to prove the existence of self, God and world 
by offering arguments. As an essentialist he defined mind to be pure 
consciousness and body to be pure extension. Now to say that the essence of 
mind is consciousness or thought is to be oversimplificatory and reductionistic. 
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Our thought cannot capture the concrete and differentiated wealth of the modes 
of human existence such as choosing, doubting, loving, reasoning, struggling, 
failing, believing, hoping, etc. and other such determinate modes ' of human 
existence. The claim that the essence of mind is thought is highly misleading 
for willing or choosing is as much the function of mind as is understanding. 
However, Descartes's attempt to prove self, God, world and other 
people was also uncalled for. Such doubts are pseudo-doubts and such 
argumentative exercises divert our attention from facing problems of life. The 
fundamental crisis of life is that we are offered various modes of existence such 
as aesthetic mode, intellectual mode, ethical mode, mystical mode, spiritual 
mode, religious mode etc. and we have to appreciate the values of all these 
modes of existence and choose one mode with a view to achieving self-
integration and self-authentication. Philosophy has always dabbled into 
ontological, cosmological or epistemological questions. However, the most 
important questions have always been moral. Philosophical ontologists, 
cosmologists and epistemologists have made philosophy and arena of 
theoretical clashes. Such theoretical clashes have been essentially mistaken, 
misplaced and misconstrued. The job of philosophy has always been to 
illuminate the possibilities of human existence and to help an individual in 
choosing and appropriating a definite mode of existence, otherwise all 
philosophical investigations are misleading and misdirecting. By indulging in 
technical obfuscations, philosophy serves as a diversionary tactics from facing 
the real problems of life. It serves as escape from the hard but , necessary 
problems of life. 
Kierkegaard was brought up in nineteenth century Europe dominated by 
scientistic or mechanistic world-view and value-system, rationalist-empiricist 
epistemology and objectivistic attitudes and collectivistic mindset. As. a 
reaction to such an intellectual atmosphere Kierkegaard underlined the 
importance of the individual thinker. Kierkegaard's critique of nineteenth 
century centered on European philosophical disdain for passionate individual 
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inwardness and emphasis on the cultivation of scientific, rationalist, objectivist 
and collectivist intellectual responses. The characterizing feature of nineteenth 
century philosophy, according to Kierkegaard, was what he termed a dissolute 
pantheistic contempt for individual man (Kierkegaard: 1941, 33). The thrust of 
nineteenth century philosophical milieu was on hard objectivity and absence of 
personality. An overriding emphasis on "the masses", "the public", "the 
group", "the crowd" etc. have smothered the individual and the personal. The 
human being who is an individual, who is not an organ of a larger body, but a 
person is radically ignored in the age of "the crowd". 
Contemporary society bypasses or ignores the need for passionate 
commitment which entails living dangerously and instead prefers to be guided 
by detached understanding and cool reflection. The scholars and intellectuals 
have mastered the art of reflection. In their quest for absolute truth their lives 
reflect total lack of involvement and devotion. They understand life but have 
forgotten how to live. Accordingly, scholars have attempted to hammer out the 
compatibility of Christianity with the imperatives of modern world. The greater 
their ability at reflection, the greater their disability to cope with the 
imperatives of life. 
Objectivist philosophers from Plato upto Hegel have effectively 
excluded everything personal or subjective from philosophy. Kierkegaard 
brings out that essential philosophical truth cannot be determined objectively, 
universally and collectively, such truths can be determined only by the 
individual subjective thinker. Such truths as existence of God or man's 
relationship to God etc. cannot be propositionally articulated and subjected to 
objective or methodological validation and verification. Such truths are 
expressions of individual commitment. Believing in God is akin to 
commitment of love, which commitment can never be argumentatively 
clinched. Similarly on a far more deeper level, a justification or proof for the 
existence of God is simply impossible of attainment. It is the intensity and not 
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the objective necessity of our belief which determines its truth. The truth of our 
belief in God can be authenticated only by the intensity of our commitment. 
"An objective uncertainty held fast in the approximation -- process of the 
most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an 
existing individual" (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op.cit., p. 182). 
Kierkegaard has drastically altered our conception as well as function of 
philosophy. Kierkegaard's perspective on philosophy like that of Wittgenstein 
is also dissolutionary, disillusionary and liberatory. The fundamental objective 
of Kierkegaardian perspective on philosophy is to disabuse us of the 
expectations held aloft by traditional objectivist or rationalist mode of doing 
philosophy. The traditional philosophical rationalist or objectivist has all along 
nurtured the hope of finally resolving philosophical problems by advancing 
disinterested and clear arguments. The leitimotifof Kierkegaardian perspective 
on philosophy is to persuade us that philosophical problems are not finally 
disagreements to be settled by highly advanced philosophical arguments; rather 
the most important philosophical questions are ultimately choices of 
commitment. Rival or alternative philosophical theories are to be treated as 
entailing alternative programmes of action; they are not to be treated as 
conceptual dilemmas being ultimately resolvable by highly advanced and 
sophisticated pieces of reasoning or by irrefutable and cutting arguments. 
Philosophical analysis can clarify the illusionary obfuscations of traditional 
philosophy. It can negatively bring out as to what philosophy cannot 
accomplish. However, it cannot bring out any positive or affirmative role for 
philosophy,for ultimate philosophical affirmations or positions can be 
appropriated by an individual thinker in the ultimate depths of his authenticity 
or subjectivity. Each one of us has to strive to furnish to ourselves appropriate 
philosophical responses amid a plethora of conflicting dilemmas and 
paradoxes. 
Kierkegaard objected not just to Hegel's peculiar variety of `systematic' 
philosophy, but to the entire Western philosophical tradition which took the 
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medium of philosophical enquiry to be "The Concept" and, objective 
conceptual truth as its goal. This search for universal, impersonal truth was the 
defining mark of virtually every major Western philosopher from Plato until 
Kant and Hegel. Only those truths which held for "every rational creature", 
regarelless of situation and psychological peculiarities, were acceptable as 
philosophical truth and could be disclosed by a Greek philosopher of fifth 
century B.C., and if true, must be valid for a Chinese philosopher of the same 
period as well as for an American philosopher of the twentieth century. A 
Philosophical truth, for example, the Principle of Universal Causation or the 
Law of Induction, was not indigenous or peculiar to any particular 
philosophical style, or to any particular group of philosophers. These laws hold 
for every man, and the philosopher takes it upon himself to do nothing other 
than to formulate and prove these principles. The philosopher is explicitly 
concerned with these principles, but he has no privileged relationship to them 
(Solomon: From Rationalism to Existentialism, p. 71). 
The phrase `individual existence' is used by Kierkegaard for a man who 
is not merely a biological organism or a psychological creature or a product of 
social condition. Only a man who is not merely biologically, psychologically 
and sociologically determined but is guided by individually appropriated values 
can be said to be existing in the special Kierkegaardian sense of existence. The 
really existing individual is passionately anti-social or atleast asocial who 
recognizes his freedom in despair and owns responsibility for his actions. The 
existing individual is master of his life and legislator of his values. Those who 
cannot command their lives and legislate their values may also be said to be 
existing as per the dictional or literal connotation of the term existence. Such 
people are not the driving force of events and affairs but driven to their 
arbitrary destinations by powers that be: 
And it is just this that it means to exist, if one is to 
become conscious of it. Eternity is a winged horse, 
infinitely fast, and time is a worn-out jade; the existing 
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individual is the driver. That is to say, he is such a driver 
when his mode of existence is not an existence loosely so 
called; for then he is no driver but a drunken peasant who 
lies asleep in the wagon and lets the horses take care of 
themselves. To be sure, he also drives and is a driver, and 
so there are many who — also exist (Solomon: 78-85). 
For Kierkegaard, existence is not self-evident but something to be 
striven for through passionate commitment and through realization of one's 
personal freedom and through feelings of responsibility. Human existence 
cannot be achieved through walking, breathing, digesting and performing 
countless similar chores. Authentic or true existence can also not be achieved 
by abstract thinking. An authentic existence entails a despairing struggle 
through realization of various projects by our exercise of freedom with a sense 
of responsibility. 
The achievement of authentic individual existence entails passionate 
commitment to a way of life. Human existence as such is a perennial conflict 
between ongoing emergencies, competing desires and confronting alternatives 
amongst which we have to make choices. Human existence does not derive its 
significance from any perennially given a priori but from an ultimate 
commitment to a mode of existence or framework of values within which 
particular choices can be worked out and implemented. 
Western philosophy has, by and large, ignored human existence in the 
special Kierkegaardian sense. To be sure, modern western philosophy -started 
with the Cartesian `Cogito Ergo Sum' -- `I think therefore I exist'. Kant's 
transcendental as well as empirical self, Fitch's Ego and Hegel's Spirit — all 
pertained to human existence or refer to human subjectivity. However, this is 
not the subject which ought to have been the starting point of philosophy for 
Kierkegaard. The Cartesian, Kantian, Fitchtean and Hegelian `subject' is the 
cognitive subject. Such a subject has cognitive reality. Its reality is what it 
thinks. Descartes claims that this subject is a thinking substance that has 
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thoughts. Kant argues that one must presuppose a thinking subject in all our 
mental operations and this thinking subject as against the empirical one is the 
real subject according to Kant. Kierkegaard does not agree with Descartes or 
Kant: 
The real subject is not the cognitive subject ... the real 
subject is the ethically existing subject (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, p. 281) . 
Kierkegaard implies that the entire body corpus of western metaphysical 
discourse as well as epistemological debates originate from prioritizing, rather 
primordialising the cognitive or thinking subject in contradistinction to willing, 
striving, living and existing subject. Kierkegaard questions the vary existence 
of the thinking subject or the Cartesian Cogito. The Cartesian Cogito does not 
mean a particular existing being. It does not refer to myself or yourself or 
anywhich self. It solely refers to the `Pure Ego'. A pure ego, by the very nature 
of case, can have a purely conceptual existence (Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, p. 281). A purely conceptual existence can never lead us to real 
existence. We can never derive existence from thought. An abstract thought, is 
a thought without a thinker. Trying to prove existence from abstract thought is 
a contradiction in terms. The very act of abstraction, in fact, is a sort of proof 
for the existence of the abstract thinker.Pure or abstract thought can neither 
yield existence nor entirely snuff it out into nothingness (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, p. 281). The real anti-dote against metaphysical 
agnosticism and epistemological skepticism is to switch over to positing ethical 
subject to be the fundamental or primordial reality of man. 
The choice of a way of life or a mode of existence or a set of values is, 
in the final analysis, irrational. An ultimate set of goals or ends or a way of life 
has to be appropriated without any recourse to rational justification. 
Whatsoever our ultimate goals or ends or values, we cannot justify them by 
recourse to any moral or rational considerations. Kant's attempt to justify 
ultimate categorical imperatives or values by showing that these values are 
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transcendentally necessary for any morality, is finally unattainable. Even if we 
agree with Kant that certain values can be defended by appeal to reason, one 
can turn about and challenge the very authority of reason. Morality may be 
justified on rational grounds but why should I choose to act morally or 
rationally is a pertinent question which Hegel asks and Kant has no answer to 
respond to. The criteria of `reasonableness', `goodness', `happiness', `social 
solidarity', `greatest happiness of the greatest number' on which we might 
justify a set of moral values, will all rebound or boomrangfor it can always be 
asked as to why we should choose to be reasonable or good, happy, socially 
concerned, or concerned about the greatest happiness of the greatest number of 
people. Every suggested ultimate ethical criterion can be similarly challenged. 
Now, the question is how we are going to choose our way life or a set of 
values, what are the grounds on which to choose a set of values or what are the 
criteria which can justify a way of life. Kierkegaard emphatically denies that 
there are any grounds or criteria which can justify a way of life or a set of 
values. The solution offered by Kierkegaard is that we must simply choose a 
way of life. Our choice in this regard will have to be exercised without appeal 
to standards, reasons and justifications. No set of reasons or rational 
justifications can ever lead us to a way of life. The choice of a way of life is an 
ultimate decision and rationalizations or justifications can play no part in 
arriving at such an ultimate decision. In the final analysis, choice of a way of 
life, emanates from our need from a pure or unalloyed commitment. Such a 
commitment must well up from the depths of our own inwardness or 
subjectivity,without any appeal to any supporting principles or reasons. The 
choice of our way of life is totally irrational or we cannot give reasons for our 
ultimate choice of a way of life. The ultimate choice itself is unjustifiable 
(Solomon, pp. 88-89). 
Kierkegaard is absolutely convinced that our ultimate choice of a way of 
life is unjustifiable. However, his emphasis on choice of an appropriate way of 
life is unqualified. The choice of a way of life is the most crucial and 
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categorical imperative of achieving or appropriating human existence. If we are 
to exist, we have to leap to a way of life. An emphasis on the absence of 
ultimate justification can otherwise lead us either to suicide or total retreat to 
inactivity. Or it might lead us to giving up on choice of existence altogether 
leading to convenient merger into crowd mentality. However, as the choice of 
an ultimate way of life is unjustifiable, and making a choice is unavoidable, 
man is caught on the horns of supreme dilemma. It is crucifying to make such a 
choice.The poignancy of such a human dilemma is brought out by Robert C. 
Solomon in the following words: 
For the burden of choice is entirely on one's own 
shoulder; no other support, whether it be from society, 
from one's religious teachings, or from Reason itself can 
be made responsible of one's decisions. Because no 
criteria can be used in ultimate decisions, one cannot 
blame these criteria for the choice that one makes. The 
incredible responsibility of having no one and no value to 
which to turn leads Kierkegaard to cite despair as an 
essential ingredient in freedom of choice, to cite guilt as 
an essential component of responsibility, and to identify 
dread, the dread of an indefinitely large range of 
possibilities which it is one's own responsibility to 
choose between, as the defining passions of human 
existence (Solomon, op.cit, p. 89). 
Kierkegaard does emphasize that there are no reasons or grounds for 
choosing one way of life rather than another. However, the absence of ultimate 
justification is actually the absence of ultimate object of justification. There is 
no objective justification which can justify a single way of life for all men. 
However, as against, objective reasons there are most crucial subjective 
considerations which do guide or atleast orientate us towards making a choice 
of a way of life. Our subjective or personal desires, hopes, fears, struggles, 
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needs, habits, proclivities, predilections, orientations, etc., do silently and 
subtly persuade us towards an appropriation of a way of life. The choice of a 
way of life can be made only by a person who has to live within a given scale 
of life. This is what Kierkegaard means by "Truth is subjectivity". 
Kierkegaard figures out three man conceptions of life.His existential 
dialectic as against Hegel's historical dialectic, is the formulation of various 
opposed conceptions or modes of existence. As against in Hegel's historical 
dialectic in which various forms of consciousness are opposed to each other 
because each gives a one-sided view of life, there opposition can be reflectively 
mediated into higher forms in which one-sidedness can be ironed out. The 
inadequacies in the conception of oneself as an individual are corrected in the 
conception of one self as a rational or moral being, as a member of society. The 
inadequacies of the ethical conception of self are corrected in the religious 
stage in which the conception of one self, as Spirit, as part of the absolute 
`God' becomes fully explicit. At this stage one's conception of oneself is 
`Absolute'; it is without inadequacies, for it opposes oneself to nothing. 
Kierkegaard points out that such a mediation may be worked out between 
opposing ideas but is of no avail to an ethically existing individual who wants 
to know how to live. The opposed ways of life or alternative courses of action 
facing an individual are paradoxes impossible of mediation or resolution. These 
unrseolvable paradoxes are absolute and one can choose either one or other but 
not have the best of both. Kierkegard's formulation of three incompatible ways 
of life — the aesthetic mode, the ethical ode and the religious mode — signify 
three fundamental commitments or views of life or modes of existence. 
Amongst these three conceptions of life each entailing a distinct set of values, 
one can only choose any one of these modes. Any mediation or compromise 
between these modes of life just canno be worked out Each mode of existence 
with its corresponding set of values is rationally indispensable. No way or 
mode of life can be said to be more rational or reasonable than the other. Our 
choice of fundamental values is essentially irrational. No set of values can be 
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epistemologically or methodologically certified to be true. We cannot provide a 
rational validation of values. We can only be unflinchingly committed to a set 
of values (Solomon, op.cit., 91). 
Kierkegaard made a clear and categorical distinction between scientific 
hypothesis or philosophical beliefs and religious faith. Both natural theologians 
and religious apologists fail to make this basic distinction. They confuse 
scientific or philosophical beliefs with religious faith and design or devise 
arguments with a view to establishing or proving the respective claims of their 
respective religions. Thus, religious faith is confused with objectively 
verifiable beliefs and detailed sophisticated logical arguments are advanced to 
substantiate its veracity. Kierkegaard radically questioned the soundness or 
wisdom of the horizontal or all-pervasive application of scientific method or 
rationalistic arguments. We cannot achieve anything or arrive at any result by 
recourse to scientific research in the sphere of religion. Nor can we make any 
headway in this regard by appropriation of a rationalist mindset. Religious faith 
is categorically different from a scientifically hypothesis. Faith in God can not 
be logically validated or scientific confirmed. Faith in God was not amenable 
to logical sophistication or scientific verification, Faith in God signified 
transformation of a believers' personality through inwardness, subjectivity and 
commitment. 
The following lines bring out Kierkegaard's contention in this regard: 
"Faith was not similar to the acceptance of a scientific or 
factual hypothesis. The belief in God or Christ was not a 
hypothesis, and hence it was not proper to apply scientific 
tests of the validity or truth of a hypothesis to such a 
belief. Faith in God was an act of commitment to a 
supreme Being or Authority. One either had faith, or did 
not have it. But faith could never be created with the help 
of arguments and proofs. The problem was not to prove 
the truths of Christianity. Indeed, this attempt was 
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impossible, and betrayed an utter confusion between 
religious faith and scientific belief. The problem was to 
become a Christian or be a Christian. If one was already 
committed to God or Christ, then Apologetics was. 
superfluous. If one was not, then Apologetics or Natural 
Theology could never make one into a Christian, i.e., a 
person fully committed to God. This commitment could 
come as a result of an intense reflection upon his 
authentic self, that might inwardly and silently be 
pressing the individual towards a definite choice. A true 
Apologetics is, thus, the cultivation by the individual of 
the life of inwardness. Let him listen to the pulsations and 
whisperings of his authentic self, rather than to the 
language of verbal creeds and dogmas that may have 
been poured into his conscious religious education and 
training. More often than not, they hinder rather than help 
the traditional Christian in committing himself to Christ. 
(Jamal Khwaja; 1965, 134-35). 
Kierkegaard went through an agonizing spiritual crisis in his younger 
days. Consequently, he internalized an abiding conviction that he was a man of 
destiny with a special calling from God. Kierkegaard was blessed with a 
profound awareness of the human condition and had a deeply entrenched 
Messianic strain in his personality. Kierkegaard had this profound conviction 
that he was an exceptional individual with a divinely assigned spiritual mission 
of reviving new Testament Christianity with a view to resolving the moral and 
religious crisis his contemporaries were going through. He subordinated his 
exceptional intellectual and literary skills to working out the moral and 
religious transformation of his age. Christian beliefs and values were his 
immediate horizon. His Christian upbringing powerfully inculcated in him the 
recognition of human finitude and the need to operate as a free authentic 
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individual without becoming oblivious to the immense possibilities inherent in 
human personality. Kierkegaard like Pascal was fired with the irresistible 
ambition of revisiting and restoring the authentic perspective on human 
condition originally advanced by Christianity. However, such an authentic 
perspective cannot be restored by recourse to logical induction or deduction. 
The discovery of Christian truth is true for oneself, it is an existential truth. 
Kierkegaard was fully convinced that a pantheistic world-view and value-
system where spiritually deadening and enervating. A genuine and authentic 
religious life could be anchored on complete banishment of Pantheistic 
philosophy. All Pantheistic absolutistic and monistic beliefs and values 
according to Kierkegaard were anathematic to the essence of Christianity. 
Kierkegaard underlined the view that a lonely and solitary individual is 
the locus of authenticity, although he did not deny the distant possibility of the 
fellowship of the Church. Kierkegaard's opposition to absolutism of any kind 
was absolute. His contempt for Pantheism for its contempt of the individual 
was complete. His unflinching critique of Hegelian.Penchant for universal was 
unqualified. Accordingly he believed only in Personal Transcendental God and 
the dependent finite man. Each man stands before God only as lonely single 
individual. Each one, like Abraham has to face God supported only by one's 
unconditional dedication to Him. Kierkegaard takes Hegelian absolutism to 
task for its inability to come to grips with the problem of change and becoming. 
Kierkegaard was not concerned with the problem of change and becoming as 
such. His concern with the problem of change was to the extent an individual is 
involved in becoming himself. One of the main reasons for Kierkegaard's 
opposition to the Hegelian approach is its identification of the structure of 
thought with that of Being. Such an identification culminates into Hegel's 
inability to appreciate the finite mode of the existent or the concrete being. The 
finite existent beings are in peculiar relationship to God. They are neither 
excluded from Him nor included in Him. They are neither isolated form Him or 
identical with Him. The entire order of existence may be said to be included in 
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God. However, such an inclusion can be out of God's free creative causality. 
Such an inclusion can not be, as Hegel conceived it, by way of a necessary 
dialectical identity. The finite existents are radically characterized by 
becoming. Hegel's failure to grasp the meaning of finite existents makes him 
incapable of understanding real change. The movement of finite existents is not 
mere appearance but their characterizing and salient features. Only God is the 
Real, Necessary, Eternal and Immutable. Finite existents are' radically 
contingent, temporal and changing. Man's historical process is also radically 
contingent as it is based on a free relationship between man and God 
(Kierkegaard; Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op.cit, 79). The finite 
existents are striving constantly throughout the historical process, existential 
thinking has to be instantly practical and existential truth always remained 
unfinished. The existential truth is always paradoxical (Ibid., 117). The mode 
of the being of the finite existents is always temporal and oriented to future; it 
is an ongoing existence. As history is contingent and time and becoming are 
real, there is always scope for novelty and surprise. There is always hope in 
future for man can always go on choosing fresh possibility. Our ceaseless 
capacity to choose from ongoing choices fructifies into our self-authentication. 
It is through ceaseless choices that our unique personality is carved out. Our 
capacity to lead authentic lives entails a leap — a leap from despair to hope. Our 
ceaseless capacity for self-authentication signifies our freedom. One who 
resolves for self-authentication before God is a free man, a man of true faith. 
Such a passionate decision is profoundly existential in character. Such a 
profound decision can not be taken by recourse to logical reasoning. Abstract 
or pure thought can not grapple with such a decision. Abstract or general 
scientific thinking can, of course, make highly relevant and fruitful contribution 
in non-existential fields of empirical sciences. However, scientific and logical 
modes of reasoning can contribute little or nothing in negotiating passionate 
existential decisions. 
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As against reason which is always concerned with the general and 
universal and ideal and systematic, subjectivity is concerned with the 
individual existent. Only the individual existent can invite practical interest and 
passion from us. Existence is always individual existence. Existence is always 
taken as for granted; it is never sought to be demonstrated: 
I always reason from existence, not toward existence, 
whether I move a sphere of palpable sensible fact or in 
the realm of thought. I do not for example prove that a 
stone exists, but that some existing thing is a stone. The 
procedure in a court of justice does not prove that a 
criminal exists, but that the accused, whose existence is 
given, is a criminal. Whether we call existence an 
accessoriam or the eternal prios, it is never subject to, 
demonstration. (Philosophical Fragments, 31-2). 
`Subjectivity' in the context of Kierkegaard's perspective on religion 
should not be confused with subjectivism. A subjectivist is a person who 
equates belief with feeling or emotion or psychological experience. In 
Kierkegaard's philosophy `subjectivity' denotes personal appropriation of an 
object; it is in diametrical opposition to impersonal assent to certain beliefs or 
contemplation of a spiritual entity such as soul or God. Subjectivity implies a 
deep, persistent and abiding interest towards the object such as God. Such an 
object assumes the significance of the SummumBonum or Highest Good or 
Supreme Value in the life of a person. It implies a passionate practical 
commitment to the object of our concern. It implies unqualified freedom of 
choice. The objects of reason necessarily exact our assent by the sheer force of 
their evidence. On the other hand, there is no support of evidential data with 
reference to which we could subjectively appropriate our object of faith. The 
subjective appropriation is devoid of objective grounding or anchoring. A 
subjective appropriation of an object of faith implies ineliminable or 
ineradicable element of risk. It is leap unto the darkness. It is the greatest 
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gamble of life for at stake is our be all end-all. Evidentially necessitated object 
of faith for Kierkegaard is no faith, at all. Authentic faith has to be rooted in 
freedom of choice. Just as an imposed relationship cannot be authentic so a 
rationally necessitated and empirically dictated faith cannot be an authentic 
faith. We can appropriate God through unqualified freedom: 
"Freedom is the true wonderful lamp; 
When a man rubs it with ethical passion, 
God comes into being for him" (Ibid., 124). 
Subjectivity as a mode of understanding or realization operates in direct 
contradistinction to our speculativity. Religious faith is subjectivity at its 
highest. As any act of subjectivity is posited by will, religious faith as a form of 
subjectivity is posited by ultimate will. As religious faith entails my 
relationship with God, it concerns with my eternal welfare, it correspondingly 
inspires my infinite interest and demands the greatest degree of personal 
response and commitment from me. God as appropriated by my subjectivity is 
both supremely existent and absolutely paradoxical.In view of the same, the 
role of will in religious faith becomes all-important. As the subjective 
appropriation of God is most dangerous leap that can be taken by man, the risks 
involved are the highest. The role of rational justification in such a'subjective 
appropriation of God is not only irrelevant but at its most comical (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscripts, op.cit., 53). 
From the Christian point of view faith belongs to the existential. God 
did not appear in the character of a professor who has some doctrines which 
must be first believed and then understood. Faith expresses a relation from 
personality to personality (The Last years: Journals 1853-1885 (ed.) R. Grager 
Smith, London, 1965, 99-100). 
For Kierkegaard, religious faith is perennially opposite to speculative or 
rational justification. In view of the same, Kierkegaard has assembled one of 
the most powerful critiques of rationalist philosophy. He has 
0 
117 
marshalleddevastrating considerations against any possible rationalist or 
objectivist appropriation of religious faith. Nevertheless, rationalist and 
objectivist philosophy makes an all-important contribution towards our 
attunements to subjective appropriation of religious faith. The logical 
possibility of a realm that cannot be understood by reason dawns upon us 
through our engagement with philosophy. It is through reason that we 
appreciate the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. Religious faith 
and subjectivity can be grasped only against the backdrop of philosophical and 
scientific objectivity. Without understanding the mode of philosophy we cannot 
follow the direction of subjectivity and faith. It is through the temptations and 
attractions of speculative philosophy that we are awakened to the full 
realization of subjectivity. Thus philosophy plays a negatively necessary role in 
our understanding of religious faith. Only philosophical reflection shows us the 
impossibility of any rational justification of faith. It is through philosophical 
reflection that we understand that we cannot understand Christianity. 
People have always thought that reflection would destroy 
Christianity, and is its natural enemy. I hope I have 
shown, with God's aid, that religious reflection can retie 
the knot which a superficial reflection has unraveled for 
so many years. The authority of the bible, and all that 
belongs to it, have been abolished, and it looks as if one 
were only waiting for the ultimate stage of reflection to 
clear up everything. But see how, on the contrary, 
reflection is going to render service by putting springs 
under Christianity again, and in such a way that it is able 
to hold out against reflection. Christianity of course. 
remains completely unchanged; not a jot has been altered. 
But the struggle has become different: previously it was 
only between reflection and immediate simple 
Christianity; now it is between reflection and simplicity 
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armed by reflection... The real task is not to understand 
Christianity but to understand that one cannot understand 
it. This is the sacred cause of faith and reflection is 
sanctified by being used for it. (Kierkegaard: The Works 
of Love, trans. D.F. Swenson and L. Swenson, Princeton, 
1946, 248). 
The purpose of Kierkegaard's writings was to awaken us to the need for 
unconditional religious commitments. He was trying to jolt his readers out of 
their complacency into a realization of the need for making the leap of faith. 
Kierkegaard's writings were elaborated as a reaction against Hegelian `system'. 
Hegel's religious rationalism was tantamount to radical denigration and 
misunderstanding of the logic of religion — it was rather a rejection of Christian 
faith. As a reaction against the rational extravagences of Hegel, Kierkegaard by 
recourse to his typical style characterized by rhetorical, paradoxical and 
ironical exaggerations exalted the irrational and absurd bordering on willful 
obscurantism. More often than not, Kierkegaard's celebration of irrationality 
and absurdity of religious faith and his radical denial of reason give the 
impression that believability or plausibility of religious faith was directly 
proportional to its paradoxicality and irrationality. However, irrationality were 
not for Kierkegaard the ground of religious faith. It is only when philosophical 
rationalism attempts to play a positive role in the religious sphere by offering 
explanations, proofs and justifications of religious faith that it is to be rejected. 
However, this rejection of reason is itself philosophical. Philosophy while 
appreciating the limits of reason also entertains the domain or jurisdiction of 
faith as a mode of being and doing other than and beyond its own. In the final 
analysis, while faith entertains belief against all claims of understanding, it also 
uses understanding (Soren Kierkegaard — The Last years: Journals 1853-55, 
1965, 504). 
Broadly speaking, Kierkegaard is operating within the epistemological 
and methodological framework outlined by Kant. Following Kant's critique of 
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Pure Reason, Kierkegaard points out that it is by reason that we understand that 
there are limits to reason and that there is atleast the possibility of objects 
existing that we do not and can not know the `unknown' (Soren Kierkegaard: 
Philosophical Fragments; op.cit., 35). Kierkegaard further writes: 
Every man can distinguish between what he understands 
and what he does not understand .... And he can discover 
that there is something which is, inspite of the fact that it 
is against his understanding and way of thinking. (Soren 
Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript; 495). 
The realm or the sphere of the unknown can not be known by any of the 
faculties of understanding. It is essentially unknowable. Human understanding 
can not specify and determine it in any way. The unknown is the limit of the 
human reason. It is absolutely different from what is understandable. There is 
no mark by which the unknown could be distinguished from what is known. 
The unknown is understandable and even unutterable. It is beyond the limits of 
understandability and intelligibility. It lags beyond the limits of knowledge of 
any kind (Philosophical Fragments, 35). Reason knows that there is the 
possibility of objects existing that we do not and cannot know by reason. 
Reason does also appreciates that the objective and speculative modes of 
understanding do not exhaust all the possible modes of understanding. For 
example, in direct contrast to objective and speculative modes of 
understanding, there is what Kierkegaard calls `Subjectivity'. It is a specific 
mode of non-speculative personal understanding. Of course, subjectivity as a 
mode of understanding may not fructify into specific cognitive propositions. It 
rather results into existential appropriations and commitments. 
Religious faith, according to Kierkegaard operates on a different plane 
in contradistinction to logic or methodology of traditional rationalist 
philosophy. Religious faith is concerned with the objects that are beyond the 
reason. As against reason, its mode of understanding is subjectivity. While God 
is Infinite, human reason is related to the dialectic of finitude, i.e. reason can 
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know only what is finite (Soren Kierkegaard — The Last Years: Journals 1853-
55, op.cit., p. 246). Secondly, the objects of faith are paradoxical, for 
Christianity claims that infinite God became the finite man in the person of 
Christ. Thirdly, religious faith entails a vital and personal response and 
commitment from us. The objects of religious faith do not merely demand 
speculative assent. Faith is related in the existential. The knowledge of the facts 
and figures of the entire cosmos cannot increase or decrease an iota of faith. 
Faith entails a relationship between human personality and Divine Personality. 
God does not invite theoretical assent from us. He is not an object of our 
intellectual and mystical contemplation. God invites the supreme personal 
interest from us. Our speculative contemplation of God necessitates complete 
dispassionate detachment from us. it entails distanciated and impersonal 
approach from us. However, the interest of a man of faith in God is profoundly 
personal and engaging. He sees God as the source of his eternal happiness : 
The subject is infinitely interested in his eternal' 
happiness... But in order to philosophise he must proceed 
in precisely the opposite direction, giving himself up and 
losing himself in objectivity, thus vanishing from 
himself.... Christianity does not tend itself to objective 
observation, precisely because it proposes . to intensify 
subjectivity to the utmost. (Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, 55) . 
Here we are on the horns of dilemma. While responding to God we can 
not be simultaneously personally passionate and objectively impersonal. 
According to Kierkegaard, it is a fully fledged either/ or situation. ' If we are 
infinitely interested in God we can not be speculatively convinced of His truth 
and vice versa. We have to be either this or that; we can not be both: 
The inquiring subject must be in one or the other of two 
situations. Either he is in faith convinced of the truth of 
Christianity, and in faith assured of his own relationship 
121 
to it: in which case he can not be infinitely interested in. 
all the rest, since faith itself is the infinite interest in 
Christianity... or the inquirer is, on the other hand, not in 
an attitude of faith, but objectively in an attitude of 
contemplation and hence not infinitely interested in the 
determination of the question. (Ibid., 23) . 
The following quotation brings out categorically Kierkegaard's conception of 
subjective truth: 
If the religious level of existence is understood as a stage 
upon life's way, then quite clearly the truth that religion 
is concerned with is not at all the same as the objective' 
truth of a creed or belief. Religion is not a system of 
intellectual propositions to which the believer assents 
because he knows it to be true, as a system of geometry is 
true, existentially; for the individual himself, religion 
means in the end simply to be religious. In order to make 
clear what it means to be religious, Kiekegaard had to 
reopen the whole question of the meaning of truth. His 
was the first radical reappraisal of the subject since the 
thirteenth century when St. 'Thomas Aquina's 
monumental De Veritatehad settled the meaning of truth 
for the next five centuries of philosophy; and like that 
earlier treatment, Kierkegaard's stand on the question 
may well have marked a turning point in European 
philosophy. (Ibid., 31). 
For Kierkegaard, the objective truth is easily recognized, and indeed 
today it has come to be almost the only sense of the term in our, usage. If I 
know that twice two is four, this knowledge is in the highest degree 
impersonal; once I know it, I know it, and I need not struggle continuously to 
make it my own: it is a reliable piece of lumber in the mental attic, one on 
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which I can put my hand any time I have need for it. But the truth of religion is 
not at all like that: it is a truth that must penetrate my own personal existence, 
or it is nothing; and I must struggle to renew it in my life everyday: 
What is in question here, says Kierkegaard, is ones own 
personal appropriation of the truth —appropriation coming 
from the Latin root proprius meaning one's own. A 
learned theologian may be in possession of all the so-
called truths of rational theology, able to prove and 
disprove propositions and generally hold his own 
dielectrically with the best, and yet in his heart God may 
have died or never lived. On the other hand, an illustrate 
peasant who knows nothing of formal theology, who may 
not even be able to state accurately the tenants of his 
creed, nevertheless may succeed in being religious. He is 
in the truth, as we say, and people who know him can 
recognize this fact from his presence, his bearing, his way 
of life. In the Oriental religious and philosophical 
tradition, where truth has never been defined as 
belonging basically to the intellect, the Master is able to 
discern whether or not a disciple has attained 
enlightenment from how he behaves, what kind of a 
person he has come to be, not from hearing him reason 
about Sutras. This kind of truth is not a truth of the 
intellect but of the whole man. Strictly speaking, 
subjective truth is not a truth that I have, but a truth that I 
am (Irrational Man, 152). 
(B) ATTACK ON HEGEL: 
Hegel as a paradigmatic rationalist philosopher was Kierkegaard's focal 
target of criticism. Kierkegaard revolts against the abstract philosophical 
interpretations advanced by Hegel. Hegel attempted to capture all reality in his 
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system of thought. However, in this process, he lost the most important 
element, namely, existence, which implies subjectivity, choice and decision. 
Hegel is primarily interested in creating a complete theoretical system that 
informs all spheres of reality. Kierkegaard advanced radical objections against 
the abstract metaphysical approach of Hegel. Hegel's intellectual or rational 
quest for figuring out exhaustive explanations of all that is out there seemed 
comic to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard underlined that philosophy must be 
anchored upon personal experience rather than abstract reasoning; inwardness 
rather than objectivity. Kierkegaard rejects the theoretical goals of Hegelian 
philosophical systematizations. Hegel'ssystem-building distracts our attention 
from transformative existential aspirations and directs us into the welter of 
metaphysical explanations. Hegel avoids subjective viewpoint or the existence 
of the individual and this constitutes the failure or irrelevance of Hegel's 
philosophy and, for that matter, of all traditional rationalistic western 
philosophy. Such a failure does not emanate from conscious ignorance of the 
subject and subjective truth. It is also not due to an oversight on the part of 
rationalist philosophers. It is in the very nature of speculative and objective 
mode of doing philosophy to ignore subjectivity. 
The western rationalistic perspective on man advanced by numerous 
western philosophers from Plato to Hegel was utterly unacceptable to 
Kierkegaard. The grand rationalistic constructions or speculative systems 
accomplished by rationalists also aroused Kierkegaard's irresistible anger. 
These rationalist systems try to define human beings in terms of reason only 
and they attempt to be so complete that every aspect of reality can be accounted 
for by them. In such systems the truth of a proposition was a matter of finding 
an appropriate place within the system. There was no place for subjective 
dimensions of human existence in such systems. 
The fundamental objection advanced by Kierkegaard against Hegel's 
philosophy is that it can not accommodate the existing individual at all. 
Kierkegaard brings out that an individual's relation to himself is not a cognitive 
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one. Hegelian abstractions cannot accommodate our too concrete and unique 
situations. Hegel's system is incapable of guiding me in taking the crucial 
decisions of my life. In fact, Hegel's philosophy prevents people from facing 
up to the decisions which shape their lives. Hegel rather orientates us to a 
passive identification with the anonymous public. Hegel has a pantheistic 
contempt for the individual man (Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, 317). Hegel's treatment of religion as a symbolic expression of the 
metaphysical truth that Absolute Spirit exists only in and through the cosmos 
which expresses it is also deeply violative of Kierkegaard's religious 
sensibility. Such a Hegelian interpretation, according to Kierkegaard, is a 
betrayal of the Christian truth that God is entirely transcendent of the world and 
ourselves (David Cooper, 347) . 
Kierkegaard has attacked all philosophical systems advanced by 
Western philosophers from time to time. He has especially attacked his 
predecessor Hegel's system. For Kierkegaard Hegel's philosophical system 
leaves no room for wisdom and ethics. Hegel might have achieved a great 
philosophical system but he has missed on how to live and thus his philosophy 
has missed on everything. The only reality for an existing individual is his own 
ethical individuality. The discovery of so called objective truths, the 
formulation of the great systems of philosophy etc. are worthless if philosophy 
cannot provide us the direction or orientation as to how to conduct ourselves 
here and now in the face of formidable challenges of life (Solomon, p. 78) . 
Hegel's "Absolute Knowledge" is devoid of practical wisdom and ethical 
guidance.Such a philosophy can be only used as a ruse to excuse ourselves 
from making ethical or practical decisions. Philosophy according to 
Kierkegaard is pointless if it is not edifying. 
Hegel like all rationalistic philosophers avoids the subjective viewpoint 
of the existing individual. The avoidance of the subject and the subjective truth 
is an inherent feature in the very conception of the systematic philosophy. In 
Hegel's system, for example, the individual human existence as a concept is 
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included as one of the stages in the conceptual development of Spirit. However, 
the reduction of existence to a concept is an impossible task (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, 173). Soloman writes: 
The Hegelian system does attempt to capture individual 
existence in the logical development of concepts, but it 
captures only the concept of the individual, and not the 
individual. "Subjectivity" (the existence of an individual 
human being) can never be captured in logic for it is 
forever "irreducible to a concept. (Soloman: 79). 
The logical inductions and deductions cannot capture the peculiar 
feelings, thought, emotions and dispositions of an existing individual. It is the 
unique, peculiar and non-universal features of an individual which constitute 
his personality. Philosophy according to Kierkegaard should furnish an 
understanding of psychological differences rather them of logical similarities. 
Philosophy should help us in recognising our uniqueness rather than helping us 
recognizing ourselves as an instance of the concept of humanity, Only a 
recognition of our peculiarities can inspire us the need for making the most 
fundamental commitments. Understanding the nature of such commitments 
ought to be the central task of philosophy. The job of philosophy is not to 
engage in conceptual analysis or furnish us conceptual knowledge. The central 
concern of philosophy is the individual and his way of life. As existing 
individuals we are not primarily knowing subjects but moral agents. The 
primary concerns of philosophy are not epistemological but ethical. The central 
question of philosophy is not "what can I know" ?but "what should I do?" 
(Solomon: 79) . 
For Hegel all paradoxes are resolvable. A paradox or contradiction could 
always be resolved by finding a higher `synthesis' which embraces the central 
principles of the opposite thesis. Kierkegaard points out that such a resolution 
and mediation was possible only between concepts. Conceptual or 
logicalparadoxes may be resolvable. However, Kierkegaard is concerned with 
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` 	 ethical paradoxes of an individual which paradoxes according to him are 
absolute and not amenable to resolution. Ethical paradoxes do not refer to an 
opposition of concepts but to an opposition of courses of action. Ethical 
paradoxes are absolute because ethical decisions are based on a choice between 
incompatible ways of life. One can either appropriate this or that way of life. 
The choice of a way of life always involves a commitment to act in certain 
ways in the face of objective uncertainty. An action is always objectively 
uncertain, as it is always projected towards future. Ethical wisdom always 
entails risk. Action always precedes results. The paradoxes of practical wisdom 
cannot be viewed with cool reflection and detachment. Their solution always 
demands commitment to a way of life. Kierkegaard's fundamental objection to 
Hegel is that the great the German rationalist fails to seriously' grasp the 
ultimate significance of ethical dilemmas confrontating an existing individual. 
Hegel could not appreciate the implications of individual existence viz., 
`choice', `individual freedom', `responsibility', `commitment', `despair' and 
`guilt' etc. The following words from Solomon bring out the crux of 
Kierkegaard: 
"Unlike the Hegel and the rationalists before him, 
Kierkegaard leaves the correctness of the ways of life to 
which one commits himself an open question to be settled 
only by the individual. In other words Kant and Hegel 
had attempted to prove the objective necessity for 
believing in God and as such, to prove that every rational 
being ought to believe. Kierkegaard denies that any such 
objective necessity can be demonstrated, and then, in the 
face of this `objective uncertainty' ...., it is the choice of 
individual whether to believe or not, this is the subjective 
truth..." (Solomon: 84). 
Kierkegaard revolts against the speculative system of Hegel, for he 
thinks that in speculative philosophy the individual man vanishes. He points 
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out that a logical system is possible, but an existential system is not possible. In 
the construction of a logical system care is taken to see that anything which 
exists is not included. The system of logic is abstract. But even in such a 
system Hegel wants to introduce movement. But it is surely strange to make 
movement fundamental in a sphere in which it is unthinkable. Kierkegaard 
wishes to put forward the thesis that an existential system cannot be 
formulated. Existence may be a system for God, but it cannot be a system for 
any existing human being. System and existence cannot be thought together. If 
systematic thought has to think of existence, it has to be abrogated and must be 
thought as not existing. For Kierkegaard, existence separates and holds the 
various moments of existence discretely apart; systematic thought consists of 
the finality which brings them together. The fact that the thinker is an existing 
individual signifies that existence imposes its restrictions upon him. The 
systematic thinker is one who is outside existence and yet in existence, who is 
in his eternity forever complete and yet includes all existence within himself. If 
the existing thinker comes into existence after a systematic understanding, the 
strangely ironical conclusion would follow that he would have no 
understanding of himself in his existence. Such a thinker would have to be 
God. In a logical system the existence of the individual is excluded and this 
gives rise to ironical conclusions, for a logical thinker can have no 
understanding of himself in his existence, for he has no existence. Such a 
situation has an obvious immorality and so it has been said about Hegel that we 
owe to him the completion of the system, the absolute system without the 
inclusion of an Ethics. Kierkegaard then points out that for an existential 
system to be possible, it has to be completed by one individual or by some 
individuals participating with one another. But if such persons are human 
beings, then two alternatives are open. Either the existing individual or 
individuals can forget that they are existing beings, by which they become 
comic figures, since existence has the remarkable trait of compelling an 
existing individual to exist, whether he wills or not', or such individuals can 
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concentrate their energy upon the fact that they are existing individuals. But to 
be an existing human being does not mean to be a human being in general, for 
such a being can be agreed to by the speculative philosopher, rather it means 
that you and I and he are human beings each one for himself. 
About the Hegelian system Kierkegaard says moreover that it seems to 
be the work of a man who is absent-minded about his existence and such a 
system does not care for the moral problems of an individual human being. On 
the other hand, philosophy which is propounded by an existing individual for 
existing individuals, gives emphasis on the ethical aspects of life. When 
philosophy is so understood, it becomes evident then that the ideal of a 
persistent striving is the only view of life that does not carry with it an 
inevitable disillusionment. The persistent striving is the ethical view of the 
existing individual. This striving is not to be understood metaphysically. It 
represents the consciousness of being an existing individual. 
In systematic philosophy an identity of subject and object is established 
through the unity of thought and being. But existence consists in their 
separation. In the objective sense, thought is understood to be pure thought. 
This correspondence, equally between its subject and object, is also the thought 
itself. Thus truth becomes the correspondence of thought with itself. This 
objective thought has no relation to the existing subject and in such a situation 
the existing subject tends more and more to disappear. The human being 
becomes aware through the imagination of participating in the pure abstract 
relation between thought and being. The being which is ascribed to the thinker 
does not signify that he is, but only that he is engaged in thinking. The existing 
subject, on the other hand, is engaged in existing, which is indeed the case with 
every human being. The objective tendency, according to Kierkegaard, is 
comical. For example, if a dancer could leap very high, we could admire her. 
But if she would give the impression that he could fly, it would be a matter.of 
laughter. Leaping is the accomplishment of a being who belongs to the earth, 
who obey's the earth's gravitational force, as leaping is only momentary. 
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Systematic speculative philosophy has abolished the individual being of 
a man and every speculative philosopher concerns himself with humanity at 
large. In such a system the individual man becomes something infinitely great 
and at the same time nothing at all. It is true that a man in the street or a 
pavement dweller can play the game of being humanity, but one learns at last 
that being purely and simply a human being is a more significant thing than 
playing the society game. When a pavement dweller plays this game, everyone 
thinks it ridiculous: and yet it is equally ridiculous for the greatest man in the 
world to do it. 
Hegel's understanding and interpretation of Christianity are also 
unwarranted, according to Kierkegaard. Christianity as assumed by Hegel, is 
not a set of doctrines. To be a Christian was not to believe in a certain set of 
doctrines. Any attempt at proving the truth of Christianity or showing 
it'sreasonableness is both impossible of attainment and unnecessary. The 
central problem of Christianity is not self-validation but the transformation of 
the individual according to the values encapsulated into Christianity. Faith is 
the essence of Christianity. No doctrine or religion or church can instill faith in 
us. Faith is a function of our own subjectivity. It is the individual who has to 
choose the path of faith. Christianity, as a way of life, is an individuaI's own 
choice and this choice is not to be made on grounds of truth or plausibility. The 
choice is a personnel commitment without any appeal to rational grounds or 
criteria. Philosophical systematization, rational investigation or scientific 
inquiry can never generate faith in Christianity. Faith is beyond philosophical, 
rational and scientific criteria: 
Faith does not result simply from scientific inquiry: it 
does not come directly at all. On the contrary, in this 
objectivity one tends to loose that infinite personal 
interest which is the condition of faith. (Kierkegaard: 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 30). 
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Hegel's logic traces or exposes the concepts which are necessary 
conditions for consciousness. Hegel is concerned with the fundamental 
categories or concepts of logic, for the universal, for the a priori. While logic 
can capture the universal similarities, it can not capture the psychological 
differences. It cannot capture the peculiarities of an individual person. Logical 
generalizations cannot capture individual feelings, particular emotions and 
personal dispositions. They can not capture unique or peculiar aspects or non-
universal dimensions of human personalities. The job of philosophy is not to 
arrive at inductive generalizations or workout deductive conclusions. The job 
of philosophy is to recognize the uniqueness of a person rather than recognize 
him as an instance of the concept of humanity. Our fundamental commitments 
can be anchored on the unique self-awareness that philosophy can furnish us. 
Understanding the nature of such commitment constitutes the central problem 
of Kierkegaard's philosophy. 
Philosophy is an appropriation of an individual's way of life rather than 
accumulation of conceptual knowledge. Objectivist metaphysicians wrongly 
assume that explanation of individuality can be furnished through logic. Such 
an assumption on the part of rationalist or objectivist metaphysicians is both 
unwarranted and illusory. Instead of turning to Hegel's detached and objectivist 
metaphysical system, Kierkegaard appeals to Socratic wisdom. Socrates 
avoided or bypassed the metaphysical quest for indifferent principles. The job 
of philosophy according to Socrates is to furnish practical guidance for living. 
Kiekegaard shares with Socrates the final goal of philosophical inquiry, viz. 
self-knowledge or self-awareness. The Hegelian system is too closed to leave 
any room for future ethical guidance or direction. For Hegel, the inadequate 
and outmoded concept of the individual had been surpassed in the directive of 
the system, which assumption is the very negation of the existing individual 
according to Kierkegaard. In view of the same, Kierkegaard writes: 
An existential system is impossible.... System and 
existence are incapable of being thought together: 
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because in order to think existence at all, systematic 
thought must think it as abrogated, and hence as not.  
existing. Existence separates, and holds the various 
moments of existence discreetly apart, the systematic 
thought consists of the finality which brings them 
together. (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 107) . 
Kierkegaard underlines that Hegel's philosophy characteristically avoids 
the existence of the individual. In his so-called system the existence or non-
existence of the individual becomes a matter of accidental importance or pales 
into insignificance. To Hegel's systematic philosophy, individual existence is 
included as one of the stages in the conceptual development of spirit. However 
existence cannot be reduced to the concept. A concept is a mere possibility. 
The Hegelian system does attempt to capture individual existence in the logical 
development of concepts but it captures only the concept of the individual and 
not the individual. In the speculative system of Hegel, the individual man is 
lost as an expression of Infinite Spirit. Hegel's system cannot accommodate the 
existing individual at all. Each one of us is too unique, and our situations are 
too concrete for Hegelian abstractions to provide us with a sense of 
individuality. Hegel's system is incapable of guiding us in taking the vital 
decisions of our lives which shape or shake us to our foundations. Individuals 
for Hegel are mere accidents of the state, whose laws and traditions they are to 
obey (David Cooper: 2003, 347). 
(C) CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE 
Kierkegaard was a man of exceptional intellectual power. He was also 
an exceptional Christian. His Christian inwardness was both genuine and total. 
He indefatigably challenged his countrymen on their pretention of Christian 
faith. He launched a carefully planned challenge to his time. He was a copious 
and energetic writer with effects that still reverberate in philosophy and 
theology. 
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Kierkegaard did not develop any philosophical system. He was a 
tenacious critic of the elaborate system of philosophy established by Hegel. 
Kierkegaard raised his voice in protest against the absurdity of pure thought.He 
writes: 
Let a doubting youth, an existing doubters imbued with a 
lovable and unlimited youthful confidence in a hero of 
thought, confidingly seek in Hegel's positive philosophy 
the truth, the truth for existence: he will write a 
formidable epigram over Hegel... let him submit himself 
unconditionally in feminine devotion, but with sufficient 
vigour of determination to hold fast to his problem: he 
will become a satirist without suspecting it. The youth is 
an existing doubter, hovering in doubt and without a 
foothold for his life, he reaches out for the truth in order 
to exist in it. He is negative and the philosophy of Hegel 
is positive — what wonder then that he seeks anchorage in 
Hegel. But a philosophy of pure thought is for an existing 
individual is a chimera, if the truth that is sought is. 
something to exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure 
thought is like travelling in Denmark with the help of a 
small map of Europe, on which Denmark shows no larger 
than a steel pen point — aye, it is still more impossible. 
The admiration and enthusiasm of the youth, his 
boundless confidence in Hegel, is precisely the satire 
upon Hegel' (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 3) . 
Kierkegaard was profoundly disillusioned with speculative philosophy. 
In fact he was, continuously despaired of philosophical speculation. In view of 
the same, he continuously revisited to the question of Christian faith. He was 
deeply hostile to objective system-building deeming it to be both distractionary 
and dillusionary. The historically established speculative systems of philosophy 
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were, in fact, antithetical to truly philosophical thinking and living. Speculative 
philosophical systems provide a life-long escape from the real problems of 
individuals existence. 
Kierkegaard put up a massive intellectual struggle to renew the meaning 
of Christianity by bringing out the permanent cleavage between faith and 
reason, Christianity and culture. As Kierkegaard saw it, Christian revelation 
can not be naturalized and assimilated or made probable and acceptable. It can 
not be reconciled with the rest of history in a total world-view. A genuine 
Christianity has got to be an irremediable absurdity. It has got to be a perpetual 
offence to reason. It has got to pose a choice, a fateful decision. Any attempt to 
reconcile faith and reason, to philosophise Christian beliefs and to graft 
revelation into the tree of natural theology is bound to rebound or boomrang. 
Christian beliefs are wholly alien to reason and experience. They are incapable 
of assimilation. They constitute a limit and a challenge to human thought. They 
constitute the tension, not only between a skeptical mind and a religious heart 
but also between Christian dogma and secular culture. 
The most crucial philosophical engagement of Kierkegaard was his 
endeavour to understand Christian faith. The claims of Jesus to be God is the 
supreme paradox for Kierkegaard. It is simply impossible to gather 
authenticatory evidence in support of this claim. The historical success of 
Christianity can not be deemed to be authenticating this supreme paradox. For 
all rational and even historical purposes it is the most absurd of claims. The 
objective certainty with regard to this absurd claim is impossible of argument 
and even formulation. In fact we can not carry out any investigation or research 
in this regard. In view of the fact that the divine reality is absolutely 
discontinuous with human reality even on the conceptual plane, it is 
unthinkable to entertain in any way the possibility of the truth of this paradox. 
A religious truth is diametrically opposite to a geometric truth which can be 
learnt through appropriation of rules and understanding of logical entailments. 
As against the truth of a geometrical theorem, the truth of Incarnation is 
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impossible of learning and even understanding. The paradox of incarnation is 
beyond reason. It imposes a limit on thought and throws the inquirer into a 
passion of uncertainty. The appropriation of the paradox in the patience of faith 
can not bring certainty. The paradox remains absolutely unintelligible. Faith 
can not reduce its offence to reason. It is a perpetual affront to human 
intelligence and a perennial source of suffering for it poses itself as a limit of 
all thought. 
Historically speaking, many Christian theologians had tried to 
demonstrate Christian doctrines,to rationally defend them. They thought that 
these doctrines could be objectively validated by recourse to philosophical 
reasoning. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, had this abiding and unshakable 
conviction that a successful rational defence of Christianity could never be 
successfully accomplished. Christianity was not a set of reasonable doctrines. 
It's doctrines were rather paradigmatically absurd. Philosophy and Christianity 
were impossible of reconciliation. Christianity was essentially paradoxical and 
irrational 
Christianity cannot be inherited like family property. It cannot be a 
parental gift. One does not become a Christian by one's accident of birth. Nor 
can Christianity be appropriated by recourse to certain ritual performances. To 
be a Christian was not to be born into a Christian family. Christians cannot be 
mass-produced by State or church. The society, at large, can not deliver 
generations of Christians. Nor can the state manufacture them with the 
trademark `Christian' embosomed on them. 
To be Christian is to live in a state of suffering, unhappiness, dread, guilt 
and sin. To be Christian is not to accept or reject a set of doctrines. To be 
Christian is to appropriate a way of life, it is not to espouse or propound a body 
of knowledge. Acceptance of Christianity or believing in Christ can never 
constitute a piece of knowledge. The problem is not to understand Christianity 
but to understand that it cannot be understood (Solomon: 74) . 
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It is true that Christianity is anchored on certain fundamental or 
foundational doctrines. However, acceptance of these doctrines do not 
constitute the sufficient condition of being a Christian. Christian doctrines are 
absurd and such doctrines can not be accepted to be true. Christianity is beyond 
the ken of our understanding. In view of the same, our ascent to its doctrines 
cannot constitute our appropriate or relevant response. To be a Christian is to 
be suffused with the passion of faith. The doctrines of Christianity are not to be 
believed in literally but are meant to be used as a foil for passion of faith. To be 
Christian is to accept a way of life characterized by ineffable and inscrutable 
suffering . This suffering emanates from our relationship to God as signified by 
Christ. This relationship is neither true nor knowable nor literally believable. It 
is a perennially mysterious and incomprehensible feeling of guilt and despair,in 
the face of one's inscrutable sin before God. Christianity really signifies 
espousal of an "irrational" way of life. The historically long drawn-out 
apologetics carried out with the best of intentions has been deeply detrimental 
to the growth of Christian way of life. It has essentially distorted the vision and 
mission of Christianity. Appropriation of the doctrine of Trinity analogous to 
the law of Universal Gravitation can lend some plausibility to our beliefs but 
can rob us of our way of life. To rationalize Christianity is to scuttle the 
emotional appeal of Christianity. To attempt to prove the faith is to rob us of 
our passionate commitment to Christianity: 
When faith begins to loose its passion, when faith begins 
to cease to be faith, then a proof becomes necessary, so as 
to command respect from the side of unbelief 
(Concluding Unscientific Post Script, 202). 
Unlike many Christian theologians and philosophers who worked out a 
reconciliation between philosophy and religion, Kierkegaard struggled to bring 
out the radical incompatibility between the two. The Christian doctrines could 
never be shown objectively valid. A rational defence or justification of 
Christianity can never be successfully accomplished. For Christianity is not 
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comprised of a set of reasonable doctrines but an unfathomable, an 
indecipherable complex of absurdities and paradoxes. Reconciliation between 
rationality and Christianity was an impossible task. A rational justification of 
Christianity was needed to buttress the official, institutional and collective 
Christian theology for mass consumption. The institutional and theological 
Christianity is bent upon to mass producing generation after generation of 
Christians with maximum possible uniformity as if they were the products of a 
factory. In point of fact, Christianity is not a set of doctrines to be accepted or 
rejected or a body of true propositions but a way of life. Christianity was also 
not a way to happiness or satisfaction or successful secular life. It was 
essentially an appropriation of suffering, a mode of life born out of a deep 
sense of guilt and sinfulness (Solomon: 73). 
Kierkegaard questions the conventional conception of Christianity. The 
fundamental doctrines of Christianity can never be proved to be logically 
consistent and coherent deductions or scientifically arrived at inductive 
generalizations. The Christian doctrines are essentially absurd and Christian 
apologetics has all along been endeavoring to make Christianity plausible. 
However, such a plausibility can be achieved only on the cost of Christianity 
itself. Becoming a Christian is accepting a set of essentially absurd doctrines, 
especially the doctrine that a man was God is absolutely paradoxical. Belief in 
Christ can never be demonstrated to be a true proposition, thus Christianity and 
philosophy are essentially incompatible. Christianity cannot be known but 
appropriated only through passionate faith. Christianity is passionate 
inwardness. Truth is passionate inwardness as well. Christianity is not an 
acceptance of a literal truth of a set of doctrines. It is rather an acceptance of a 
way of life, a life of suffering: 
At the basis of this suffering is the doctrine of one's 
relationship before God, as signified by Christ, This 
doctrine is not something true or known or even literally 
believed. It is a feeling one has of constant guilt and 
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despair, but whose object (one's Sin before God) must 
forever remain, not only a `mystery', but simply 
incomprehensible. To be a Christian, therefore is to 
embark upon this `irrational' way of life (Solomon, 75). 
The validation of Christianity by recourse to apologetics robs us from 
Christianity as a way of life. The acceptance of doctrine of Trinity is poles 
apart from our acceptance of Scientific laws. The plausibility of Christianity 
could be purchased only on the cost of giving up Christianity as a way of life., 
The long drawn-out historical quest for furnishing a proof or a set of proofs for 
the existence of God is all the more unacceptable and unwarranted. Kant's 
refutation of the traditional proofs for the existence of God is joyfully and 
gratefully acknowledged and celebrated by Kierkegaard. The very quest for 
proof is inspired by our lack of passionate faith. 
Europeans philosophers and theologians have all along deemed 
Christianity to be a set of doctrines. To be a Christian was to believe in these 
doctrines. Furthermore, with a view to purchasing the platability and 
plausibility of Christianity, philosophers gave totally alien meanings to central 
Christian concepts. However, Christianity according to Kierkegaard is not a set 
of doctrines that can be proved to be true or made reasonable. Christianity is 
not oriented to exploring its truth, it'supshot is the relation of the individual to 
God. One cannot become a Christian as a result of philosophical or scientific 
research. Being Christian involves deep personal involvement or faith, Faith as 
subjectivity cannot be inculcated in us by appropriating a doctrine or a religion 
or a Church. Faith as subjectivity has to be chosen by an individual. Faith is 
chosen not because it is true or is plausible but because we personally commit 
ourselves to it without any reasons thereof. The philosophisation of Christianity 
leads to emasculation of Christianity (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 324-
325). 
To be Christian according to Kierkegaard is not to master ponderous 
tomes of theology but to suffer before God. Christian theologians can write 
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volumes on suffering. They can display great understanding and detailed 
information about suffering. However, they are not prepared to experience 
suffering, "There are two ways, One is to suffer; the other is to become a 
professor of the fact that another suffered" (Auden, W.H., The Living Thoughts 
of Kierkegaard, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1952, 26) . 
An objective acceptance of Christianity is paganism or thoughtlessness. 
Christianity protests against every form of objectivity; it desires that the subject 
should be infinitely concerned about himself. It is with subjectivity that 
Christianity is concerned, and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it 
exists at all. Objectively, Christianity has absolutely no existence. If the truth 
happens to be only in a single subject it exists in him alone; and there is greater 
Christian joy in heaven over this one individual than over Universal History or 
the system (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 116). 
It is always beguiling and attractive to deem Christian doctrines as 
objectively true. We are always inclined to argue that Christianity is rational 
and can be defended on solid rational grounds. We think that Christianity can 
be learnt as well as taught. Kierkegaard repeatedly underlines that such an 
objective estimation or understanding of Christianity tantamounts to its utmost 
trivialization. The central paradox of Christianity is the incarnation; that a God 
was incarnated at a particular point of space and time. This paradox constitutes 
the alpha and omega of absurdity. Such a paradoxical absurdity or absurd 
paradox can never be made rationally and objectively acceptable. It can be 
known only subjectively. If we suppose Christianity to be objectively true or 
scientifically acceptable, we are contradicting its very logic and topsy-
turveying its very raison de'tre, locus standi and modus operandi. However, 
most Christians find it hard to bear the thought of their own individuality and 
responsibility. They prefer to be members of a sect or community and 
persuding them to see themselves as concrete individuals is an experience of 
conversion for them (Mary Warnock; Existentialism, Oxford University Press, 
London Oxford, 1970, 11). 
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Jesus himself constitutes the Truth. Christ is the Truth, Christ is the 
Teacher and Christ is teaching the Truth. Christianity can not be learnt in a 
theological Seminary. Learning of Christianity entails an encounter or 
confrontation with God. This brings out the spiritual authoritarianism of 
Christianity indicating that Christianity is centered on a spiritual authority 
rather than on a rational authority. Reality is spiritual rather than rational. 
Nevertheless, reason has a very crucial role to play in the context of 
Christianity. It has to recognize and appreciate the absurdity of the doctrines of 
Christianity. Its fundamental role is discovering the utter irrationality of 
accepting the Christian way of life. Once we understand the utter irrational 
character of Christian beliefs and values, there is nothing left to be understood. 
Rational justification of Christianity is neither possible nor necessary. 
There is no need to strive for rational confirmation or validation of Christianity. 
There can not be a Christian Theology or Christology. God, Christ and Holy 
Spirit are not objects of knowledge. Theology is impossible of attainment or 
formulation. Christianity is irrational in the sense that its doctrines are absurd. 
It must be accepted though it cannot be understood. Any so-called 
rationalization of Christianity would toss out its fundamental structure and 
character out of existence or distort it beyond redemption. We need to accept 
the doctrines of Christianity and live by them rather then fret about working out 
a philosophical theology. There can not be any rational understanding of 
Christianity for there is no scope for employment of reason with reference to 
Christian doctrines. In view of the same, Christianity can not be based on 
reason. It must be based on authority; the authority of paradox can be 
appropriated only through faith. Such a faith entails religious life characterized 
by the feeling of continuous presence of God. There is no scope for uncertainty 
or skepticism. A man of faith lives in the continuous presence of God with 
devotion and awe. His life becomes a daily witness to that presence. To be a 
Christian is to love this continuous presence of God. To be a Christian is to live 
passionately in the presence of God. To be the Christian "Knight of Faith" is 
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simply to exist in the presence of God. To be a Christian is to tear through all 
the rational prognostications and skeptical investigations and to unquestionably 
surrender before the ineffable and inscrutable presence of God. 
Christianity as a way of life or as a set of values is what's most 
significant for Kierkegaard. Christianity as a set of doctrines such as 
Incarnation or Trinity is only important in so far as they orientate a religious 
attitude in us. For Kierkegaard, the appropriate religious attitudes are fear, 
dread and even terror before an almighty yet unknowable God. Secondly, we 
must go through unqualified despair and unmitigated suffering at our personal 
limitations. Thirdly, we must cultivate an overpowering guilt in the face of sin 
before God. Religious life is deeply characterized by an all-pervasive feeling of 
sinfulness and an extreme sense of paradox. It entail's an awareness that 
ordinary rules and laws may have to be suspended in order to follow God's 
will. The more irrational of our faith in God becomes, the more authentic our 
religious faith gets, for it gets shorn of the support of objective reasons. 
Kierkegaard repeatedly underlines that belief in the Christian God is 
paradoxical because it asserts that an eternal transcendent God becomes 
incarnate in human history. This central paradox of Christianity is beyond the 
ken of human rationality. 
(D) THREE MODES OF EXISTENCE 
Kierkegaards' appropriation of subjectivity leads him finally to outlining 
three possible modes of human existence. These three modes of existence are 
not logically compelling or justifiable. They constitute Kierkegaards' 
existential dialectic. They have their specific values and it is upto man to opt 
for mode of existence. These three modes are, (a) Aesthetic Mode, (b) Ethical 
Mode and (c) Religious Mode. 
(a) The Aesthetic Mode 
According to Kierkegaard, a man choosing aesthetic mode of existence is not 
bothered by considerations of duty, self-control, obligation or responsibility. 
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Such a man strives for immediate satisfaction and gratification. He is not 
bothered by considerations of good or evil or principles of morality. He can 
only experience feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, fulfilment and 
frustration, pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering, ecastacy and despair. 
He leads a life of romantic immediacy. He lives from moment to moment and 
craves for immediate pleasure or satisfaction. A typical aesthetic life is almost 
pathologically engaged in enjoyment of pleasant or pleasurable. It can be 
enjoyment of health and wealth, beauty and talent, honour and prestige, arts 
and philosophy, literature and theology etc. 
However, aesthetic life is constantly threatened by the ever present 
prospect of pain and suffering, frustration and boredom. The aesthete, with a 
view to escaping boredom, is ever in search of novel pleasures. He stoutly 
refuses to engage in reflection or ponder over the significance of his doings. 
However, willy-nilly, he cannot help reflecting on the significance of his 
momentary pleasures. Eventually, he is confronted by the emptiness and 
ultimate meaninglessness of his perennial quest for gratifications. All 
immediate gratifications sound to be holo and one becomes a skeptical of one's 
chosen mode of life. The skepticism leads to cynicism and cynicism culminates 
into despair. In utter desperation most of the aesthes loose themselves in the 
crowd and the hustle and bustle of everyday collective life. However, some of 
them are endowed with requisite resilience to withstand the pressure of 
merging into the crowd and opt for what Kierkegaard characterize, as ethical 
mode of existence (David West : An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, 
Polity Press, 1996, 123-24). 
(b) The Ethical Mode 
The ethical mode of existence as formulated and advanced by Kierkegaard, is 
guided by rational, universal and secular principles and standards. An ethical 
person against an aesthete can control his itch for immediate pleasures and is 
also not bogged down by considerations of sin and guilt which characterize a 
religious mode of existence. The ethical life is societal and communitarian. In 
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this mode of existence one control's one's desires and interests and is 
motivated by considerations of personal duties and social responsibility. Ethical 
life consists of the applications of universal rational principles. Ethical 
principles apply to all human beings and all human beings deserve to be treated 
ethically. Each human being is to be treated as an end in himself and each 
human being has to operate within the kingdom of ends as was expounded by 
Kant. However, Kant's rational justification of moral principles is utterly 
unacceptable according to Kierkegaard. 
In ethical mode of existence man engages in self-evaluation, self-
appraisal and reflection. The ethical man is always concerned about the 
meaningfulness or meaninglessness of his life and can measure up to this or 
that standard of morality. He undertakes his actions and projects after due 
deliberation and action. The actions of an ethical man are significant in view of 
their accordance with moral principles and not because they are immediately 
pleasant or pleasurable. The commitment to ethical principles imparts a 
measure of meaningfulness to the life of an ethical man. The application of 
ethical principles gives meaning to life.An ethical reflection discloses to us the 
meaninglessness of aesthetic life as well. 
So long as one remains in this secular, ethical mould, one can lead a 
meaningful life by one's unqualified dutifulness. Sometimes one can fall short 
of one's ethical standard or momentarily lapse into self-gratification or pursue 
personal interest at the cost of societal or communitarian welfare. Such 
momentary lapses can occasion repentence in him and by way of compensation 
or atonement he can go in for the upkeep of moral values or principles with 
greater zeal and enthusiasm. However, if his reflection leads him from secular 
to religious sphere of existence and he experiences sin and consequent guilt, he 
can again experience meaninglessness and despair. The despair of the 
revelation of sin and guilt cannot be overcome by mere subordination to ethical 
values and principles. The terrifying revelation of sin and guilt can be 
overcome by religious faith and subordination to God (Ibid., 124-25). 
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(c) The Religious Mode 
The religious mode of existence is anchored on man's relationship with God. 
The religious sphere of existence is personally deemed by the Kierkegaard to 
be the best and he himself admits to have been endabaring in his writings to 
awaken his readers to an espousal of religious view and way of life (Solomon, 
p. 98). Kierkegaard deemed Christian conception of existence to be the highest, 
although, unlike Kant and Hegel he did not advance any rational justification. of 
Christianity. Nevertheless like Kant he deemed God to be essentially 
unknowable and incomprehensible. God to Kierkegaard was not an object of 
knowledge but simply an object of faith. 
The central doctrine of Christianity viz. the historical existence of God 
in the form of man, is essentially absurd and an absolute paradox which cannot 
be hermeneutically manipulated with a view to making it reasonable and 
acceptable. A rationally imposed plausibility cuts at the very roots of the 
doctrine it may be purporting to be rescuing. The doctrine that Christ is eternal 
like God and temporal like man is fundamentally absurd. As this doctrine is 
central to Christianity, the religion is unavoidably and inevitabily absurd and 
paradoxical from the rational point of view. However, what is crucial according 
to Kierkegaard is not the rationality or truth of Christian doctrines. What is 
important is the cultivation of appropriate attitudes of the believers and 
practitioners towards the Christian doctrines such as God, Christ, Trinity, 
Incarnation etc. For example, Kierkegaard exhorts, a Christian must cultivate 
such attitudes as fear, dread and even terror before an almighty or unknowable 
God. He must be full of despair and suffering at irredeemable personal 
limitations and failures. He must be suffering from overwhelming sense of guilt 
in the face of sin before God. However, a Christian has to cultivate love of God 
as well. He must be ever full of fear and despair in the presence of God but also 
have faith in His goodness and justice. He must shun all doubts as well as 
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rational justifications and passionately exist in the presence of God 
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 288). 
Reason cannot provide a justification of Christianity. It can only make 
us understand absurdity of Christian doctrine. Through reason we can discover 
the utter irrationality of accepting the Christian way of life. The Christian way 
of life is irrational because there is no standard for choosing it and the choice 
must be a simple leap of faith. Reason cannot even comprehend the doctrines 
of Christianity. Christianity is irrational in the sense that it must be accepted 
even though it cannot be understood. Rather than trying to understand it we 
must live by it. The ethical principles are rationally justifiable but religious 
truth is not amenable to rational validation. Accordingly, Christian teaching 
cannot be based on reason; they can be anchored only on authority, the 
authority of the teacher, namely Jesus. He is not only the teacher but Himself 
constitutes the Truth. Christianity entails being confronted with God. The 
historical existence of Christ constitutesthe miracle that is the Truth for 
Christianity. Christ while living constituted God's revelation to us. Presently, 
we are not living with the Christ but we have to analogously feel the presence 
of Christ here and now. One can become a Christian only by feeling onself in 
the actual presence of God. Being in the presence of God unavoidably brings 
one's to the recognition to one's own incompleteness. One recognizes one's 
own sinfulness in the presence of God. Man's sinfulness is not an outcome of 
the transgression of any moral principle or of any divinely prescribed 
injunction. No amount of reasoning can disclose man's sinfulness. Man by his 
very being sins against God. Feeling guilty about it, despairing at the 
ineradicability or ineliminabilityof one's sinfulness, recognizing that one is 
essentially incomplete and thereby an insult to God, and sincerely repenting at 
one's incorrigibility, is the Christian way of life. 
As a philosophical theologian and more aptly as a religious prophet, the 
mission of Kierkegaard was to awaken us to the need for unconditional 
religious commitment. Accordingly, Kierkegaard employed all his -dialectical 
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skills — rhetorical exaggerations, paradoxes and ironies to jolt us out of our 
intellectual slumber and moral complacency with a view to realizing the need 
for making the leap of faith. 
Kierkegaard's philosophical reflections were largely elaborated by way 
of reaction against the `System of Hegel. Kierkegaard's extravagant anti-
rationalism is directly proportional to Hegel's religious rationalism. 
Throughout his writings, Kierkegaard appears to exalt the irrational and absurd 
and paradoxical at the expense of the rational. At its face value, Kierkegaard 
seems to be wallowing into sheer and willful obscurantism. He seems to be 
deliberately denigrating reason and glorifying the irrationality and absurdity of 
religious faith. Kierkegaard seems to be holding the position that it was 
precisely because religious faith was paradoxical and flouted reason that it was 
thereby believable. 
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CHAPTER — V 
IQEAL ON SUBJECTIVITY 
Of all the modern Muslim philosophers, thinkers, intellectuals and poet-
scholars, Igbal's philosophical canvas has been latitudinously and 
longitudinously widened and enlarged by his vertical and horizontal 
interactions with western philosophy. In his poetic and prose writings he has 
alluded to most of the Greek, Medieval, Modern and Contemporary western 
philosophers. He has been especially impacted by several post-Kantian 
philosophers such as Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson and 
many more. 
Iqbal seems to have been impacted by various western philosophers in 
various ways. He has similarities and dissimilarities with numerous illustrious 
western philosophers whose writings he had gone through and whose doctrines 
and principles he had either fully or partially accepted and rejected. However, 
there is no evidence that he had directly come into contact with the writings of 
Kierkegaard whose existentialist approach to philosophy became acceptable 
and later on popular only in mid-twentieth century when the writings of such 
existentialists as Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul 
Sartre became available to people at large. But Iqbal need not have been 
directly or indirectly impacted by Kierkegaard, for in his approach to religion 
and philosophy, in his radical espousal of subjectivity, in his indefetgable 
advocacy of faith and love, in his repudiation of the absolutistic claims of 
reason, in his acceptance of the ultimacy of the Will and in his appropriation of 
religious experience as revelatory of the Ultimate Reality, he was more 
Kierkegaardian than Kierkegaard himself. In their attitudes and values and 
more importantly in their methods and approaches they were almost each 
others clones. Like Kierkegaard Iqbal rejects abstractions of academic 
philosophy as pointless and futile for they divert out attention from the real 
concrete problems of the individual. Conventional philosophers have made 
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philosophy a technique of conceptual analysis. In their so-called search for 
Ultimate Reality the Philosophers work out elaborate explorations and 
investigations. Instead of finding out what is Ultimately Real, the philosopher 
is himself lost in his own elaborations. 
(A) BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION 
However, despite his exceptional perspicuity in Western philosophy, 
Igbal's philosophical development has been fundamentally inspired by the 
world-view and value-system of the Qur'an as well as teachings of the Prophet. 
He also had a profound understanding of and grounding in Islamic philosophy. 
Besides, he was deeply drunk into Western and Muslim literary traditions. He 
was also one of the most concerned intellectuals of his times and therefore 
abreast of contemporaneous literary, cultural and philosophical trends across 
the board. However, most importantly, he was influenced by post-Kantian 
German voluntarists such as Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as well as the 
highly original French philosopher of twentieth century, namely, Henry 
Bergeson. Of all the Muslim thinkers, philosophers, scholars and poet's, he was 
irreversibly transmuted by Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, an outstanding Persian Sufi-poet 
born in 1207 at Balkh (now in Afghanistan) and buried at Quania (now in 
Turkey). Igbal was also quite familiar with Jewish, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist 
and Jaina religious and cultural traditions and highly accomplished in Arabic, 
Persian, Urdu, English and German languages. In fact, Iqbal has been inspired 
by diverse sources in the formulation of his main philosophical tenets. 
Iqbal is an unflinching advocate of the pivotal role of human personality 
in the cultural and civilizational evolution across the board. He is not a 
rationalist and yet he is a humanist of the highest order. His humanism is not 
secularist or rationalist in the modernist sense of European philosophical 
discourse. He is humanist in the sense that man's moral and spiritual 
consciousness is vitally and crucially indispensable for the evolution and 
transformation of our society, polity, economy and culture. Whereas, human 
rationality is vortexed into innumerable limitations, man's spiritual vision and 
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creativity accompanied and directed by Divine grace, are irresistible forces - of 
evolution, revolution and transformation. As against secularist rationalist 
humanism, Iqbal is an advocate of spiritualist humanism. In fact, Iqbal is a 
perennialist philosopher. Though highly accomplished 	in modern 
philosophical trends and movements, he is irretrievably and irreversibly 
inspired by the vision and mission of Prophets; the latest version of this vision 
and mission having been incorporated into the Qur'an and Prophethood of 
Muhammad. His philosophical beliefs and values are, to the best of his 
consciousness and conscience, in almost isomorphic consonance with verses of 
the Quran and sayings and doings of the Prophet of Islam. His entire 
intellectual life and philosophical struggle were oriented to figuring out the 
features of the ideal Muslim. An indefinite and unfailing search for the ideal 
Muslim was the Cynosure of his intellectual freedom and philosophical 
wisdom. 
The goal of human life according to Islam is glorification and 
implementation of Divine Writ. The heart of a Muslim has got to be dyed into 
Divine colour. An Ideal Muslim is unfailingly inspired by the vision of the 
Qur'an and mission of the Prophet. He is in abiding love with God and the 
Prophet. Iqbal says that a Muslim who is innocent of love is innocent of faith as 
well. A Muslim eats, drinks, sleeps, sees and sees not in accordance with the 
Will of Allah. A Muslim transcends the verbal interpretations and appropriates 
intuitive intimations. Accordingly, his doings are illuminated by light of truth. 
He lives in contentment even when blessed with royal opportunities. He is 
spiritually insightful and ever-conscious of God. Every action of a Muslim is 
aimed at attaining to the proximity of God. In fact, attainment of ever-
increasing nearness to God is the only criterion for actions being righteous or 
vicious. Pursuit of war aiming at attaining to Divine Proximity, is ethically 
righteous. Pursuit of peace aiming at something other than Divine Proximity is 
ethically unjustified and unjustifiable and therefore a vicious action. Iqbal has 
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outlined the crux of his philosophical vision and mission in the following 
verses: 
J--  	J_ mart .L . +uL.   
Imbue thine heart with the tincture of Allah, 
Give honour and glory to love ! 
The Muslim's nature prevails by means of love: 
The Muslim, if he be not loving, is an infidel. 
Upon God depends his seeing and not-seeing, 
His eating, drinking and sleeping. 
In his will that which God wills becomes lost — 
"How small a man believe this saying ?" 
Whatever thou lost, let it be thine aim therein to draw nigh to God, 
That his glory may be made manifest by thee. 
Peace becomes an evil, if its object be aught else; 
War is good if its object is God 
Igbal's critique of establishmentarian Muslims and especially of 
entrenched Mulladom is devastating. Its wistfulness or poignancy can be 
discerned in his entire poetic contributions. The Muallas in the propagation and 
appropriation of their vested interests compromised the pristine glory and 
authenticity of the Quran and Sunnah. They admixture Islamic beliefs, values, 
norms, standards of behavior and criteria of evaluation with unIslamic 
presuppositions, practices and rituals. They were the professed guardians of 
faith but their quest for personal survival, prestige and profit took precedence 
over their commitment to the principles and practices of Islam. They became 
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innocent of their value, significance and meaningfulness as standard bearers of 
Islam and indulged in the imitation of modes of behavior and patterns of 
thinking espoused by non-Muslim communities. They lost self-authentication 
as Muslims and became spiritually vacuous. They became alienated from their 
spiritual moorings and lived by dint of borrowed beliefs and values. They 
became divested of Islamic behavior and consequently Muslims lost their 
prestige and leadership role in the country of nations. They worshipped the 
idols of their wish fulfillment and consequently idolaters have been looking 
askance at us. The Mullas sold Islam in their love for personal idols and in the 
process corrupted monotheistic vision with polytheistic outlook. The 
unavoidable and inevitable degeneration culminated into Mullas and Sufis 
donning ludicrous apparels and cultivating long tresses so that they along with 
the Muslim community became a laughing stock in the eyes of the world. Their 
hearts are devoid of monotheistic orientation or direction. They are a heartless, 
mindless and lightless flock of power-seekers and office-worshippers. They are 
not only unmindful of the requirements of the community; they have rather 
immensely tarnished the glorious faith of Islam by their ceaseless striving for 
pleasure, pelf and power. For all practical purposes they have become the 
grandiloquent salesmen of Islam: 
Lo aLW ~ .I 	5j oJ 
	 I_ e  I 	,~ I I c 	I ,LJ ___5 
L~y~+ j~l suw 
The Ka'ba is filled with our idols, 
Infidelity mocks at our Islam. 
Our Shaykh bath gambled Islam away for love of idols, 
And made a rosary of the zunnar. 
Our spiritual directors owe their rank to their white hairs, 
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And are the laughing-stock of children in the street. 
Their hearts bear no impress of the Faith, 
But house the idols of sensuality. 
Our preacher fixed his eyes on the pagoda, 
And the mufti of the Faith sold his verdict. 
Iqbal is highly respectful and deeply appreciative of the role of ever-
expanding horizons of knowledge. He is especially appreciative of the modern 
scientific, logico-mathematical, methodological and epistemological 
investigations carried out by Modern West since sixteenth century A.D. 
onwards. Modern western scientific achievements and technological 
astonishments constitute some of the mightiest contributions to the growth of 
human civilizations. The knowledge that is rationally arrived at or worked out 
is the charcterising feature or hallmark of us humans in comparison to other 
species of animals across the spectrum. Our rational or logical inductions and 
deductions have yielded limitless information or countless data of experience. 
On the basis of these sense experiential data and inductions and deductions 
thereof, man has been able to discover universal and eternal Laws of nature. 
On the basis of these Laws, we have been able to devise and design astonishing 
technological solutions to ever-increasing social, political and economic 
problems. However, propositions of science and statements of knowledge, 
though necessary and unavoidable in the growth of human civilization as well 
as culture do not and can not exhaust the multicomplex mystery that man is. 
Man does not live by bread alone. So he does not live .by clothes, housing 
facilities, career opportunities and promotions, great industrial achievements 
and large urban centres, swanky cars and glittering shopping malls etc. More 
than scientific Laws and technological goods, man lives by faith and love, truth 
and beauty, goodness and justice etc. These life-sustaining and life-nourishing 
values can not emanate from scientific propositions or Laws. Scientific Laws 
are discovered or arrived at by recourse to observational, inductive and 
experimental research or by rational derivations and deductions etc. Values are 
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not necessitated or dictated by experimental investigations or rational 
deductions. They are neither objects nor products and can neither be objectified 
nor produced. As against scientific research, it is religion which vouchsafes the 
framework for the meaningfulness, validity, necessity, desirability and 
relevance of values. Cultural advancement and historical evolution do also 
necessitate value-interactions and value-interventions. But our historical and 
cultural consciousness has been abidingly impacted by our religious world-
views or outlooks. Social, political and ethical philosophes can debate as to 
how far values have a necessary connection with religion and how far they are 
a function of cultural and historical developments. However, one thing can be 
indisputably advanced; scientific research or rational knowledge can not 
provide a basis for values. The necessity and relevance of values can be 
established only in contradistinction to scientific research, logical deductions 
and methodical explorations. 
Iqbal is hundred-percently convinced that modern, primarily European 
natural and social scientific investigations can never provide us any ground for 
values such as love and quest for truth. The modern scientific investigations are 
devoid of quest for truth and taste for values. Iqbal claims to have spent 
decades in the pursuit of modern scholarship inspired by European scientific or 
naturalistic vision. He has found it to be morally uninspiring and spiritually 
enervating. The following lines from Asrar-i-Khudi bring out the same: 
te j L 'J. r~ - 9 	:L_.; 
	
 3y.i. 1 	d 	;,,,, 	L-1 	L__ 
fj~ is JjIj ___________ 	d 1'J JI 	ra `.7 ____w_ 
Thou hast cast knowledge of God behind thee 
And squandered thy religion for the sake of a loaf. 
But do not seek the glow of love from the knowledge of today, 
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Igo not seek the nature of Truth from this infidel's cup! 
Modern knowledge is the greatest blind — 
Idol worshipping, idol-selling, idol making 1 
Shackled in the prison of phenomena, 
It has not overleaped the limits of the sensible 
Its fire is cold as the flame of the tulip; 
Its flames are frozen like hail. 
(B) CRITIQUE OF REASON 
Iqbal has advanced an extraordinarily radical critique o reason. His 
Urdu and Persian poetry especially has assembled a devastating critique of 
human reason. The culminating point of rational investigations is impresnce to 
what is Ultimately Real. Philosophy worked out of human reason alienates 
from real life. A philosophical system activated by rational speculation like that 
of Hegel, is like a shell without a pearl; such philosophical systems are illusory, 
misleading, and fictitious. Reason, at the most, is like a lamp that illuminates 
our courtyard. However, it cannot illuminate the inner recesses or dark rooms 
of our house: 
< 	 i 
JJ DJ +7 	Y' 	LQ t 	 V 
Reason is the light of the eyes of a wayfarer 
Reason is nothing but a candle of the street 
What tumultuous events occur inside the house 
The candle of the street does not have any inkling of them. 
Iqbal was an outstanding philosopher of early twentieth century. 
However, his was a multidimensional personality. He was a seer. • He was a 
savant. He was a scholar. He was a visionary. He was also a poet of 
international renown. Most importantly, he was a non-reductionist and an 
integrationist. He is an integral epistemologist. He cannot be pigeonholed 
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within watertight western epistemological compartments. He is not either an 
empiricist or a rationalist or an intuitionist. He is all the three integrated into 
one. With exceptional epistemological perspicuity and prescience, he clearly 
and categorically appreciates the respective functions of sense-experience, 
reason and intuition and is not broiled into mystifying controversies advanced 
by modern western epistemologists. Sense-experience, reason and intuition are 
not mutually exclusive, Knowledge is a process which cannot be carried out 
without the crucial and critical contributions or inputs of all the three sources; 
sense-experience, reason and intuition. 
Iqbal recognizes sense-experience as a valid source of knowledge. The 
sense-organs give us knowledge of the physical phenomena after coming into 
contact with the external world. Apart from sense-experiential sources, Iqbal 
acknowledges the reality of the physical world by citing of the Qur' anic verses. 
According to him, Reality reveals its symbols within the realms of Spirit and 
Matter. The Quran has laid great emphasis on the study of the observable 
aspects of Reality. It was this empirical attitude of the Quran which taught the 
Muslims to cultivate concern for external world and made them the founders- of 
modern science (Iqbal: Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 15). 
However, our senses enable us only to observe the phenomena. They are 
unable to obtain the truth of things. Hence, we need some other means of 
knowledge beyond senses. This leads us to a consideration of the most 
important role played by human reason as a source of knowledge. Iqbal also 
acknowledges reason to be a highly significant source of valid knowledge. 
However, Iqbal has developed a powerful critique of modern western 
epistemology with its emphasis on empirical, rational and experimental 
knowledge. In his poetry, especially, he has masterfully assembled a critique of 
rationalist epistemology. Reason may not necessarily be negating the existence 
of any Higher Reality. However, it is beyond the capabilities of reason to grasp 
or appropriate any clue to an understanding of the Higher Reality. Reason can 
proliferate speculations and conjectures with regard to what is Ultimately Real. 
157 
Such speculations and conjectures can not provide any confirmation with 
regard to Ultimate Reality. The Ultimate Reality can be appropriated only by 
recourse to Religious Experience, Intuition or What Iqbal calls Love. Iqbal 
brings out that while rational knowledge is characterized by fears and doubts, 
the Love or Intuition is inseparable from firm faith and resolution: 
~.~..! 	 _-_J   
The wherewithal of reason is fear and doubt, 
Love is inseparably armed with resolution and conviction. 
Iqbal stresses that with a view to achieving a complete vision of Reality, 
the sense-experience must be replaced by the perception of what the Quran 
describes as 'Fuad' or Qalb' i.e. heart (Ibid., 15). lgbal, in his 
`Reconstruction' further brings out that `Heart' is a kind of inner intuition or 
insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the Sun and 
brings us into contact with aspects of reality other than those open to sense-
perception (Ibid.). It is according to the Qur'an, something which sees and its 
reports, if properly interpreted, are never false (Ibid., 16). It is an extraordinary 
experience of Reality through intuition. Iqbal called this kind of experience as 
`mystic experience'. The region of mystic experience, according to Iqbal, is as 
real as any other region of human experience (Ibid., 2) . Natural science, gives 
us reliable knowledge but makes available only a sectional view of `Reality'. 
Different sciences deal with different fields of knowledge or areas of research. 
But mystic experience gives us the total view of Reality. 
Sense-experience and reason are critically important in all operations of 
knowledge. However, knowledge of what is Ultimately Real is beyond the ken 
of empirical and rational modes of knowing. Kant has rightly shown that 
knowledge of the phenomenal world is co-operatively worked out by our 
sense-experiential and rational faculties. However, knowledge of the 
transphenomenal or noumenal realm is not available to sense-experience or 
reason. Reason, is especially, almost inexorably led to demonstrate or prove the 
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existence of God. However, attempted demonstrations of pure reason, 
inevitably eventuate into antinomies. Following Kant, Iqbal also tries to bring 
out the untenability of classical proofs for the existence of God, with a view to 
showing the incapability of reason to furnish us any realization of Noumenal 
Reality and paving the way for intuitive appropriation of God. 
Classical and medieval philosophers have advanced three main proofs 
with a view to demonstrating the existence of God: cosmological proof, 
ontological proof and teleological proof. Igbal concedes that these proofs are 
arguments embody a real movement of thought in its quest after the Absolute 
(Ibid.,23). However, Iqbal, following Kant, has brought out the limitations of 
these proofs or arguments. He says that, as logical proofs, they are open to 
serious criticism. They betray a superficial interpretation of experience. 
The advocates of cosmological argument deem this world to be a finite 
effect. It has to have a cause which cause has to be an effect of another cause 
and so on and so forth. Now, in order to avoid infinite regress, we have to stop 
at an Uncaused First Cause. However, according to Iqbal, we cannot privilege 
— a cause at any point to be an Uncaused First Cause, for it is the negation of 
the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds. Furthermore, 
the Uncaused First Cause arrived at by cosmological argument cannot be 
regarded as a Necessary Being. In the relation of cause and effect, the two 
terms of relation are equally necessary to each other. More importantly, the 
cosmological argument can, a best, demonstrate the conceptual necessity of 
causation. However, such a conceptual necessity of causation can in no way be 
deemed identical with the necessity of existence as such. The cosmological 
argument is an attempt to reaching the Infinite by negating the finite. However, 
the Infinite arrived at by the negation of the finite is a false infinite. Such an 
Infinite is neither self-explanatory nor offers a cogent explanation of the finite. 
The true infinite does not exclude the finite. It rather embraces the finite 
without disturbing its finitude. It also provides an explanation as well as 
justification of the being of the finite. However, the movement from the finite 
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to the Infinite as attempted in the cosmological proof for the existence of God 
is quite illegitimate. The argument fails to demonstrate the existence of God as 
envisaged by classical and medieval philosophers (Ibid., 23-24). 
The teleological argument, according to Iqbal, is also of no avail. The 
advocates of teleological argument for the existence of God, scrutinize the 
effect i.e. the world, with a view to figuring out the nature of its cause. In view 
of the fact that nature displays the traces of foresight, purpose and adaptation, 
they infer thereby and therefrom, the existence of a self-conscious Being of 
Infinite intelligence and power. Such an argument according to Iqbal, can 
prove the existence of a contriver and not that of a Creator. "Even if we 
suppose him to be also the Creator of his material, it does no credit to his 
wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material and 
then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its 
original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always 
remain limited by his material, and hence a finite designer who's limited 
resources compel him to overcome his difficulties after the fashion of a human 
mechanician". As a matter of fact, natural phenomena constitute a system of 
wholly interdependent members whereas a human artificer works out his plan 
by selecting and isolating his materials from their natural relations and 
situations. In view of the same there is really no analogy between human 
contrivance and natural integration and evolution of organic wholes (Ibid., 24). 
The ontological argument for the existence of God has underlined that 
God as a Perfect Being must be necessarily existing. This argument cannot 
withstand the logical scrutiny in view of the fact that God is Perfect by 
definition but is not Existent by definition. His existence is sought to be proved 
by recourse to ontological argument and it cannot be assumed to be a fact as 
such an assumption is an example of petitio principle i.e. taking for granted the 
very point in question. The conception of an existence can never be a proof of 
its objective existence. Kant rightly pointed out that the notion of three hundred 
dollars in my mind cannot prove that I have them in my pocket. The idea of a 
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Perfect Being in my mind and the reality of that Perfect Being are separated by 
an unbridgeable gulf which cannot be papered over by any piece of logical 
sophistry. 
In view of the above limitations of reason, Iqbal tries to bring out that it 
is through intuition or mystical experience or religions experience that we can 
appropriate God. Reason only prepares ground for the operation of intuition 
which reveals to us the secrets of hidden Reality (Reconstruction, p.• 16). Iqbal 
in his Reconstruction' outlines five features of intuition or religions 
experience. 
Firstly, the religious or mystical experience is characterized by 
immediacy. We know God through mystical experience as we know other 
objects. Secondly, the wholeness of mystical experience is unanalyzable. The 
mystical experience is not analyzable as our sense-experience can be subjected 
to a detailed analysis. In a mystical state, our contact with Reality is so 
engrossing and intimate that the ordinary subject-object distinction is 
obliterated. Thirdly, the mystical experience is a moment of intimate 
association with a Unique other Self, This Unique Other Self transcends, 
encompasses and momentarily suppresses the private personality of the subject 
of experience. Fourthly, a mystical experience is not communicable. It is more 
like a feeling than thought. "The interpretation which the mystic or the Prophet 
puts on the content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in 
the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be so transmitted". The 
mystical experience is a matter of inarticulate feeling, although it has a 
cognitive element as well. It is because of this cognitive aspect of feeling that 
while religion starts with feeling, it has never, in its history, taken itself as a 
matter of feeling alone and has constantly striven after metaphysics (Ibid., 17). 
Fifthly, the mystical experience as an intimate association with the Eternal, 
results in a sense of the unreality of serial time. However, the mystic or the 
Prophet immediately returns to normal levels of experience, even though the 
subject of experience is invested with a deep sense of authority. 
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From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the limitations of reason 
are astounding and baffling. We can arrive at certain general statements about 
the world by the application of reason. However, it can lead to transcendental 
illusions when applied to Theological, Psychological, and Cosmological issues. 
Furthermore, reason is not a disinterested tool that can be applied in our search 
for truth. It is deeply conditioned by our Biological, psychological, Social, 
Political, Economic and above all our Ideological motivations or biases. Our 
very rationality is determined by irrational forces. Thus, the capacity of reason 
to arrive at so-called justified true beliefs is highly doubtful. The validity of 
knowledge-claims arrived at by means of reason cannot be accepted unless it is 
categorically established that reason is an innate, universal and immutable 
faculty of mind. Logical inference does give us valid conclusions. However, 
logical inference is an implicative derivation from given premises. Besides 
such claims are a priori. The central question is whether reason can arrive at 
justified true beliefs that are synthetic a posteriori pertaining to not only 
physical investigations but metaphysical, ethical and spiritual inquiries as well. 
The reach of reason in these inquiries is painfully limited. 
Iqbal in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam brings out a 
holistic or integral epistemological account. Following both the Qur'anic 
epistemological insights and common-sense epistemological reflections, Iqbal 
accepts the validity of all the three levels or types of knowledge: empirical, 
rational and intuitive. For Iqbal, the rational knowledge is rooted in empirical 
observations and is capable of intuitive flashlights or direct apprehension and 
understanding of Reality. 
The thrust of Igbalian epistemology is in underscoring the pivotal or 
foundational role of intuition or mystical experience or religious experience in 
intimating to us the realization of the Ultimate Reality. IgbaI's fundamental 
epistemological assumption is that self-realisation is the basis of God-
realisation. Realisation of ourself analogously furnishes us the realization of 
God. An intuitive understanding of our self is the gateway of our intuitive 
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understanding of God. Our intuition reveals God to us as the Supreme Ego or 
Ultimate Self. Scores of attributes are ascribed to this Supreme Ego by the 
Quran; Creativity, Eternity, Omnipotence and Omniscience being the main 
attributes among them all. 
All knowledge furnished by recourse to sense-experience or reason has 
got to be uncertain and cannot provide any certainty with regard to world, self 
and God. It is Intuition or Love that does furnish us knowledge of our own 
selves: 
d 4 	 L9--.:~ 	1jL 	 ,g ay—, ~s 
The Intellect entertained many a doubt as to whether I exist or not 
By Intuition this secret was revealed unto me that I do really exist. 
Thus the secret of Ego or self and that of Supreme Ego or God is 
vouchsafed to Iqbal by recourse to intuition or mystical experience or religious 
experience. 
(C) PHILOSOPHY OF EGO 
Iqbal is neither an epistemological nor a metaphysical reductionist. He 
has a holistic approach. He is an integrationist and a perennialist. The entire 
human personality centred on `Ego' is the central epistemic, ' semantic, 
metaphysical and ethical category of his philosophy. Human `Ego' is inspired 
by the `Supreme Ego' or God. The foremost assignment of man is the 
achievement of realization or enlightenment. He has to achieve self-realisation 
leading to God-realisation. Such a realization can be achieved by subordination 
to or synchronization with Divine commandments. It is through such 
subordination or synchronization that we can accomplish self-divulgement or 
self-disclosure. The essence of religion is nothing but self-realisation paving 
the way to God-realisation. Religion is nothing but divulgement or discovery of 
the secrets of self. Human life without self-divulgement tantamounts to death. 
A man who realizes himself, supersedes the entire universe in esteem and 
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glory. He becomes cognizant of the conscience of the universe. He is the 
cynosure of Space and Spacelessness. The entire universe revolves round his 
personality. He is the successor of the Prophets of Allah. He cannot be 
accommodated elsewhere. He demolishes the old world with a view to 
establishing a new world of fresh possibilities. He is oblivious to all that is 
besides God and is inflamed by the candle of his own `Ego'. He is 
dimensionless in the world of dimensions. He is the sanctum sanctorum and the 
entire universe revolves around him. However, as a spark of the 'Supreme 
Ego', he is resistant to all fluctuations and challenges. He is eternal and 
eternally resistant to any whif of dissolution into `Supreme Ego'. 
He is, accordingly, a perennial centre of love and commitment. Iqbal, in 
view of this core principle of his philosophy, refuses to acknowledge validity 
of any non-dualistic, monistic, absolutistic and pantheistic interpretation of the 
cosmos. He upholds the flag of spiritual pluralism flagging. 
The absolutist, non-dualist, monist and pantheistic — philosophical or 
theological moments-have always stressed on Absolute Oneness. They have 
downplayed the undeniable but inexplicable reality and personality of finite 
centres of experience or consciousness widely exemplified by each individual 
thinking subject and moral agent. The absolutists have underlined that all finite 
centres of experience while culminating into Absolute Oneness lose their 
finiteness or fixity and personality into it, These finite centres of experience are 
ultimately an illusion. The criterion of reality is all-pervasiveness and all 
limitedness is inherently relative in character and thus nothing more than an 
illusion. For Iqbal, every inexplicable centre of consciousness or subjectivity is 
the basic reality of our universe. Every mode of life is individual and there is 
simply nothing such as universal life. God too is an individual although 
Supremely Unique Individual. The universe is a conglomeration of individuals. 
However, this conglomerative or aggregative exercise is not characterized by 
perfect order, control and harmony. We are gradually approximating from this 
disorder to order and are ourselves participating in this ongoing process. The 
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members participating in this process are not finished or fixated. New members 
continue coming into being and participating in this process. The universe is 
not a finished product but an ongoing process. In view of the same, we cannot 
bring out an any law or generalization about the universe. The universe is 
perfectible and the process of creation is going on. Man participates in this 
process in so far as he is instrumental in transforming disorder into order. Iqbal 
says that even in the Quran we find a clue as to the possible existence of other 
creators besides God. 
This view of man and universe is in radical contradistinction with the 
world-view forwarded by pantheistic Sufism, according to which the supreme 
goal and salavation of man lies in his complete dissolution into Universal Life 
or World-Soul. Iqbal says that man's highest moral or spiritual ideal is not self-
negation but self-affirmation. The realization of this ideal depends on the 
achievement of maximum individuality and uniqueness. The Prophet has 
exhorted us to cultivate divine attributes in ourselves. Man can achieve 
maximum individuality by appropriating maximum resemblance to the 
Supremely Unique Individual. Presently, the highest manifestation of life is 
`Ego'. Every individual is a specific and complete centre of Ego. Although man 
is physically and spiritually a complete centre, he is not a perfect individual as 
yet. The greater the distance from God, the greater man's lack of individuality. 
A man with greatest proximity to God will be the most complete individual. 
However, such a man is not dissolved into God but dissolves God into himself. 
The perfect man not only dissolves God into his `ego', but overpowers 
the material universe as well. Life, according to Iqbal, is a ceaseless absorptive 
movement and is capable of dissolving all roadblocks into itself. The essence 
of life is creation of new aspirations and ideals. Life has invented or promoted 
such resources as five senses or reason etc. with a view to sustaining and 
expanding itself. These resources help in overcoming resistances. The greatest 
roadblock in life is matter. However, nature is just not pure evil as it is helpful 
in fructifying the latent• potentialities of life. The `Ego' in overcoming all 
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resistances is blessed with freedom. It is partly autonomous and partly 
determined. By orienting itself to the Supremely Autonomous Person such as 
God, the `ego' can achieve more and more freedom. Life itself is this very 
quest for freedom. 
According to Iqbal the centre of life in man manifests itself in the form 
of ego' or personality. The personality is a perennial state of tension and the 
development of the personality depends upon this very tension. In the absence 
of this tension we are caught into the coils of lassitude and inaction. This state 
of tension is man's prime capital and he should not waste it at any cost. He 
should refrain from falling into lassitude. This very state of tension glorifies us 
with immortality. Our personality, furthermore, provides us a criterion and in 
the light of this very criterion the problem of Good and Evil is resolved. 
Anything which weakens our personality is evil and anything that stabilizes our 
personality is good. We should consider aesthetic, religious, and moral values 
on the basis of this very criterion of personality. 
As matter constitutes the greatest hurdle in ego's freedom, so time 
constitutes the greatest hurdle in our quest for immortality. Time is not an 
infinite linear process. Such a concept of time is artificial. Time as pure 
duration is innocent of any dimension of length. Our personal immortality is an 
aspiration and it is realizable by recourse to struggle. Its achievement or 
appropriation is dependent on such a mode of reflection and action which 
sustains tension in us. Accordingly, Iqbal opines that such an ideal can not be 
realized by recourse to values fostered by Buddhism and Persian Sufism. Iqbal 
further states that if we sustain tension in our lives death can not overpower us. 
There is a gap between our death and the Day of Judgment interpreted by the 
Qur'an as Burzukh'. Only such `Egos' sustain during this gap as have 
strenuously prepared for the same. 
Love, according to Iqbal, is the foremost establishing factor of our Ego. 
The highest form of love is creation of values and ideals and our ceaseless 
struggle for their realization. Love blesses both lover and beloved with 
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individuality. The quest for unique individuality imparts unique distinction 
upon the seeker who congrues with the individuality of sought. However just as 
love stabilizes Ego so seeking or demanding a favour weakens the 'Ego'. The 
stability or upkeep of `Ego' entails promotion of love on the one hand and 
avoidance of inaction on the other. The best example of the most profound 
lover of God of values, and of ideals and also of a ceaseless striver is Prophet 
of Islam, according to lgbal. 
The Ego, according to lgbal with a view to appropriating unique 
individuality, has to negotiate three stages: (1) subordination to the 
commandments of Allah, (2) Self-control, which is the highest form of Ego or 
self-awareness and (3) vicegerency of Allah, the third and final form of human 
evolution is deputyship of Allah: Deputy here means `Khalifatullah' who is the 
ultimate statement or symbol of most perfect Ego, the pinnacle of humanity. 
Such a personality is devoid of mental conflicts and rather characterized by 
harmony. Such a personality is an integrated manifestation of Supreme Power 
and highest knowledge. The life of a `khalifatutlah' is an integration of thought 
and action and reason and emotion. He is the ultimate fruit of the three of 
humanity. He is the leader of humankind and his kingdom is the kingdom of 
God. He blesses people with his qualities of head and heart and brings them 
nearer to himself. The more we register the progress in the process of 
evolution, the nearer shall we be to Him. The appropriation of such a proximity 
can lead us to a qualitatively higher plane of existence. The intellectual and 
physical evolution of mankind is a precondition for his emergence. Presently it 
sounds to be nearly a dream. However, humankind is under the process of 
evolution and committed with creation of such an ideal race which gives birth 
to this perfect man. The establishment of kingdom of God depends upon such 
unique individuals whose leader is a highly unique personality to the maximum 
possible extent. Nietzsche's philosophy adumberates the idea of such an ideal 
race. However, his atheism and elitistic bias have completely besmirched his 
idea of ideal race. 
167 
While taking sides in his metaphysical quest, Igbal breaks free both of 
idealism and materialism. He is deeply impacted by the Quranic world-view 
and value-system. Among the Western Philosophical movements he has been 
powerfully influenced by Post-Kantian voluntarism. His interpretation of the 
Quran and understanding of nineteenth century European voluntarism orientate 
him towards voluntarism and Vitalism. Iqbal starts with the contention that the 
ultimate ground of all experiences is a rationally directed creative will. Iqbal 
advances plausible arguments stipulating this creative will has an Ego. For 
Iqbal, the Space-Time continuum or universe is itself of the nature of free 
creative will. The entire cosmic existence is informed by the operations of will. 
The phenomenal universe is vibrating with the pulls and pressures of the will. 
The will is all-pervasive and omnideterminant. However, nothing can 
determine will itself. 
The free creative will or flow of will can be conceived to be going on 
either teleologically or ateleologically. It can be either rationally directed 
creative and purposive force oriented towards sure and certain telos or it can 
move on as a purposeless blind force. 
Iqbal points out that law and order of the cosmic situation indicates it to 
be a teleological and rational whole. The world as we. experience it is not a 
chaotic jumble. Human life too is oriented to ends and purposes. Our own 
consciousness does not testify the view advanced by various thinkers, that life is 
characterized by chaos. The universe and our own self rather testifies that we 
are living in rationally directed order. It is not an ateleologically orchestrated or 
mechanistically worked out blind dance of atoms. 
In his onto cosmological reflections, Iqbal does not accept the world to 
be directed by a Being outside it. For lqbal world is itself an intelligent and 
purposeful self. The end or goal or telos of the world is not superimposed on it 
from outside. Any transcosmic superimposition would imply negation of all 
creative freedom in the universe. Any alleged or possible outside prescription 
reduces the creativity and freedom of the universe to utter pointlessness and 
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meaninglessness. With a view to obviating such a cosmic determinism, Iqbal 
accepts the universe itself as a self or an Ego. There is a will to egohood 
everywhere. The entire universe is characterized by a gradual rising note of 
egohoods. Our experience of our own self justifies such a hypothesis; an 
experience which is intimate and profound. Our experience of our personal 
consciousness can furnish us a contact with Ultimate Reality. It can intimate to 
us the ultimate meaning of existence itself. An analysis of our personal 
consciousness intimates to us a perpetual and constant flow of physical states 
or a flux of sensations; we experience a ceaseless flow of feelings, values and 
ideas. 
The finite ego is an ongoing process of discrete states. However, it is not 
a rigid block or a static substratum. Nevertheless a finite ego should not be 
construed as a chaotic jumble, even in face of fluctuating states furnished to us 
through conscious experience. For Iqbal, the finite ego has rather a definite 
centre. It has a totality or organic wholeness of its own. Moreover, the dynamic 
flow of the finite ego is revealed to us as teleologically oriented. It is revealed 
as a harmonious, ordered and directed rational will. 
Igbal, on the analogy of dynamic flow of creative self, tries to establish 
the entire universe as a creative and dynamic process. Iqbal cites even 
contemporary scientific research as revealing the material or phenomenal 
modes of existence as active, moving, changing and perpetually fluctuating. An 
analysis of matter on atomic plane furnishes us only electrical charges such'as 
electrons protons, neutrons and positrons. In fact, scientific research is 
increasingly turning out to be corroborative of the dynamic conception of 
human consciousness underlined by Iqbal. 
In view of the above considerations, Iqbal brings out that Reality is 
characterized by a dynamic, creative, indivisible and continuous, flow. An 
indivisible movement is the characterizing feature of the whole of Reality. This 
movement is neither successive nor serial; it is a pure duration. However, the 
unity of pure duration necessarily entails the prediction of the self to it. For 
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Iqbal, this self is the Supreme Ego or God. This Supreme Ego or God is beyond 
plurality or multiplicity of instants designed, out of practical compulsions, by 
our efficient self. It is the Supreme Ego or God who transforms pure durations 
into a totality or unity. 
The Supreme Self as advanced by Iqbal is diametrically opposite to the 
unmoved Prime Mover of Aristotle. It is not the Uncaused Cause or First Cause 
of all movement and change. The Divine Reality is Supremely dynamic in 
character and essence. Movement as ascribed to man is diametrically opposite 
to movement ascribed to Divine Reality. Human change is indicative of short-
comings and imperfections. On the other hand, God's Dynamic Reality moves 
in the realm of pure duration and is beyond serial character. God is Life and 
Movement. However, it does not imply any contradiction in His perfection. 
God's movement does not entail any shortcoming or signify any imperfection 
in His Character. God's movement signifies His eternal self revealation. The 
Dynamic Character of God is brought out or authenticated by the following 
lines: (quotation page 81) (M.M. Sharif, vol. I, page 481). 
In his `Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam', Iqbal cites Surah 
Ikhlas as an example of the Quran underscoring the individuality of the 
Ultimate Ego. The Surah reads as follows: 
Say: He is God, 
The One and Only, 
God the Eternal, Absolute; 
He begetteth not, 
Nor is He begotten; 
And there is none like unto Him. 
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The above Surah according to Iqbal categorically, transparently and 
succinctly delineates the perfect individuality of the Ultimate Ego. The Surah 
brings out that the Ultimate Ego is pairless and unique. As a perfect individual 
it must be closed off as an Ego. The Perfect Ego must be non-reproductive. in 
character or beyond any tendency of reproduction. This emphasis on perfect 
individuality of God in the Qur'an is in contradistinction to widely persistent 
pantheistic interpretations of Ultimate Reality which conceive God as some 
pervasive Cosmic Principle such as light. The Quran is radically opposed to all 
pantheistic interpretations. The Quran does identify God as light. However, it 
must not be hermeneutically stretched with a view to supporting the pantheistic 
perspective upon the universe. The Aayat-i-Noor (verse of the Light) need not 
necessarily be pantheistically interpreted. The text of this verse can more 
authentically be cited in support of the individualistic view of the Ultimate 
Reality. The text of this verse in translation is: 
God is the Light 
Of the heavens and the earth. 
The parable of His Light 
Is as if there were a Niche 
And within it a Lamp : 
The Lamp enclosed in Glass: 
The glass as it were 
A brilliant star: 
Lit from a blessed Tree, 
An Olive, neither of the East 
Nor of the West, 
Whose oil is well-nigh 
Luminous, 
Though fire scarce touched it: 
Light upon Light! 
God doth guide 
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Whom He will 
To His Light; 
God doth set forth Parables 
For men: and God 
Doth know all things. 
Iqbal brings out in his `Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' 
that the opening line of this celebrated verse of Qur'an can be cited in support 
of a pantheistic interpretation of God. However, any pantheistic insinuasion is 
radically negated by rest of the verse. 
Iqbal interprets the Qur'anic metaphor of light in a rather radically 
innovative way. In view of the fact that the velocity of the light can not be 
exceeded in the world of flux and relativity, light may possibly most 
appropriately symbolize the Absolute. The metaphor of light can be interpreted 
as suggesting the absoluteness of God; it need not necessarily be interpreted as 
suggesting His Omnipresence for such an interpretation can be tangentially 
exploited by the advocates of pantheistic world-view. Iqbal does concede that 
the opening line of the Aayat-i-Nur can easily be interpretatively stretched into 
a pantheistic world-outlook. However, the amenability of the first line to a non-
individualistic or pantheistic interpretation of God is possible only if it is 
interpreted out of context. 
Iqbal contends that the divine individuality should not be understood 
within the context of material, spatial and temporal parameters of human 
individuality. We cannot conceive the Ultimate Ego or God as spatially 
infinite. Even the absoluteness of space and time postulated by classical 
physics has been radically undermined by contemporary scientific research. 
Presently, space and time are deemed to be human interpretations of complex 
interrelated events. They are not something over and above the creative activity 
of the Ultimate Ego. God is not spatially closed off and His infinity refers only 
to His own inner unlimited possibilities. The universe, at best, can be deemed 
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to be a partial expression of His creativity. God is intensively rather than 
extensively Infinite. 
Ego is the starting point as well as the central explanatory category in 
the philosophy of Iqbal. This central role of Ego in the philosophy of Iqbal 
makes it akin to the philosophical system of J.G. Fichte. Both have elaborated 
their philosophies of Ego in the light of their personal, historical and cultural 
backgrounds. However their starting point is the same. 
For J.G. Fichte, scientific materialistic dogmatism and idealism offer the 
fundamental philosophical choice. The scientific or materialistic dogmatism 
views man as only a link in a vast chain dominated by the law of causality. In 
contradistinction to scientific dogmatism, idealism accepts the primacy of 
consciousness and the reality and the value of the individual. In view of the 
same, idealism accepts the freedom of the individual as well. Now, we are free 
either to be scientific dogmatists or idealists. If we are not interested in merely 
explaining the world but changing it, we must choose to be idealists. We must 
start from our own consciousness. Fichte was the first modern European 
philosopher who made Ego' the starting point of his philosophy. Ego, 
according to him, is the 'thing-in-itself' (Mayer: A History of Modern 
Philosophy, p. 334). 
Fichte thinks that subjective ego postulates its own existence and thus 
it's the fundamental principle on which philosophy can be based (Ibid: p. 335). 
There is no rational explanation of the reality of ego. It has only a volitional 
meaning. Subsequently, we postulate the antithesis of the `Ego' i.e. Non-Ego as 
well. Above the Ego and Non-Ego, is the Absolute Ego i.e., God, who created 
them for self-expression (Ibid: 335). 
The affirmation of Ego so stridently underlined by Fichte and made the 
starting point of his philosophy, was warmly welcomed by Iqbal as it seemed to 
him to be close to the spirit of Islam. lqbal accepted both the metaphysical and 
moral implications of this Fichtean point of view. He clearly agrees with Fichte 
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when he conceives Ultimate Reality as the `Supreme Ego' or the `Absolute 
Ego', All the egos and non-egos are the self-revelation of this Supreme Ego. 
The following quotation from Igbal's ` Reconstruction of Religious Thought in 
Islam' will clearly reveal Igbal's basic agreement with the philosophy of 
Fichte; 
I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must 
add now that from the ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The 
creative energy of the Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and. 
thought are identical, functions as ego-unities. The world, in 
all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call 
the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the 
human ego, is the self-revelation of the `Great I am'. Every 
atom of divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, 
is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. 
Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually 
rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man. 
That is why the Qur'an declares the Ultimate Ego to be nearer 
to man than his own neck-vein. Like pearls do we live and 
move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life. 
(Iqbal : The Reconstruction; 71). 
According to Iqbal, the essential nature of the Reality is spiritual. For 
Iqbal, the very test of Reality is self-consciousness. "Only that is, strictly 
speaking, real which is directly conscious of its own reality" (Ibid., 72). To 
possess self-consciousness is to possess an ego. To possess an ego is to be able 
to say I am or "I exist". According to Iqbal, to be able to say so is the test of 
real existence. He asserts that the degree of reality of a thing varies with the 
degree of the feeling of `I am ness'. In accordance with the degree of the 
feeling of egohood, there are degrees in spirit. The Ultimate Reality is the 
Supreme Ego. From the Ultimate Egos, finite egos issue forth. Every form of 
the world down from an atom to human self is the unfoldment of God's self- 
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consciousness. Every form is an ego or self. He regards Matter' also as a 
colony of egos but only of a lower order. The degrees of the expression of the 
egohood varies. Some egos or selves are lower, others are higher. A thing is 
lower or higher in the scale of being according to the degree of intuition of `I-
am-ness' which is possessed by that thing. The ego of metal is lower as 
compared to the ego of a plant and so on. Iqbal says that the gradually rising 
note of egohood runs throughout the entire gamut of being. This note reaches 
its perfection in man". 
According to Iqbal, each ego is individual, unique and distinct from 
other egos. He holds that every ego is "self-centred and possesses a private 
circuit of individuality". However, he believes that these egos can interact with 
and respond to one another. Iqbal regards God also as an Ego and hence an 
individual, rather "Most Unique" Individual. 
Further, Iqbal says that in the history of religious thought, sometimes, 
personality and individuality have not been attributed to the Ultimate Reality or 
God. The Reality has been regarded as some vague, omnipresent element, e.g. 
light. He holds that such a view of God leads to a form of Pantheism which 
regards Reality as identical with the world and nothing beyond. He, on the 
other hand, emphatically affirms the personality or individuality of God. He 
criticizes those thinkers who try to deduce Pantheism from the Qur'anic 
metaphor of light used to describe God. It does not imply Pantheism. He 
conceives the personality .of God on the pattern of human self which is a unity. 
All the individual life and thought in the universe is a derivation from the 
Supreme Self (Muhammad Rafique: Sri Aurobindo and Iqbal; Aligarh Muslim 
University, 1974, 80-81). 
All forms of pantheism are anathematic to Iqbal. Any pantheistic world-
outlook whether anchored on the principle of mind or of life is utterly 
unacceptable to Iqbal. All intellectualistic explanations of reality incur his deep 
suspicion. The inexplicable finite centers of experience constitute the 
fundamental fact of the universe. There is no universal life; all life is 
175 
individual. God Himself is the most Unique Individual and the entire coir and 
furniture of the universe is comprised of egos of countless grades or stages. 
Whatever is, is comprised of the secrets and manifestations of the self. Iqbal 
agrees with Fichte that at the very outset Ego posit's itself as there must be a 
self that knows. However, the process of knowledge entails something to be 
known. In view of the same, the next step of the Ego is to posit Non-Ego. 
However, this Non-Ego is not something alien to Ego. Ego itself is the source 
of Non-Ego. This Non-Ego is posited by Ego itself with a view to possibilising 
evolution through intellectual achievement and moral struggle. The following 
verses from 'Asrar-i-khudi' illustrate the same. 
Iqbal has concentrated his attention on the repudiation of Ibn-i-Arabi's 
doctrine of Pantheism. The doctrine is similar to the one advanced by 
Shankaracharya of India in early 9th century AD. For Shankar, Brahman was 
the Ultimate Reality. Human soul and Brahman were identical. The world was 
an illusion (Maya). He also advanced the thesis that the salvation of man lies- in 
merger of the soul into the Brahman. On the ethical plane, he advocated 
complete renunciation. In the introduction to the first edition of the Asrar-i-
khudi, Iqbal wrote that some of the great Indian thinkers have arrived at the 
conclusion that the continuity in the life of self, which is at the root of all pain 
and suffering, is achieved through activity. If we want to liberate ourselves 
from our previous actions and reactions entangling us into the cycle of birth 
and rebirth, we must cease doing any activity all. The Gita critiqued this 
position and advanced the doctrine of Nishkama karma signifying that 
renunciation does not mean complete inactivity but means to be indifferent to 
the deeds and their consequences. 
According to Iqbal, Islam laid radical emphasis on activity. However, 
some Muslim thinkers such as Ibn al-Arabi espoused the same interpretation of 
Islam as was advanced by Shankaracharya with regard to Upanishads and Gita. 
With his exceptional scholarship and great hermeneutical skill Ibn Arabi 
advanced the thesis that the world is a mere illusion and God is the only true 
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reality. God is characterized by eternity, absoluteness, infinity. The entire 
unvirse is grounded on Him. God is the only Reality and the phenomenal world 
is just a passing shadow of the Reality of God. 
Iqbal was radically critical of the philosophical interpretation of Islam 
advanced by Ibn-i-Arabi who was christened by Sufis as Shaikh-i-Akbar (the 
greatest Doctor) . The fundamental assumption of Ibn-i-Arabi is that God is the 
Absolute Being. He is the only Reality or nothing is real besides Him. As 
Absolute Being, He is the Source and Cause of all existence. He is the Essence 
of everything or everything is God.The traditional doctrine of Tawhid 
encapsulated in the Kalima `there is no God but God' is transformed by Ibn-i-
Arabi into the doctrine of Wahadat al-Wujud (The Oneness of Being), 
amounting to `there is nothing in existence except God'. 
The question of the relationship of ego with the universe or external 
world or more specifically with the environment is highly significant with 
reference to the upkeep and sustenance of human civilization. Modern 
European Science has made the most significant contribution to human 
civilization by undertaking, methodologically speaking, the most crucial 
empirical investigations of the physical, chemical and biological orders of 
existence, both vertically and horizontally and both at micro and macro planes, 
with a view to achieving maximum material, economic and commercial 
benefits and more importantly demythologizing the universe and liberating us 
from mellenia-old superstitions and false gods of varying hues and colours. 
Knowledge is power. Man armed with the weapon of knowledge can dominate 
his physical environment. Scientific research and investigation are the 
crowning achievements of human self. It is man's self that constructs a cosmos 
out of the perceptual or experiencial chaos that confronts us, to begin with. 
Knowledge is the charcterising and distinguishing feature of man in 
comparison to other animals, according to the Qur'an. However modern 
European civilization can not sustain itself on scientific research or knowledge 
alone. Civilisations cannot thrive or sustain on one-sidedness of whatsoever 
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variety. All civilisations succeeded as well as failed by virtue of excess. The 
contemporary western civilization with its concentration sole on scientific 
research culminating into commercial success and economic prosperity, can not 
go on forever. A sustainable civilization has to be vitally concerned with moral, 
religious and spiritual values. If knowledge is divorced from moral, religious, 
and spiritual concerns, human civilization is doomed to extinction. The 
imperatives of mind have got to be supplemented by the imperatives of heart. 
Scientific research will give us power. However, it is through spiritual intuition 
that we can appropriate the requisite vision and mission necessary for a 
balanced and integrated civilization. The following verses from Iqbal constitute 
a telling critique of one-sided pursuit of knowledge or knowledge divorced 
from spiritual concerns: 
ti.s..wt çr~al_~  	 LL,)- 	 W 	ss 	 )_ ! L 
When the heart is wedded to truth, it results into Prophethood 
If it is alienated from truth, it leads to infidelity, 
If we assemble scholarship without the warmth of heart, we wallow into evilish 
mode of existence 
Such a light leads to the darkness of the entire globe, 
The heart of the Europeans is fired with this very knowledge 
They are intoxicated into bloodshed and warfare because of this very 
knowledge, 
Knowledge sans love is from transgressors 
Knowledge with Love is from celestial world. 
The development and evolution of the self demands perennial resistance. 
It is the very resistance of air that enables a bird to fly; no flight is possible in a 
vaccum. The ego's search for the ideal, presupposes the presence of resistance 
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and the consequent struggle and endeavor. The placing of Adam in a painful 
environment should not be construed to mean that it is a part of punishment. 
Such an environment was devised with a view to providing the ego with 
necessary means for its integration. In view of the same, the presence of evil- in 
human life is indispensable. For the realization of the ideal of selfhood, 
struggle against all odds is an essential condition. Accordingly, Iqbal points out 
that the presence of a strong enemy is, infact a blessing from Allah. He 
challenges our potential for resistance, our courage of convictions and our 
capacity for survival and self-integration. An enemy is like a raincloud to the 
seed of man for he awakens his potentiates: 
C . 	; Jk~~------' 	I Gr-'.'-i.`~,A' 	`' 	` }I."--' ~.,t° 3.►1 	y _. 	'' 
To tell you the truth: Thine enemy is thy friend; 
His existence crowns thee with glory 
Whosoever knows the states of self 
Considers a powerful enemy to be a blessing from God 
To the seed of man an enemy is as a raincloud 
He awaken's its' potentialities. 
While outlining the characterizing features of Imam 'Ali's personality, 
Iqbal underlines that Ali was a man of unconditional faith and unqualified love. 
His spiritual sagacity could transcend the material imperatives of human 
conditions. Through self-realization, he operated as the hand of God and 
became a symbol of political majesty and spiritual glory. By transcending the 
material imperatives of human condition and by becoming a spiritual master of 
the highest order, Imam `Ali became the standard — bearer or benchmark of 
world-transforming or world-transmuting manliness, magnanimity and 
equanimity. With reference to Ali's qualities of head and heart, Iqbal exhorts us 
to go in for a total revolution both on personal and collective planes. With a 
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view to establishing an equitable, egalitarian, judicious and balanced socio-
political order we must cultivate frames as hard as stone replacing the rosy 
features of our constitution. We must create a new man and a new world order. 
We cannot go on bemoaning and groaning about obstructions of life. We must 
realize that action is the essence of life and creative transformation the law of 
life. We cannot surrender to obstructions and obtrusions of life. We have to go 
in for a fresh world-order. If the world does not accord with our goals and 
ideals we have to fight with the world till it corresponds to our aspirations. 
Unless such an accordance is achieved, we will have to go on shaking the 
foundations of this world and working out new configurations thereof. A man 
of action through share force of his character dictates a new world order into 
existence. The obstructions that the world offers only sharpens his will power 
by being engaged into supreme adventures. It is through such adventures that 
the potentialities of men of action are fructified or realized. 
Life is a manifestation of power and it is essentially a taste for 
adventures. Weakness or powerlessness rob's life of its beauty and grandeur. 
The obstructions of life are so overwhelming that most of us are inclined to 
taking a line of least resistance. The beguilements of life are so attractive that 
most of us scumb to its multifaceted rationalisations and ratiocinations. 
Helplessness or powerlessness generate highly sophisticated self justifications. 
It inspires a world-view and value-system of its own. It underlines such values 
as mercy, softness, gentleness, humility and kindness. Sometimes it 
masquerades into the philosophy of determinism and sometimes it spins finest 
excuses in defence mechanisms. It changes it colours like a chameleon, 
However, as a matter of historical fact, power and truth are two sides of the 
same coin. Power is the supreme criterion of evaluation. Power is the supreme 
value of life; it is the criterion of distinction or demarcation between truth and 
untruth. The contentions of men of power are hardly in need of rational 
justifications. It is through appropriation of power that untruth acquires the 
glory of truth. Power transforms poison into nectar; it transmutes good into 
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evil. Accordingly, we need to realize this fundamental truth of human existence 
and orient ourselves to the highways and byways of life (Asrar-i-Khudi, 
published by Kutub Khanaie Naziriya, Muslim Manzil, Khari Bavli, Delhi-6, 
2"d edition, 1971, pp. 42-45). 
In view of the above considerations, Iqbal is acutely conscious of the 
role of power in human history, society, polity and economy. The all-important 
role of power is brought out by Iqbal in the following verses of Asrar-i-Khudi: 
X1)1 	cylLys 
Life is the seed, and power the crop: 
Power explains the mystery of truth and falsehood. 
A claimant, if he be possessed of power, 
Needs no argument for his claim. 
Falsehood derives from power an authority of truth, 
And by falsifying truth deems itself true. 
Its creative word transforms poison into nectar; 
It says to good, "Thou art bad", and Good becomes Evil. 
Iqbal exhorts man to stop complaining about the obstructions that life 
offers to us all. In point of fact, these obstructions are the necessary pre-
conditions for self-realisation, for moral upliftment and for spiritual 
enlightenment. Those who are spiritually enlightened transcends the 
imperatives of elements. They consider the obstructions of life and grace of 
God and opportunities for self-authentication. Those who appropriate 
themselves with the full might of the potentialities of their self, he can topsy-
turvey the entire established order. They fizzle out who become oblivious to 
the possibilities of their own self. Only those who are anchored on the full 
realization of their potentialities can get immortal. Death is not separation of 
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body and soul but oblivion to the possibilities to the self. Only self-realised 
ones case undertake projects and attain to Reality by appropriating the 
mysteries of the universe: 
r--A.ri L,L+ ,s- ~l.s—~ ._1 9--~ 	cs 	~ L J - ,1lui-s  
3 	 LL_c  
When thou makest thyself strong with self 
Thou will destroy the world at thy pleasure 
What is death? To become oblivious to self 
Why imagine that it is parting of soul and body? 
Think of self and be a man of action 
Be a man of God, bear mysteries within. 
Iqbal is not a conventional Urdu or Persian poet who through 
symbolical, metaphorical, allegorical and other figurative uses of language 
brings out various dimensions of love. He is also not a conventional 
philosopher trying to outline a neat system of philosophy and thereby 
attempting to respond to various issues pertaining to reality, value, knowledge, 
truth, good beauty, free-will and determinism, mind and body etc. He is an 
exceptionally outstanding poet-philosopher of the East with a missionary zeal 
for reunderstanding and reinterpreting Islamic world-view and value-system 
with a view to recharging and revitalizing Muslims of the world wallowing into 
social, political, economic, cultural and intellectual stagnation. He uses his 
poetic genius as a vehicle for the transformation of global society with special 
reference to Muslims of the world. Iqbal announces his mission in the 
following verses under the inspiration of Rumi : 
C ~L11_ ,iee 	 L_ I y.j ,L j1 I j 4- -fl--- 
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Create a new style for thy song. 
Enrich the assembly with thy piercing strains! 
Up, and re-inspire every living soul 
Say `Arise!' and by that word quicken the living! 
Arise, and set thy feet on another path; 
Put aside the passionate melancholy of old 
Human Ego, according to Iqbal, is blessed with freedom of world-
shattering, world-shaping and world-civilising significance. However, it is 
through facing pain, suffering, evil as well as forces of resistance and 
obstruction that we can feel the thrill of our freedom. Man is determined by 
circumstances and conditions or forces of obstruction in so as far as they pose a 
challenge to his personal projects. If man surrenders to obstructions, he can be 
said to be fully determined in the face of natural or institutional impediments. 
However, if he chooses to confront the ongoing and upcoming impediments, he 
can put himself on the track to realizing as well as earning his freedom. Human 
freedom is not a gift to be appreciated or being grateful for. It is to be earned 
after putting up a no holds barred struggle. The more we overcome obstacles 
the more we can feel the growth of our freedom. 
Apparently man is determined by natural, historical, social, 
psychological and genetic factors. However, this determination or control of 
human freedom is not absolute or unqualified. These determinations only mark 
off the field of human operations and endeavours. They also prescribe the 
methods of human operation. When man boldly confronts the environing 
conditions and factors and with intelligent and purposeful creativity strategises 
his steps and methods of intervention, the environing conditions are 
substantially changed or drastically recast. In furtherance of its desires and 
aspirations and values and ideals, the self has to engage with its obstructing 
environment with maximum possible dexterity, ingenuity and creativity. Only 
by responding to environing challenges and conditioning imperatives with 
sufficient or maximum creativity can we extend the frontiers of our freedom. 
183 
This ever-widening freedom of the human ego finally synchronises with Divine 
Freedom. Man becomes a co-worker with God. However, given the 
imperatives and parameters of human ego, man is ever liable to lapse into 
unfreedom, surrender and helplessness. Islam has, accordingly, prescribed 
rituals and prayers throughout day and night, with a view to perennially 
reconnect man with God. Prayers at regular intervals restore or increase human 
freedom by bringing the ego into closer touch with the Ultimate Source of life 
and freedom. The following lines from Zabur-i-Ajam are to the point: 
F 
° 1s 1 9---- .rte 
The king of Badar (Prophet) has so promulgated, 
That Faith is in between freedom and determinism. 
You deem every creature to be determined, 
And caught into the coils of space and time. 
However, life is bestowed by the creator, 
Who is hidden despite so many wide-open splendours. 
Just liberate yourself from the world of attributes, 
And move on from determination to liberation. 
When you rub off yourself from dust of determination, 
You can trample down your world like that of a she-camel. 
However freedom cannot be deemed to be an end-in-itself. We cannot 
appropriate freedom for the sake of freedom. A free individual will have to put 
himself under reasonable restraint. A man finds himself determined by 
environing circumstances and conditions. He breaks free of this determinism 
by assertion of his will and creativity and puts up an indomitable struggle with 
a view to achieving freedom of choice. However this hard-one freedom will 
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have to operate under reasonable constraints or man has to graduate to the level 
of self-determination. This may be said to be higher determinism. This stage of 
higher determinism is born out of self-realisation and realization of our 
psychological, moral, and spiritual challenges and imperatives. This stage is the 
first stage out of the three stages Iqbal regards as essential for the development 
of the ego. This first stage is `obedience to law'. The second stage of the 
discipline is self-control. The third and the highest stage attainable .by human 
ego is the highest stage of God's vicegerency. 
Furthermore, human self is sustained by creating and positing of ideals 
and purposes. It is through pursuit of ideals and purposes that man can carry on 
the constructive and transformative projects of civilization. Man does not live 
by bread alone. He lives by ideals, purposes and values. He lives by dedication 
and devotion to the highest ideals and values. He lives by commitment and 
faith. Mere proliferation of knowledge also can not sustain him. Knowledge is 
an instrument of security. It cannot furnish us a spiritual vision or moral 
mission. We need to appropriate the highest ideals of truth beauty and 
goodness. We need to explore our connection or relationship with the divine. 
Intellectual and scientific struggles and social, political and economic 
endeavours, cannot carry us that far on the track of civilization. We need 
universal, eternal, all-consuming and all-powerful ideals. Such ideals can be 
prescribed or promulgated by Supremely All-powerful and All-knowing God. 
The source of ideals should be imperishable and immutable and ideals should 
be such as to be authenticating and buttressing up what is true, beautiful and 
good and abolishing or eliminating what is false, ugly and evil. 
The ego or self, according to Iqbal, can not be abstractly assumed or 
conceptually figured out. The ego or self is a vital force. It can lead to great 
intellectual and socio-political transformations. However, human ego or self 
itself needs to be sustained by recourse to its commitment to a higher vision 
and mission, a higher system of beliefs and values. The ego or self lives 
through the creation of values and ideals and through a constant, consistent and 
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continuous desire and struggle to realize them in one's life and surroundings. 
The perennial desire and struggle is the origin or cradle of self. We need to 
keep the flame of desire burning lest our self is entombed into purposelessness 
or vagrancy. It is through sustained desire for perfection that human self can 
upkeep its moral and spiritual struggle. Life without desire is as impossible as 
world without heat and sunshine. The following lines from Asrar-i-Khudi 
beautifully summarize the role of desire in the sustenance and development of 
self and life: 
L~  -- 3— i ?--'ate  
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Life is latent in seeking. 
Its origin is hidden in desire 
Keep desire alive in thy heart, 
Lest thy little dust become a tomb. 
Desire is the soul of this world of 
Hue and scent, 
The nature of everything is a storehouse of desire. 
Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast, 
And by it's the breast is made bright as a mirror. 
It giving to earth the power of soaring, 
It is a Khijr to the Moses of perceptions. 
186 
From the flame of desire the heart takes life, 
And when it takes life, all dies that is not true. 
When it refrains from forming desires, 
Its pinion breaks and it cannot soar. 
Desire keeps the self in perpetual uproar. 
It is a restless wave of the self's sea. 
Desire is a noose for hunting ideals, 
A binder of the book of deeds 
This desire that enriches life, 
0 
	 And the mind is a child of its womb. 
(D) ROLE OF LOVE 
Iqbal underlines that it is love that establishes human self or personality 
and when it is established, it's manifest and hidden powers conquer the entire 
world order (Asrar-i-Khudr, Kutub Khana-e-Naziriah, Delhi, 1971, pp. 16-22). 
As a self-professed disciple of Jallaluddin Rumi, he accepts the 
extraordinary rather all-important role and function of love in the economy of 
life. Rumi looks upon love as the great cosmic force which is at the back of the 
whole process of evolution. The processes of assimilation, growth and 
reproduction are all manifestations of Love. The striving for the ideal is love's 
movement towards Beauty and perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of 
forms is the force of love which actualizes all strivings and movements. Iqbal 
while agreeing with this account of love advanced by Rumi summarizes his 
position on love in the following words: 
Reason understands the secret of the universe, i.e., 
apprehends it as it is manifested to us in the physical world 
while love enjoys a direct vision. Reason is limited to the 
categories of space and time while love is able to transcend 
these limits and come face to face with Reality. The object of 
Reason and love is the same, apprehension of Reality. But 
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reason's search is incomplete while love is the true guide on 
this path. (Dar: A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy, 168) 
The development of human ego or personality, according to Iqbal, has been the 
ultimate fruit of evolutionary process so far. This evolutionary process, as of 
now, aims at the immortalization of human self. It is beyond ken of reason to 
either appreciate such a destiny of man or be of some help in this regard. As 
against reason, love is supremely or perfectly qualified and competent to 
undertake such a project. Igbal, following Rumi, also believes in love as a 
cosmic assimilative force. It has been the function of love to transform the 
inorganic into organic and organic into the animal. It will be through love that 
self ever-increasingly approximates to immortality. Human self is a point of 
light, the spark of life in our earthen frame. It is through love that the self is 
made more lasting, more living, more burning, more growing. From love 
proceeds the radiance of its being and the development of its hidden 
potentialities. The essence of life is ignited by love or love imparts fire to life. 
It is through love that man learns the art of universal efflorescence. The origin 
of love is not from earth, water or air; love is deathless and shorn of the fear of 
mortality; love is both peace and strife; love is both the elixir and sharp cutting 
edge of life. Iqbal describes the connection between `Love' and the Ego in his 
Asrar-i-Khudi as follows: 
LILj 	 asYJl et : 4_S 
ash t_ a CS__A __%__4j 
sS 
~L.__.~, 	. t .S l —s 
The luminous point whose name is the self 
Is the life-spark beneath our dust. 
By love it is made more lasting, 
More living, more burning, more glowing. 
Transmute thy handful of earth into gold, 
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Kiss the threshold of a Perfect Man. 
From the wine of Love, spring many spiritual qualities: 
Amongst the attributes of Love is blind devotion. 
Be a lover constant in devotion to the beloved, 
That thou mayst cast they noose and capture God. 
(Diwan-r-Igba1 Lahori, op.cit., pp.93-5, (tr. R.A.NichoIson,pp.28-36) 
Love is transforming and transmuting, It has the wherewithal to redesign a 
higher man, an altogether advanced man, a man of deeper morality and deeper 
spirituality. Iqbal cries out: 
La J1 - .may 'LA 	S Gi L - .s 	L. J 	 L ~ 
Come on 0' Love! 0' Secret of my heart, 
Come on 0' my field! 0' my produce; 
Senile have become these clay-encased men, 
Create a new Adam out of our mud. 
(Diwan-i Igbal Lahori, op. cit., p. 205, (self translation). 
Iqbal asserts that a man of Love absorbs the qualities of Allah. He is as 
impartial as the Sun, as generous as a river and as forbearing as the Earth. Like 
Allah, he is affectionate to one and all. Thus, he maintains that humanity in real 
sense exists due to internal personal love and compassion. He says in his Jawid 
Namah: 
Jj t51J 'Js J~ ~-~r~' .r- ~ Ji 	J'j Ls~' .~~ .r'~ 1.) w'' .9 .rte 
Man continues through inter-personal love and discipline. 
On the path of friendship he strikes steps; 
A man of love appropriates the style of God, 
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And becomes equally affectionate to believers and unbelievers; 
Bracket up infidelity and religion in the expense of thy heart, 
If the heart is not so commodious, fie on it; 
Though heart is confined to the realm of water and mud, 
This entire cosmos is the horizons of heart. 
(cf. Kazmi, (1997) Jav1d Namah., p. 418). 
He emphasizes that Love is the driving force of human evolution. Human 
splendor with all its achievements and accomplishments is one of the 
manifestations of love. Man too is a manifestation of God because of the 
inspiration of love: 
cx,.,,I J 9 U~ ~ .i 	~Qy1~ 	,J~I~ ~s1 y ,~La! ,___ 
`Adam is the fruit of the perennial struggle of Love, 
The splendor of God is manifest through the veil of human existence. 
(Ibid., p.76, (self translation). 
Indeed for Iqbal, Love is the Fountain of life; love is the flashing sword of 
Death. In this way, the multifunctional and multidimensional character of 
Love has been forcefully brought out by Iqbal in his Jawaid Namah with the 
beautiful similes about it: 
1r .r. jt' lj 9 Ur_s ,f s1 BLS 
ye ti 	~L- jj r~ 
sy "%V.) ~JLr- 4..L.~ 
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Love dwells within the soul as sight doth in the eye, 
Within the house and yet without the door; 
Love is both ashes and torch 
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'Tis greater than one's knowledge and one's faith; 
Love is the king and the clear proof, 
Love is the foundation of both worlds; 
Timelessness, yesterday, and tomorrow, 
No-place, up and down proceed from love; 
If it seeks selfhood from God, it sways the world, 
The place of heart and breaks the ancient spell of this old idol-house; 
The lover gives his self to God, 
And they sacrifice the interpretive reason; 
If your are a lover go from hither to thither, 
Avoid death by all means. 
(Javid Nameh, p. 321, (tr. Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad, 15-6,Lines: 315-29). 
The following verses from Igbal's Urdu poetry also bring out the all-important 
rather omnipotent role of love in man's life and in the larger project of human 
civilization : 
wa 
f L'f ; y 	~j" ~- 	-~G )irk F 
Love is the primal Mentor of reason, heart and observation 
Religion and law, without love, are nothing but idol-houses of concepts. 
The authenticity of Abraham too is Love, the patience of Husain too is love 
In the battleground of Being, Badar and Hunain (wars fought by the Prophet of 
Islam) too are love. 
With love, even infidelity tantamounts to Islam 
Without love, even a Muslim is an infidel. 
The comparison between `reason and love' or `knowledge and love' is 
an ongoing or running theme of Igbals' Urdu and Persian poetry. While the role 
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of love, according to Iqbal is all-important and all-powerful, the limitations of 
reason and knowledge are obvious, their crucial contributions notwithstanding: 
Unless knowledge is rooted in love 
It is no more than a gallery of ideas 
The hypocritical reason can put on hundreds of masks 
Love is innocent — neither a theologian, nor a Sufi nor a philosopher 
(Ku111yat-i Igba1, op.cit., p. 352) 
,sue 	 wI ,s 	,. ..,1 --- 	Lt 
Love is the law and code of life 
Love is the essence of civilization and religion 
I 3- AAa 	g--cSa 	a  
The consummation of religion is dependent on norms of love 
Learn religion through the love of men of love 
The love of the Prophet of Islam is one of the running themes or motifs of 
Iqbal's poetry: 
That Vetern of spiritual pathways 
The Master of the Choir and furniture of the Universe 
Last of the Messengers, 
Who imparted the splendor of valley of Sinai to the dust of roads, 
In the eyes of Love and absorption he is the first and the last, 
He is the Qur'an, he is the Furgan, 
He is the Yasin, he is the Taha 
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The Love of the Prophet is not only the characterizing feature of a man 
of faith, it is his be-all and end-all. One who is invested with the Love of the 
Prophet, has the choir and furniture of the universe under his lock and key. 
Believers, individually and collectively, derive their sustenance from the Love 
of the Prophet. Nay, the entire universe is flourishing around his Love : 
L4L,, 	9--~'~ 4S j_A 
.,.,~ ~l L_LS 	J 
Whoever has the wherewithal of Prophet's love 
The entire world is at his feet 
The community owes' its' existence to the love of the prophet 
Nay, the life of the universe is dependent on his love 
Our soul is restless in his love 
His love is a day bereft of any evening. 
The Love of the Prophet is central to the very vision and mission of Islam. He 
is the source of inspiration and locus of honour: 
_L 	Z Imo 	,r__S1 .;,~ 
t---_i 	dL 
There is a beloved hidden within thine heart: 
I will show him to thee, if thou hast eyes to see. 
His lovers are fairer than the fair, 
Sweeter and comelier and more beloved. 
By love of him the heart is made strong 
And earth rubs shoulders with the Pleiades 
The soil of Najd was quickened by his grace 
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And fell into a rapture and rose to the skies. 
In the Muslim's heart is the home of Muhammad, 
All our glory is from the name of Muhammad. 
The man of God is inspired by love for love is deathless and eternal. Love is 
formidably challenging, indomitably victorious and powerfully all pervading 
and all-encompassing: 
a f 
ftv { 	" irJ b L 
The actions of a man of God are inspired by love 
Love is the essence of life, it is innocent of death 
Although the tide of time is of ferocious velocity 
Love itself is a flood and thawarts the flood as well. 
In the constitution of love, besides the present age, 
There are countless eras, presently unidentifiable 
Love is the breath of Gabriel, love is the breath of the Prophet 
Love is the messenger of Allah, love is the logos of Allah. 
(E) MAN OF FAITH 
For Iqbal, an ideal Muslim is one who does not engage himself in 
metaphysical disputations, theological interpretations, hermeneutical 
sophistications and ideological controversies. He, rather, is a man of action. He 
is socially, politically and economically engaged with a view to working out 
his own destiny and that of the world around him albeit within the parameters 
of divinely ordained prescriptions and proscriptions or Shari'ah outlined in the 
Quran. In one of his last poems titled "Iblees Ki Majiis-i-Shura" the "Advisory 
Council of Satan", Iqbal, in his unique and specific literary style brings out the 
strategy and programme of Satan as formulated in consultation with his 
advisors. Several advisors of Satan in their presentations and speeches point out 
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various imminent dangers and challenges to the supremacy of the Satan. They 
cite the rise of Democracy and spread of Marxism as two of the several 
challenges posing a threat to the kingdom of their master, Satan. In his 
concluding remarks, the Satan responds to the wistful presentations of his 
advisors and assures them that the so-called democratic and socialist 
revolutions do not pose any threat to his abiding kingdom across the globe. 
However, Islamic world-view and value-system pose a real threat to his 
supremacy, for it is irresistibly against exploitation of man by man and 
enslavement of one by another. There cannot be a greater intellectual and 
practical revolution than the Islamic teaching that the entire land or total 
economic resources do not belong to kings but to Allah alone. It is in the best 
interests of the Satanic System or Order to conceal the revolutionary features of 
Islamic Shari'ah from the eyes of the world. Anyone fully cognizant of the 
realities of the world knows that it is Islam rather than Democracy and 
Socialism which pose a real challenge to Satanic Establishment. So we need to 
strategise with a view to keeping Islamic Shari' ah out of the bounds of society, 
polity, economy and culture. The best way to keep Muslims and Islam away 
from the most important practical concerns of life is to engage them in 
pointless scholastic debates as hereunder: 
1. Whether Christ is alive or has passed away ? 
2. Whether the Attributes of Allah are included in His Essence or separate 
from His Essence? 
3. Whether the second coming of Jesus signifies Jesus himself or some 
another renovator characterized by the virtues of Jesus? 
4. Whether the words of the Quran are eternal or are created? 
5. Which of the doctrines can -lead to the salivation of Ummah etc.? 
Such scholastic engagements will alienate him from the world of 
practical concerns so that Satanic Order remains intact and unchallenged. 
Better to engage him in such poetry and Tasawwuf which disorients him from 
the practical imperatives of life. I am perennially afraid lest the Muslims 
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community is awakened to the vision and mission of Islam leading to 
devastating interrogation of the Satanic Order and its subsequent replacement 
by Islamic Order. It is in the fitness of things to inculcates among Muslims life-
negating monastic attitudes with a view to cementing the Satanic Order for all 
times to come. 
Iqbal's `Man of Faith' is not only a revolutionary but a reinterpretative 
force as well. He creates new form of life as well as reinterprets or 
reconceptualizes new models of life. He reinterprets our dream of life for he is 
persuasive enough to re-cast or transubstantiate our desires, drives, hopes and 
aspirations. Nature is red in tooth and claw but the end-product and the possible 
justification of this blood-drenched evolution is the emergence of `Man of 
faith'. 
Igbal's Ideal Man definitely has great similarities with the superman of 
Nietzche, although dissimilarities are very stricking. Nietzsche's Superman and 
Igbal's Ideal Man spring from the idea of `will to power'. Both the.Superman 
of Nietzsche and Ideal Man of Iqbal are oriented to future. While Iqbal's 
account of Ideal Man is teleological, Nietzsche's account of Superman though 
not mechanistic is a teleological. Nietzsche's Superman is his replacement for 
God and Iqbal's Ideal Man is representative of God and God's Will is to be 
perfected in this world through him. In fact, man as underlined by Iqbal, ' is 
Gods' co-worker and co-creator. The following verses from ` Pyam-i Mashriq' 
bring out the crucial rather substantial role played by man in the trans-
substantiation, transformation and transcreation of the world. Man says to God: 
l ji 
e 1 '   
`Thou didst create the night and I made the lamp, 
Thou didst create clay and I made the cup.' 1  
1 Diwan-i-Iqbal Lahori, op.cit., p. 242, (tr. A.A. Ansari, op.cit., p. 135). 
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It is I who turn stone into a mirror, 
And it is I who turn poison into an antidote. 
Thou didst create the deserts, mountains forests, 
I produced the orchards, gardens and groves 
(Diwan-i Igbal Lahori, p. 242, (Eng. tr. of the verses, cf. S.A. Wahid op. cit., p. 106) . 
He is a response to the prayers of human civilization through aeons. As 
he is from the realm of love, he is cogniscient of the mysteries of human 
existence: 
J1J -- L_ j !L+, iC ty }L~ 	~I~ ,UL~ Le 4iL 	 I--m 
For centuries life cries in mosques and temples. 
So that from the realm of love one knower of mysteries emerges. 
The `Man of Faith' outlined in Iqbals' poetry is self-transformed and 
world-transforming. He rolls' up the conventional or traditional forms of life 
and inaugurates new patterns of being, thinking and living. His creative genius 
is revolutionary. His aims and objectives and projects and programmes 
manifest in social, political and economic order for he is passionately creative 
and creating. His perennial emergence is perennially directing a new world 
order. 
It is true that both Kierkegaard's and Iqbal's Ideal Man or Perfect Man 
is a man of faith. However, the element of power is absent from Kierkegaard's 
account of Ideal Man. He is bereft of any element of power characterizing him, 
Igbal's Ideal Man or Man of Faith is radically invested with power. Igbal's 
Ideal Man is the Vicegerent (khalifah) of God. He is an embodiment of 
overmastering power for he has to execute the commandments of God on earth. 
Iqbal rejects the mechanistic-materialistic as well as the subjective 
idealistic interpretations of the universe crystalised in eighteenth century under 
the impact of Newtonian Physics and as a reaction against the same by 
Berkeley. For Iqbal, the world is not lifeless matter. It is also not comprised of 
mere minds in the Berkelian sense. As Iqbal interprets it, the world consists of 
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living-willing egos. These egos are ceaselessly struggling to graduate to higher 
stages of life and will. The universe is an ordered system of egos or 
individualities. Continuation of the individuality entails strengthening of ego or 
self. The world is comprised of finite egos. These finite egos are centres of will 
and life. There is no form of being in the world which is completely lifeless and 
will-less. The universe we are living or operating through is an evolving 
universe. It accommodates different grades of individualities in which the 
lower types of ego struggle to become higher. Our universe is a perpetual 
process. Here lower becomes higher by becoming a higher individual. 
According to Iqbal, human ego has to negotiate three stages with a view 
to achieving its purification, edification, education and authentication: Firstly it 
has to surrender to the commandments or prescriptions and proscriptions 
ordained by Allah or promulgated by Prophet of Islam. The commandments of 
Allah or promulgations of the Prophet are obviously not natural laws operating 
automatically across space-time continuum. These commandments or 
promulgations are spiritual or moral laws. They are, in the Kantian parlance, 
categorical imperatives, which have to be rationally and voluntarily 
appropriated or internalized. We have to obey them, come what may, hell or 
high water. These spiritual or moral imperatives are the laws of the 
preservation and sustenance of our existence. Obedience or subordination to 
these laws does not mean surrender to external dictates but submission to the 
demands and imperatives of our own conscience. Such a surrender does not 
signify the abdication of our freedom but restoration of the real freedom which 
is not a condition of unbridled vagrancy but born out of voluntary 
subordination to imperatives of our duty. 
Without obedience to law or without a proper self-restraint, the freedom 
of choice enjoyed by the individual is sure not only to lead him astray and 
defeat the very purpose of evolution, it will be equally disastrous for the 
maintenance of social relationships without which an individual can not hope 
to attain his desired ends. In view of the same, Iqbal recommends that an 
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individual should surrender himself of his own sweet will, to the 
commandments of Shari'ah encapsulated into categorical propositions of the 
Quran and doings and sayings of the Prophet. 
Self control is the second stage in the ongoing evolution of human ego. 
The commandments of the Shari'ah have got to be internalized out of free 
choice by recourse to self-control. A person devoid of self-control, will be 
controlled by his lower self. In order to help an individual attain self-control 
Iqbal suggests him to follow the moral and religious code of Islam in its 
entirety. To begin with, the acceptance of the supremacy of Allah will relieve 
an individual of all fears and superstitions. 
An ordinary or normal self is characterized by so many limitations of 
arising out of fear and love. Man is afraid of this world, of the world to come 
and of life and limb. He is afraid of the suffering the world has in store for him. 
He is pathologically involved in self-love, spousal love, love of property and 
riches and love of his country and love of what not. He is caught into gluttony 
indulging in what has been proscribed and forbidden by God. Once he is 
blissed with the master-key of human existence viz.; La illaha lllal lab (there is 
no god but Allah) formula for baptisation into Islam, all his fears are lost and 
all his attachments are dissolved into nothingness. Once the fear of Allah is 
installed in his heart, he is liberated from all kinds of mundane fears. Once he 
is settled into the realm of God — consciousness, he is liberated from all 
attachments as well. Furthermore, by offering prayers, by keeping fast, by 
paying legal alms and by performing Hay (pilgrimage to Mecca), we are 
purged of vices and permeated by virtues. These compulsory prayers, rituals 
and practices can fortify our ego leading to complete self-control. 
Thirdly, the ego will have to shoulder the highest responsibility of being 
the vicegerent of God. Vicegerency of Allah or Deputyship of God 
(Khafl atullah) is the consummation and culmination or ultimate realization.of 
all human potentialities, faculties and possibilities. Such a human being augurs 
well for the glory of the world, leading to appropriation of a political order that 
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transcends the vicissitudes of spatial and temporal mutations and fluctuations. 
The Vicegerent of God leads to blissful and blessed worldly human order for 
he perfectly lords over all the elements of terrestrial existence. He is the soul of
the world and his existence is the shadow of the Logos. He is fully cognizant of 
all the elements of the Whole and is sustained by the commands of Allah. He 
dismantals the older order replacing it by total revolution. He is the giver of 
glad tidings and Warner to the entire mankind of all possible dangers. He is the 
chief of the army of believers. He is the culminating point of all knowledge and 
secret of all spiritual pathways. He is the explanation and the justification of the 
entire universe and his glory spells salvation for the entire humankind. He 
gives a new explanation and interpretation of the mystery of existence. His rule 
spells universal peace, human brotherhood and perennial love. He is the 
ultimate destiny of human evolution: 
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It's sweet to be God's Vicegerent in the world 
And exercise sway over the elements 
God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe, 
His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name. 
He knows the mysteries of part and whole, 
He executes the command of Allah in the world. 
To the human race he brings both a glad message and a warning. 
He comes both as a soldier and as a marshal and prince. 
He is the final cause of "God taught Adam the names of all things", 
He is the inmost sense of "Glory to Him 
That transported His servant by night", 
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He gives a new explanation of life, 
A new interpretation of this dream. 
While outlining his concept of vicegerent of God, Igbal writes: 
He is the completest ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of 
life both in mind and body; in him discord of our mental life 
becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with 
the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct 
and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of 
humanity and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified 
because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of 
mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth. Out of 
the richness of his nature, he lavishes the wealth of life on 
others and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The 
more we advance in evolution the nearer we get to him. In 
approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. 
The development of humanity both in mind and body is a 
condition precedent to his birth. For the present he is a mere 
ideal, but the evolution of humanity is tending towards the 
production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals 
who will become his fitting parents. Thus the kingdom of 
God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique 
individuals presided over by the most unique individual 
possible on this earth" 
(Iqbal : Introduction to Asrar-}-Khudi; p.5) 
The man of faith is on an eternal quest for God, for values, for ideals. 
The greater the environmental, geographical, historical, social, political and 
economic challenges; the greater the authentication and realization of his 
personality. The more the going gets tough, the more he gets going. The 
stabilization of human ego or self is accomplished only through facing 
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challenges shaking our very foundations, so to say. It is through facing the 
excruciating challenges that our ego or self accomplishes spiritual disclosures 
of ultimate significance. It is through these disclosures or divulgements that we 
appropriate God-realisation. The man of God does not see anything but God. 
He is oblivious or impervious to his personal existence — his desires and 
aspirations, his needs and drives, his instincts and impulses, etc. He is fired by 
unflinching and unfailing commitment to one single supreme God, to the 
implementation and execution of the commandments of Allah. He is so 
passionate as to be boiling in his blood for the realization of divinely ordained 
values and ideals. His loveful and passionate commitment to God is unqualified 
or absolute. It is through love of God that he achieves moral credibility, 
spiritual authenticity, self-authentication and personal glory and majesty. All 
the excruciating challenges in the way of God, are for him, occasions to be 
celebrated, moments of joy and bliss; for such occasions and moments ooze out 
of his labour of spiritual love, commitment and struggle. In his quest for truth, 
all the sufferings are joyfully negotiated. While carrying out this divinely 
ordained loving struggle, all that appears to be evil, is transmuted into good. In 
this loving struggle, all the apparent unkindnesses, are inverted love-affairs of 
highest moral and spiritual value: 
Lcs 	~.~ 	~y ~ ~a ~~ ~ 1J 
Our ego is fortified by great challenges, 
Till the Reality of God is disclosed to man. 
The man of God does not see himself apart from Truth, 
Mouthing `La-ilah', he sacrifices himself for Truth. 
It is an honour for Love to stew up in blood, 
Being cut, beaten and hanged is an occasion for celebration. 
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Whatever happens in the way of God is good, 
The apparent unkindnesses of Allah are moments of joy. 
The Man of Faith' is above all worldly attractions and beguilements. 
He is not enamoured of worldly pomp and show, He is not bedazzled by 
ostentation of power, wealth, office or status. He is beyond slavery and 
enslavement. He is a man of freedom and truth. He is directed by divine 
commandments. In his personal, religious and legal matters, he is oriented to 
and impacted by God. His standards of good and evil or bitter and sweet etc. 
are divinely revealed: 
L_i 	 V 	t~~V r::.k--t om 
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The man of God is averse to all status symbols, 
None is subservient to him, he is subservient to none. 
The man of God is nothing but a man of freedom, 
His country and value-system are just the gifts of Allah 
The patterns of his religion and value-system are from Allah 
The criteria of his good and evil and bitter and sweet are from Allah. 
Igbal's Man of Faith or Man of God is not only a servant of God or 
seeker of God. He is a co-worker or colleague of God. He is not absorbed into 
God, he absorbs God into himself. Consequently, he becomes instrumental in 
the implementation of divine strategies and plans or Will of God. He strides 
like a colossus on the social, political and economic scene and operates as a 
great transformative force. He is a dominant creative force, a great 
transformative agency, a great revolutionary power. He has originated from 
mud but he is oriented to spiritual light or enlightenment. He is invested with 
attributes of Allah, He is so engrossed into the love of Allah that pleasures and 
attractions of all the possible worlds leave him unshaken and undisturbed. His 
faith is the centre-point of all truth and all being. In comparison to the truth.of 
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his faith, the status of this world is superstitious, magical and figurative. Igbal 
in Bal i Jibril in a long poem: "Masjid-l-Qartabah " says: 
)L )bTlab' IL, rx, J~ A b' i? f;A V, .1 i1 — A 
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`The hand of Mo'min (Perfect Man) is the hand of God; 
His hand is dominant creator and solver of the problems and doer of work. 
Although is made of dust, his foundation is of light; 
He is God's servant but he possesses the attributes of God. 
(Ku1Vyat-i-Igba1, op.cit, p. 389) 
Life without faith is hopelessness — an irredeemable despair. It is an absolute or 
unqualified darkness. Faith is the only spark which can sustain human 
civilization across all evolutionary vicissitudes. It is the only jewel which 
shines by its' own light: 
The Faith of a Muslim is to this doubt-anchored world 
What a hermits' candle is to the dark night of wilderness 
The faith of a man of God is at the centre of the Truth or centrally informs the 
truth. This universe independent of faith is devoid of meaning and truth: 
JL y uii L~A j rL  Jl~ a_ 	 LS 1.L s~ ~ ~L~Y -__i, a_ 
The centrepoint of the compass of Truth is the faith of a man of God, 
And this entire choir and furniture of the universe is nothing but imagination, 
magic and appearance 
A man of faith need not be a scholar. He need not be a professor of 
theology or philosophy, a historian or a hermeneuticist. An awareness of the 
methodological and hermeneutical intricacies involved in the Quranic Exegesis 
will not vouchsafe to us the blessings of faith. Each man of faith will have to 
negotiate the experience of revelation himself. We cannot achieve clarity with 
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regard to the Quran unless the Quran is always contemporaneously experienced 
as revealing on our conscience : 
Until the Qur'an is revealed on your own conscience, 
Commentators such as Razi and author of Kashaf' (Zamakhshri) are not going 
to untie its' knots. 
The insignificance of human learning and scholarship cannot be overstressed in 
the realms of spirituality and faith: 
0 	CSI. `4 	 ./JJG  
The man of God possesses nothing save two letters of La-2-lab 
It is the jurisconsult of the city who has amassed large lexicographical 
compendia of Arabia. 
The man of faith or man of God is socially, politically, economically, 
culturally and more importantly spiritually a power centre of unique 
significance. He is oriented to action although he is rooted in beliefs and 
values. He is the greatest agent of social transformation and intellectual 
transmutation. God-realisation is the foundation or anchor of his personality 
but action is his approach to or method of social transformation, It is through 
action that secrets of self and universe are revealed to him. He is charcterised 
by power, courage, initiative, fortitude, determination, perseverance, constancy, 
equanimity and magnanimity etc: 
Nobody can estimate the prowess of his arms, 
A mere wink of a Man of Faith is sufficient to transform destinies. 
The Man of Faith or Man of God, is the culmination of biological and cultural 
evolution. He is the locus of inspiration in the space-time continuum. In his 
long poem, Masjid-i Qartabah, Igbal says: 
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He is the destination of Reason, and the end of Love; 
He is the very life of the Assembly of the universe. 
(Ku1liyat i-Igbal, op.cit., p. 390, (tr A.A. Ansari, op.cit., p. 22). 
It is not the formal trappings that make us a Man of God. Rather it is our 
spiritual attunement with God that imparts divinity to us: 
- 4.._S ___ s j a___ . 	 .. LAS 
An infidel with an alert heart in front of an idol, 
Is better than the so-called Muslim who slept in Ka'bah 
Faith is the elixir, faith is the panacea. It is faith that can resolve the problems 
and work out solutions. It is faith that can inspire an all-out transformation and 
revolution : 
When a man is fired by the warmth of conviction, 
He is invested with the wings of Gabriel. 
Iqbal offers a passionate prayer for the early arrival of his Ideal Man. His 
arrival will spell peace, brotherhood, love and compassion. He is the ultimate 
fruit of the garden of life. In fact, he is the ultimate destiny of biological, moral 
and spiritual evolution. Iqbal says in his Asrar-i-Khudi: 
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Appear, 0 rider of destiny! 
Appear 0 light of the dark realm of change! 
Illumine the scene of existence, 
Dwell in the blackness of our eyes! 
Silence the noise of the Nations, 
Imparadise our ears with thy music! 
Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood, 
Give us back the cup of wine of love! 
Bring once more days of peace to the world, 
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle! 
Humankind is the cornfield and thou the harvest, 
Thou art the goal of life's Caravan. 
(Asrar-i-Khudi, p.107, (tr. Shaikh Akbar Ali, 1932, p. 279). 
There has not been a better critique of human rationality and classical, 
medieval and modern almost pathological obsession for objectivity. Iqbal 
claimed to have negotiated the fire of European scholarship and philosophy 
with the equanimity of Abraham. It is not an overstatement. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
COMPARISON 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal share many things despite their considerable 
differences. Both are powerful critics of theological rationalism attempting to 
rationally prove and appropriate religion. Both anchor their Christian and 
Muslim beliefs and values on faith rather than argument or method. Both 
advocate that philosophical or religious truth in it's highest sense can be 
appropriated only subjectively and all attempts at objective appropriation of 
such a truth can land us only into the morass of irremediable and 
irredeemable confusion. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is truth and truth is 
subjectivity. Iqbal says that if we try to seek God, we would not see anything 
but ourselves and if we try to seek ourselves, we would not find anything but 
God. Even the Qur'an, according toIgbal, cannot be understood by recourse to 
ponderous theological scholarship or methodological sophistication but by 
spiritual internalization, subjectivisation and conscientisation. Truth rotates 
round the faith of the man of God. The so-called objective world is, in 
comparison, nothing but fanciful, magical and illusory and cannot be. cited with 
a view to establishing or validating what is Ultimately True or Real. 
Kierkegaard and lgbal, both are primarily and respectively, inspired by 
the more or less equivalent versions of the Primordial Semitic Vision 
pertaining to Man, Universe and God enshrined in the Bible and the Qur'an. 
Both of them are essentially exhortative philosophers as both of them ask 
Christians and Muslims to reappropriate the original Biblical and Qur'anic 
beliefs and values. Both ask Christians and Muslims respectively to abandon or 
give up skeptical, cynical, nihilistic and life-negating attitudes and orientations 
born out of the so-called western modernist rationalist critique of religions 
albeit the Biblical or the Qur'anic world-view and value-system. 
The purpose of Kierkegaard's philosophy was to summon the nineteenth 
centurysmug Christendom of Europe to the passionate commitment to original 
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Christian world- view and value-system. He offered a radical re-examination of 
what it means to become a Christian using his rhetorical and satirical skills to 
disclose the limits of reason and open the door to faith. 
Iqbal's poetry and prose writings too are primarily .addressed to a 
restoration of the original vision and mission of Islam. Just as Christ is central 
to Kierkegaardian account of Christianity, so is Muhammad the cynosure of 
Iqbal's reinterpretation and reconstruction of Islamic beliefs and values. He 
categorically and specifically asks Muslims to reappropriate the Prophet for he 
constitutes the alpha and omega of Islam, the rest being antithetical to the 
essence and core of religion. Just as Kierkegaard wasunderlining the strenuous 
and demanding requirements of authentic Christianity so was Iqbal 
frighteningly aware to the exacting and overtaxing demands of being attuned 
tooriginal vision and pristine mission of Islam. Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal 
underline the absolute need for and foundational importance of authentic 
commitment to religious beliefs and values. Kierkegaard emphasised on 
passionate appropriation of the central paradox of Christianity viz; God-man or 
Christ, against all protests and objections of reason. For Iqbal, all legal, ethical 
and theological doctrines are nothing but conceptual idolatry if not animated by 
love. Sans illumination of love, life is suffering; reason a distanciationfrom the 
primal source of our being and religion an insufferable burden. With love, even 
apostasy is transmuted into faith, sans love even a believer is an apostate. 
Kierkegaard in nineteenth century Europe and Iqbal in twentieth century 
Asia have advanced extraordinarily powerful critiques of Enlightenment 
rationalism and humanism. Both of them have appreciated the subterranean and 
inherent alienation beneath the apparently shining facade of Enlightenment 
project. Both of them have protested against the reducitonistic accounts of man, 
religion and morality inspired by rationalist and humanist turnaround in 
eighteenth century Europe. Kierkegaard advanced the view that the ideal of 
rational and objective knowledge underscored by the Enlightenment was 
inherently blind to the demands of the imperatives of inner or subjective 
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existence. A rational and objective account of religion would paradoxically 
enough pulverisethe very logic and function of religion which can be religion 
only to the extent it is subjectively appropriated. Iqbal deemed human reason 
operating as a street-lamp which can furnish light across the compound of a 
house but can give no inkling as to what is going on inside the house. It is 
through faith that we can undergo self-mortification and experience God-
intoxication. Faithlessness according to Iqbal is worse than slavery. It is 
through intuition and love that we can affirm the existence of our ego, the 
Supreme Ego and graduate to the highest stage of Divine Vicegerency, What 
needs to be underlined is that Iqbal shares a deep philosophical kinship with 
Kierkegaard, for both recognized the limits of reason and science in grasping 
the nature of self, God and faith. 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal were fired by missionary zeal. Both were 
inspired by grand spiritual visions and moral missions encapsulated into New 
Testament and the Quran. Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal felt they were divinely 
commissioned with the task of rejuvenating Christianity and Islam. 
Kierkegaard felt that the institutionalized, organized and establishmentarian 
nineteenth century Christianity was the violation and distortion of the original 
Mission of Christianity and he further felt called upon to reawaken Christians 
to the pristine glory of their religion. Iqbal deemed poetry to be a part of the 
Messengership. While he saluted the Sufi and the Mullah for imparting the 
fundamental doctrines of Islam, he was deeply skeptical with regard to their 
interpretation of Islam. He likened himself to Rumi and claimed that what 
Rumi was to the tumultuous Medieval times, he was to intellectually 
mischievous present day world. Igbal's art and thought was especially 
addressed to the revival of original Islamic Mission and rejuvenation of 
Muslim community across the globe. 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal protested against distorted interpretations of 
Christianity and Islam respectively. Kierkegaard was especially critical of 
Hegel's treatment of Christianity as a symbolic expression of the metaphysical 
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truth that Absolute Spirit exists only in and through the cosmos. Such a 
Hegelian interpretation is a betrayal of the original Christian position believing 
God to be transcending the physical world and human persons. Similarly Iqbal 
has repeatedly critiqued rationalist philosophers and theologians for trying to 
adjust the Qur' anic revelations to the dictates and criteria of human reason. 
Iqbal brings out that at every point of history the Qur'an can be appropriated 
only by those who are experientially feeling themselves attuned to it as if it is 
being revealed on them. Any purely theological espousal of Islam can be 
highly distorting and misleading. 
Both Kierkegaard and 	Iqbal 	are deeply critical 	of speculative 
abstractions. Kierkegaard was 	radically critical of Hegel's speculative 
philosophy. Kierkegaard deemed Hegel to be comic for trying to capture all of 
reality in his system of thought. In his extravagant speculative flights of fancy, 
Hegel lost touch with existence of the individual human beings. Kierkegaard 
launched a life-long revolt against such abstract and speculative philosophy. 
Iqbal too thinks Hegel's shell to be devoid of the pearl. The destiny of pure 
speculation culminates in being impresent to God. The speculative philosophy 
distanciates us from life or existence. 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal were deeply outraged by all shades of 
pantheistic philosophy. Kierkegaard is highly critical of Hegel's pantheistic 
contempt for the individual man and of his speculative attempts at submerging 
concrete human beings in a totality. Hegel like all speculative philosophers 
could not see himself to be a distinct atomic individual amenable to 
experiencing terrible cosmic isolation, loneliness and dreadful responsibility. 
So he was attracted to interpreting all human beings to be components or 
expressions of World-Spirit. Iqbal too was radically critical of the pantheistic 
interpretation of Islam worked out by Ibn Arabi. Apart from negating the 
transcendental God of the Quran, Ibn Arabi's doctrine of Oneness of Being, 
undercuts human freedom and demolishes every criterion of good and evil. 
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Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal advocated that pantheistic philosophy is 
antithetical to genuine moral and spiritual life. A robust religious life is 
impossible without the complete banishment of pantheistic doctrine. The 
essence of Christianity and Islam, they believed, is opposed to all pantheistic, 
absolutistic, and monistic dogmas, 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal stress on the unqualified significance of 
man-God relationship. Both are categorically clear that all so-called proofs for 
the existence of God are fallacious, spurious, unnecessary and uncalled for, 
Both are critically cognizant of the need for cultivating a profound man-God 
relationship. However, any relationship with or appropriation of God can never 
be rationally or intellectually worked out or carried out. Both Kierkegaard and 
Iqbal emphasize on subjective appropriation of God. Iqbal emphasizes on 
relating ourselves to God by recourse to intuition and love. He goes to the 
extent of saying that love is so powerful a force as to be capable of purchasing 
the will of God. Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal agree that any objective 
demonstration of God is eternally impossible and God can be appropriated only 
through subjectivity and inwardness. 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal deem Christ and Muhammad to be central 
to Christianity and Islam respectively. For Kierkegaard the Ultimate Mystery 
of Christianity is that the eternal God was incarnated into a historical man i.e. 
Jesus Christ. This central absurdity can never be conveniently or plausibly 
explained. Any such explanation would involve distorting the core of 
Christianity, for the doctrine that man was God, is essentially absurd. However, 
the incarnation of the Christ is central to the original Christian narrative. 
Similarly, the Prophet of Islam, according to Iqbal, is the be-all and end-all of 
Islam. Iqbalunerlines that in the spiritual pathway of Islam, Prophet is the first 
and the last or the origin and the destiny. If we authentically reach the Prophet, 
that constitutes the sum and substance of Islam as a way of life. All else is idol-
worship and infidelity. 
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Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal emphasise on authenticity. An authentic 
man is a man of faith. It is only an authentic man of faith who according to 
Kierkegaard can appropriate God through subjectivity and inwardness. The 
authenticity of a man of faith is beyond pleasure and pain, profit and loss, 
powerfulness and powerlessness, honour and dishonor, popularity and 
unpopularity and other such considerations. An authentic faith is a categorical 
imperative. It is a leap unto the darkness. Similarly Iqbal brings out that when a 
man is fired by authentic faith, he is invested with the wings of Gabriel. The 
Qur'anic revelations can also be appropriated only by an authentic man of 
faith. An authentic man of faith can offer his own life as a gift to God. An 
authentic love of God can joyously lead us to self-mortification and self-
sacrifice. Such a sacrifice is the ultimate jay for an authentic man of faith. 
Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal, advance their respective formulations of 
the dialectic of existence. Kierkegaard classifies three possible modes of 
existence; aesthetic mode, ethical mode and religious made. When we live in 
existential mode, we strive for maximization of immediate pleasures. However 
such a mode is bound to lead to monotony, boredom and frustration.While 
living in ethical mode, we commit ourselves to ethical principles and values 
and are concerned about wider circles of human fraternity. However this mode 
of existence is also incapable of liberating us from frustration, alienation and 
spiritual crisis. Such a crisis can be eliminated only if we appropriate the 
religious mode of existence by a leap of faith. Only an unqualified commitment 
to God can fill in the void of our existence. Similarly, Iqbal advances his own 
version of an existential dialectic. According to Iqbal, an authentic Muslim has 
to firstly subordinate himself to the commandments of Shari'ah. Secondly, he 
has to carry on an excruciating moral and spiritual struggle with a view to 
achieving complete self-control. Thirdly, a man can appropriate the highest 
stage of Divine Vicegerency. Each human being is capable of becoming the 
vicegerent of God. The Divine Vicegerent is the Perfect Man of. Iqbal, the 
highest product of evolution. 
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Both Kierkegaard and Iqbal underscore the significance of human 
freedom. Freedom is essential to authenticity. We can never achieve authentic 
existence if we are unfree. Kierkegaard points out that if religion could be 
rationally proved or demonstratively clinched, we would loose all scope for 
freedom and the entire quest for authenticity. The fact that we are, given the 
choice to believe or not to believe in God, indicates our unqualified freedom. 
Freedom to Kierkegaard is the core or crux of faith and authenticity. Iqbal, 
throughout his poetry has celebrated the freedom of man. For Iqbal, the man of 
authentic faith is the man of freedom. While a slave is determined by 
circumstances, a free man of authentic faith determines the very circumstances. 
While in servitude, life is a handful of water, in freedom it is a boundless 
ocean. Iqbal emphasizes that while geological and biological phenomena are 
determined by destiny, an authentic man of faith and freedom is voluntarily 
directed by the commandments of Allah. An authentic free man cannot 
compromise with circumstances. When challenged by circumstances, the man 
of authentic faith and freedom; by the sheer force of his values, ideals, 
purposes and aspirations, destroys the old patterns of life and recreates a new 
world-order according to his own lights. The highest example of such a man of 
faith and freedom is the Prophet of Islam. 
However, Kierkegaard and Iqbal are not carbon copies of each other. 
They belong to two different religious, intellectual and cultural backgrounds. 
They were also different by training and temperament. In view of the same, a 
brief account of their dissimilarities would be in order : 
Kierkegaard's world is essentially a world of despair. He is 
temperamentally melancholic and philosophically oriented to despair. 
According to Kierkegaard, despair inevitably cropsup when one is inexorably 
driven to God and yet finds it impossible to reach the synthesis of finite-infinite 
relationship. The very incarnation of the Infinite God in historical Jesus is the 
highest absurdity and an irresolvable paradox. Kierkegaard believes in the 
paradox but wants to comprehend it on the basis of faith. In view of the 
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essential incomprehensibility of this paradox, Kierkegaard finds himself 
irretrievably condemned to the sad world of despair. Igbal, on the other hand, is 
an incorrigible optimist. He points out that any complaint with regard to Divine 
Determination is frutile, for man is capable of determining the course of Divine 
Will. Iqbal is cocksure that we can appropriate God through intuition and love. 
It is through love and self-sacrifice that God's Will can be dissolved in man's 
will. If man can rise on the scale of egohood, God can consult him with regard 
to his desires and aspirations. Iqbal finds joy even in the sufferings inflicted on 
man by God, for it is through suffering and strife that we can achieve highest 
spiritual stature. 
Igbal's man of faith negotiates highest possible mystical intimations and 
spiritual disclosures by recourse to contemplation and intuition. He loves to 
retire to his solitude. He is solitary. However, he is not lonely. Kierkegaard's 
radical espousal of subjectivity makes any sort of communication impossible. 
Kierkegaard's authentic man is irretrievably lost into despair for in his critical 
moments and existential choices, he is alone, bearing the burden of all his 
decisions as responsibilities. Especially the decision of subjective appropriation 
of and commitment to God is the most vital decision of the authentic man of 
faith and entails unfathomable suffering and despair, for such a decision is 
hedged on absolute uncertainty and impervious to all calculations of 
consequences; profit-wise or loss-wise. 
Kierkegaard is too much of a radical advocate of subjectivity. He is 
intensely religious which impels him to become an extreme outsider. Iqbal's 
advocacy of faith and love is radical too. However, in comparison to 
Kierkegaard, his religious orientations sound to be more sober. In view of the 
same, he can see the other side of the picture as well. Iqbal's man of faith does 
integrate himself with the external human world and he is especially in genuine 
emotional and intellectual communion with fellow Muslims. Iqbal's authentic 
man of faith can transcend his ego-centric predicament by his unqualified and 
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unconditional love. Iqbal's man of faith, following Allah, becomes equally 
affectionate with believers and non-believers. 
The divergent religious attitudes of Kierkegaard and Iqbal are inspired 
because of their divergent doctrinal backgrounds. In the context of Iqbal's 
religious tradition God reveals His commandments through the Prophet in the 
form of a `Book'. On the other hand, Kierkegaard belongs to a religious 
tradition in which the revelation of God takes place in the historic person of 
Christ. In the Islamic religious tradition, God as a law-giver is addressing to the 
entire community or Ummah of Muslims. The Muslim community as a whole 
becomes an expression of God's Will. In fact, the Muslim community as a 
whole, is the social and political locus of Divine vicegerency. Therefore, Iqbal 
throughout his poetic career, has been continuously and consistently addressing 
to the global Muslim community, exhorting them to appropriate the prestine 
glory of Islam with a view to scaling on the pinnacle of worldly success as well 
as spiritual plenitude. By contrast, Kierkegaard's man of faith, remains a lonely 
individual. Igbal's man of faith comes closer to becoming a `person'. 
Kierkegaard's authentic man of faith is completely dependent and 
absolutely finite. He stands perennially as a lonely individual before the 
Personal transcendental God. He is like Abraham standing before him only as a 
lonely single individual who is supported by none or nothing save his 
unconditional commitment to God. Iqbal's religious model was the Prophet of 
Islam, who founded the `Community of the believers' in early seventh century 
Arabia. Therefore Igbal's espousal of the `individual' was not unqualified. 
Despite his overwhelming appreciation of the role of individual consciousness 
and conscience, Iqbal's commitment to the communitarian solidarity was 
unqualified as well. 
Kierkegaard was too much focused on the `individual' to ponder over 
the question of social and political power. As against Kierkegaard, Iqbal is a 
fully-fledged political philosopher. `The will to power', is almost as central to 
Iqbal as it is to Nietzsche. Power, is the determinant of good and evil, in the 
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final analysis of Iqbal. Power and truth are the two sides of the same coin. 
Power interprets what is and what is not true. In fact, in his account of power, 
Iqbal presages Foucault and other postmodern political philosophers. 
Kierkegaard did not forward any metaphysical doctrines. He was 
passionately involved in exploring the existential dialectic of a lonely 
individual apparently pitted against the ontologically silent or clueless cosmos. 
Iqbal too was involved in a life-long exploration of human subjectivity. 
However, he formulated a considerably strong rather imposing metaphysical 
apparatus in contradistinction to the pantheistic system propounded by 
IbnArabi. His metaphysics of man as `ego', God as `Supreme Ego' and the 
universe being a pulsating constellation of countless `egos' was more akin to 
Leibnizean monadology than to Kierkegaardian existential phenomenology. Of 
course, Iqbalian metaphysics was formulated in keeping with the abiding 
axiological concerns and considerations characterising Semitic Monotheistic 
Weltanschauung. The axiologicalthrust of Iqbalian ontology was also 
galvanized by the larger sociopolitical agenda of revitalising the Muslim 
Ummah caught into the vortex of European imperialism. In comparison, 
Kierkegaard was oblivious to sociopolitical polarization of his times and almost 
fanatically concerned with the existentially challenging predicaments and crises 
of the individual. 
Philosophical reflection upon human subjectivity is as old as human 
civilization. All religious world-views and value-systems have formulated and 
forwarded their respective perspectives on subjectivity. The question of 
subjectivity has been central to Modern Western Philosophy as well. For 
example, Cartesian, Kantian and Hegelian philosophical systems are also both 
epistemologically and ontologically anchored on subjectivity. Even the post-
Kantian and post-Hegelian philosophy is centrally informed by reflections on 
subjectivity. Contemporary postmodern antihumanist critiques of the 
subjectivity also underline the central significance of the problem even in the 
ongoing philosophical narratives. However, of all the western philosophers, 
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Kierkegaard's standpoint on subjectivity seems to be most radical and most 
engaging. He defined subjectivity to be truth and truth to be subjectivity. Truth 
can only be authentically appropriated, passionately stood for and lived by and 
finally surrendered to in unconditional commitment rather than Iaboratorically 
confirmed or objectively demonstrated. 
Iqbal's life-long engagement with Islamic world-view and value-system 
and his simultaneous critique and appropriation of Sufi interpretation of Islam 
resulted into the accomplishment of a philosophical vision wherein universe, 
man and the God areconceptualized as hierarchical gradations of 'Egohood' or 
`Will', which vision on the epistemological plane can only be intuitively 
appropriated rather than methodologically, critically and analytically confirmed 
or established. Truth is centred on faith rather than experimental verification or 
logical demonstration. Allah is to be appropriated through passionate faith and 
authentic commitment rather than discovered by recourse to a critical 
examination of ponderous volumes incorporating theological scholarship and 
learning. 
Subjectivity and correspondingly, inwardness, faith, authenticity, 
commitment, primacy of ethical struggle, self-transformation, emphasis on 
action and decision etc. are some of the crucial and characterizing concerns of 
both Kierkegaard and IgbaI's philosophical vision and mission. A more 
detailed comparative and critical study of Kierkegaard and Iqbal's perspectives 
on subjectivity would therefore be a highly rewarding philosophical endeavour. 
It will hopefully also be a significant contribution to the ongoing Comparative 
Philosophy in the emerging global society. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
CRITICAL EVALUATION 
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a Danish religious thinker and 
philosopher. Hisinsistence on the priority of individual existence, subjective 
reflection, choice and responsibility make him the earliest contributor to the 
philosophy of existentialism. His dynamic concept of the self, as well as his 
passionate defense of religious faith, had significant influence on leading 
theologians and major thinkers in continental philosophy in the twentieth 
century. 
Iqbal (1877-1939), the greatest twentieth century Indo-Islamic poet-
philosopher, was an outstanding exponent of non-pantheistic perspective on 
man, universe and God. He put up a life-long struggle against all those 
philosophical or mystical interpretations which defined the ultimate human 
destiny in terms of absorption, or dissolution into World-Soul or God. For Iqbal 
every man is invested with a perennially irreducible individuality. Every man is 
an ego or centre of experience and the universe itself is a conglomeration of 
countless egos. God is the Supremely Perfect Ego as well. Man as a subjective 
centre of experience or ego in its onward march to self-realization, does not 
absorb himself into God, but absorb's God into himself. 
For Kierkegaard, truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is truth. 
Subjectivity is what makes up each person's unique existence. For Kierkegaard, 
the highest truth attainable for an existing individual is simply an objective 
uncertainty held fast in the mostpassionate personal experience. Subjective 
truth does not aspire to the certainty of objective theoretical knowledge. There 
can be no rationally certified system of moralityor religion. There are no 
irrefutable theological or ethical arguments in .favour of living life in a 
particular way. In any case, theoretical certainty about moral or religious truth 
world abolish freedom at the same time as it relieved us of uncertainly. 
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Furthermore, rational arguments could never motivate usto actually lead moral 
en if they could correctly define the true beliefs or right values. 
or Kierkegaard, Hegel's philosophy was a conglomeration of bloodless 
:ions in which individuals are virtually lost into interpretative oblivion. 
ced out a pantheistic world-view that absorbed everything into the 
Lite Spirit". Hegel treated Christianity as a historical phase in the 
)n of spirit and incorporated it into his rationalist philosophical system. 
thing short of philosophical or dialectical annulment of Christianity as a 
in. For Kierkegaard Christianity is anchored on inviolable faith in the 
Qlute paradox" that an eternal being came into existence in temporal 
history. Hegal is pointlessly and unnecessarily trying to provide some 
dialectical or rational justification of Christianity thus violating the very 
purpose as well as logic and methodology of religion. Kierkegaard accuses 
Hegel of utter abandonment of the individual. In fact, all traditional 
ratiohnalistic philosophers have failed in appreciating the "subjective 
viewpoint" or the "existence of the individual". The Hegelian or general 
rationalistic failure of ignoring the subjective viewpoint does neither stem from 
an oversight nor from any deliberate disavowal of the subject. Rather, the very 
craze at philosophical systematization inherently militates against the 
accommodation of "subjective viewpoint". The whole emphasis in such a 
philosophical struggle is at conceptual systematization. Individual human 
existence is also treated as one of the stages of the conceptual development of 
the spirit. Kierkegaard was deeply distrustful of Hegel's attempt to merge man 
and nature with the World-Soul. If we simply see our consciousness as an 
aspect of World Soul, we are no longer truly individuals. Kierkegaard 
emphasized the absolute isolation of every single human being. Each one of us 
is alone, lost and terrified in the vast crowd. It is when we turn to God and God 
turns to us that we are redeemed from this anonymity and fear. God does not 
detract from our individuality but enables us to attain full self-consciousness. 
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The dialectical sophistory of Hegel is actually justificatory apologetics 
and dogmatics of a rationalist philosopher in search of a rationale of history. 
For Hegel all changes, transitions or modifications are necessary dialectical 
movements in the ongoing march of history towards the realization and 
exploration of `World-Spirit'. This justificatory apologetics not only erodes but 
negates human freedom and concomitantly human responsibility. It effectively 
makes human life purposeless and meaningless. Kierkegaard with 
extraordinary missionary zeal summoned all his intellectual powers with a view 
to calling individuals to a sense of their value. In calling individuals to 
theimperatives of ethical responsibility and religious faith, Kierkegaard 
underlined the need for the cultivation of subjectivity and inwardness. 
Like the classical Greek thinker Socrates, Kierkegaard was interested in 
self-understanding instead of indulging in the formulation of metaphysical 
principles. We must start with an understanding of our own existence. The 
function of philosophy is not the discovery of physical and natural principles 
with a view to explaining the universe but to explore the problems of human 
subjectivity. The keynote of Kierkegaard like that of Socrates is —"Know 
thyself". The speculative systems of philosophers are illusory for they do not 
correspond to any reality whatsoever. The only reality is our finite subjective 
existence. Following Kant, knowledge is a conditional imperative whereas 
morality is a categorical imperative for the existing individual, according to 
Kierkegaard. The existing individual provides significance to his life through 
realisation of his personal freedom, through commitment, through 
responsibility, through deep and abiding engagement in moral dilemmas and 
through moments of painful decisions and actions involving courage of the 
highest order. 
To Kierkegaard God is infinite, incomprehensible and transcendent 
Being. However, his concept of God is antithetical to officially established 
Christian Orthodoxy. It is man's ultimate depth of feeling or inwardness in 
relation to God that counts. Kierkegaard like Augustine and Luther emphasized 
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the personal relationship between man and God. However, this relationship 
cannot be governed by theological standards and definite dogmas. It is beyond 
the description of theological categories as well, for such a relationship 
transcends all intellectual determinations. The professors of philosophy and 
theology were pre-eminently ill-qualified to provide rational or intellectual 
grounds for appropriation of God. The intellectual or rational appropriation of 
God was simply impossible of conceptualization or formulation. However, the 
Greek and especially Platonic emphasis on rationality and objectivity 
permeated subsequent philosophical and theological attempts aimed at grasping 
God, universe, man and human values. The grand formulations of 
philosophical systems eventually come to nothing unless they lead attention 
back to the individual. 
Therational and objective methods can and do resolve great questions in 
the spheres of mathematical and natural scientific areas of investigation or 
fields of research. However, beyond questions that are amenable to inductive 
and deductive resolution each one of us faces critical choices, baffling 
dilemmas and painful alternatives. The so-called general principles or methods 
are of no avail during these critical moments. No amount of scientific and 
mathematical reasoning could have helped Abraham in taking the supremely 
overwhelming decision whether to sacrifice his son or not at the behest of God. 
Man can either opt for a pleasure-centric/aesthetic mode of life or value-
centriciethical mode of life. However, he can overcome his overwhelming 
sense of finitude or pervasive and tragic sense of guilt, estrangement and 
alienation by appropriating God through a leap unto the darkness or by opting 
for a religious mode of life. These three modes of life viz; aesthetic or 
hedonistic gratificationism, ethical communitarianism and . religious 
theocentrism, are fundamentally incompatible in that one can only choose 
among them; there is no possibility of compromise with a view to finding the 
best of each mode of life. The foremost task of philosophy is to illuminate this 
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existential dialectic with a view to orientating the individual to an authentic 
appropriation of his subjectivity. 
Igbal's world-view and value-system is Islamic, However, an objective 
demonstration of these beliefs and values is impossible of formulation. 
Following Kant he rejects all the celebrated proofs for the existence of God. 
These beliefs and values canbe appropriated only subjectively. It is through 
intuition that our own reality and the Reality of God can be revealed to us. 
For Iqbal, fine-spun and sophisticated principles of scriptural 
hermeneutics are not going to divulge to us the thematic glories and semantic 
layers of the Qur'an. The Qur'anic verses must be revealed to the depths of the 
conscience of the seeker himself. The centrepoint of truth is the faith of the 
man of God. Everything else, in comparison, is whimsical, magical and 
illusory. 
Iqbal exhorts us to learn to circumambulate around our own selves and 
appropriate skills of digging up the depths of our own hearts. For, if we really 
crave for a transparent divulgement of the ultimate splendour and beauty of 
God, we must learn to transparently appreciate the splendour and beauty of our 
own ego. If we earnestly try to seek him, we world not see anything but 
ourselves and if we authentically try to realize ourselves we would find nothing 
but Him. 
The highest manifestation of life is ego or self. The individual human 
being as the embodiment of self or ego is a fully-fledged centre of 
consciousness. However, despitebeing a complete physical and spiritual centre, 
man is not a perfect individual. The perfection of human individuality entails 
increasing proximity to the Supreme Individuality of God. The nearer man is to 
God, the more integrated his individuality, and conversely, the greater mans 
distance from Him, the less integrated his individuality. The most integrated 
personality or individuality is one who is nearest to God. However, such a 
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perfect individual does not absorb himself into God but absorbs 
God into himself. 
Iqbal radically affirmed human "ego" as a perennially irreducible antic 
entity or domain. Human ego is the gateway to God. If we want to understand 
God, we will have to plumb the ultimate depths of our own self. Only self-
realisation can lead to God-realisation. Though the Supreme Ego is the source 
of human ego, yet human ego has a separate and distinct reality of it's own. 
However, at times, Iqbal in his own poetic and mystical impulses almost 
identifies Supreme Fgo with human ego. 
Igbal's philosophy of man, universe and God is diametrically opposite 
to or poles apart from the pantheistic perspective on man, universe and God. 
For pantheists or monists or absolutists, the ultimate salvation of man lies in 
hiscomplete absorption into the Absolute or World-Spirit. For Iqbal, not self-
absorption or self-dissolution but self-assertion and self-authentication lead 
man to moral fulfilment and spiritual salvation. Man's moral commitment 
and spiritual realization entail appropriation of higher levels of individuality 
and uniqueness. 
Therefore, one of the life-long commitments and intellectual concerns of 
Iqbal was bringing out the limitations of the pantheistic world-view and value-
system of Ibn Arabi, who as against the monotheistic emphasis on absolute 
unity of God propounded the absolute unity of all things in God. This 
pantheistic doctrine is patently unacceptable to Iqbal whose pluralist and 
transcendentalist philosophy is deeply imbued with revolutionary romanticism. 
It deems not only the unique personality of the Divine Being and His Existence 
as distinct from the universe but also the existence of human individuals and 
their partnership with God as a necessary condition for constituting the 
commonwealth of ends or ideals. 
Igbal's critique of pantheistic ontocosmology is anchored on axiological 
grounds. The foremost moral consideration brought against the doctrine is its' 
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inability to provide us a criterion of distinguishing good from evil. As 
everything emanates from The Absolute, so nothing can be deemed to be evil. 
In the absence of a criterion of good and evil, the so-called moral struggle 
becomes meaningless and in the absence of a genuine moral struggle, human 
freedom is effectively smothered. The quest for the establishment of a just and 
egalitarian social, political and economic order is lost for ever. 
In his interpretation of human existence, Iqbal accords special place to 
human freedom. Man's freedom or capacity for initiative is the only instrument 
of change and revolution in human society and history. Man, according to the 
Qur'an is the trustee of a free personality. His capacity to take initiatives 
subsequently make or mar his destiny. He earns his own rewards and 
punishments. Freedom is man's medium of communication with God. Only a 
free agent can transcend space-time limits, overcome finitude and attain 
immortality through prayer. Only a free man can transcend the limitations of 
his own empirical ego and achieve self-transcendence. In his onward march to 
self-realisation and self-transcendence leading to the proximity and presence of 
Allah,man is bound to negotiate insurmountable obstructions and insufferable 
impediments. The genuine seeker will successfully cross them all through 
putting up relentless and ceaseless struggle. Man is free to undo his unfreedom. 
Analogous to Kierkegaard's existential dialectic, Iqbal formulateshis 
ownexistential dialectic. The promotion, authentication and stabilisation 
of humanindividuality entail subordination to values. Our uniqueness can 
be reinforced andsustained in pursuit of ideals. The ceaseless struggle of life 
is perennially anchored on aspirations, goals and purposes. We create ideals 
therefore we are. Man, in order to achieve self-realisation and usher into the 
ultimate goal of the establishment of the kingdom of God will have, to begin 
with, subordinate himself to the dictates and injunctions of Allah.Secondly, he 
will have to undergo most authentic and genuine self-control, which according 
to Iqbal is the highest state of ego or most enlightened form of self-realisation. 
Thirdly, by recourse to subordination to divine dictates and self-control leading 
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to self-realisation, can man aspire to the highest stage of vicegerency of Allah. 
This is the final stage of human evolution. At this stage man is invested with 
the Deputyhood of God. This is the most perfect stage of human ego. This 
stage symbolizesthe pinnacle of humanity. The physical, mental, moral and 
spiritual potentialities of mannegotiate their ultimate plane of evolution, 
realization, fulfillment and ascension at this stage. Man transcends all 
intellectual dilemmas and ideological conflicts and all his dichotomies and 
tensions are harmoniously reconciled. The Ideal Man or Deputy of God is the 
harmonious manifestation of supreme power and highest knowledge. 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal share many things despite their considerable 
differences. Both are powerful critics of theological rationalism or attempts to 
rationally prove and appropriate religion. Both anchor their Christian and 
Muslim beliefs and values on faith rather than argument or method. Both 
advocate philosophical or religious truth in it'shighest sense can be 
appropriated only subjectively and all attempts at objective appropriation of 
such a truth can land us only into the morass of irremediable and 
irredeemable uncertainty. For Kierkegaard subjectivity is truth and truth is 
subjectivity. Igbal says that if we try to seek God, we would not see anything 
but ourselves and if we try to seek ourselves, we would not find anything but 
God. Even the Qur'an, according tolgbal, cannot be understood by recourse to 
ponderous theological scholarship or methodological sophistication but by 
spiritual internalization, subjectivisation and conscientisation. Truth rotates 
round the faith of the man of God. The so-called objective world is, in 
comparison, nothing but fanciful, magical and illusory and cannot be cited with 
a view to establishing or validating what is ultimately true or real. 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal, both are primarily and respectively inspired by 
the more or less equivalent versions of the primordial Semitic vision pertaining 
to Man, Universe and God enshrined in the Bible arid the Qur'an. Both of them 
are essentially exhortative philosophers as both of them ask Christians and 
Muslims to reappropriate the original Biblical and Qur'anic beliefs and values. 
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Both ask Christians and Muslims respectively to abandon or give up skeptical, 
cynical, nihilistic, pessimistic and life-negating  attitudes and orientations born 
out of the so-called western modernist rationalist critique of religious albeit the 
Biblical or the Qur'anic world-view and value-system. 
The purpose of Kierkegaard's philosophy was to summon the nineteenth 
century-smug Christendom of Europe to the passionate commitment to original 
Christian world-view and value-system. He offered a radical re-examination of 
what it means to become a Christian using his rhetorical and analytical skills to 
disclose the limits of reason and open the door to faith. 
Iqbal's poetry and prose writings too are primarily addressed to a 
restoration of the original vision and mission of Islam. Just as Christ is central 
to Kierkegaardian account of Christianity, so is Muhammad the ultimate 
cynosure in Iqbal's reinterpretation and reconstruction of Islamic beliefs and 
values. He categorically and specifically asks Muslims to reappropriate the 
Prophet for he constitutes the alpha and omega of Islam, the rest being 
antithetical to the essence and core of religion Just as Kierkegaard 
wasunderlining the strenuous and demanding requirements of - authentic 
Christianity so was Igbalfrighteningly aware to the exacting and overtaxing 
demands of being attuned tooriginal vision and pristine mission of Islam. Both 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal underline the absolute need for and foundational 
importance of authentic commitment to religious beliefs and values. 
Kierkegaard emphasised on passionate appropriation of the central paradox of 
Christianity viz; God-man or Christ, against all protests and objections of 
reason. For Iqbal, all legal, ethical and theological doctrines are nothing but 
conceptual idolatery if not animated by love. Sans illumination of love, life is 
suffering, reason is distanciation and religion an imposition. With love, even 
apostasy is transmuted into faith, sans love even a believer is an apostate. 
However, both are not carbon copies of each other. Kierkegaard did not 
forward any metaphysical tenets. He was passionately involved in exploring 
the existential dialectic of a lonely individual apparently pitted against the 
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ontologically silent or clueless cosmos. Iqbal too was involved in a life-long 
exploration of human subjectivity or ego. However, he formulated a 
considerably strong rather imposing metaphysical apparatus in 
contradistinction to the pantheistic system propounded by Ibn Arabi. His 
metaphysics of man as `ego', God as `Supreme Ego' and the universe being a 
pulsating constellation of countless `egos' was more akin to Leibnizean 
monadology than to Kierkegaardian existential phenomenology. Of course, 
Iqbalian metaphysics was formulated in keeping with the abiding axiological 
concerns and considerations characterising Semitic Monotheistic 
Weltanschauung. The axiologicai thrust of Iqbalian ontology was also 
galvanized by the larger sociopolitical agenda of revitalising the Muslim 
Ummah caught into the vortex of European imperialism. In comparison, 
Kierkegaard was oblivious to sociopolitical polarization of his times and almost 
fanatically concerned with the existentially challenging predicaments and crises 
of the individual. 
Kierkegaard account of religious faith can have its own merits. Firstly, 
his subjective appropriation of Christianity guarantees the autonomy of 
religious faith. Kierkegaard establishes religious faith as philosophy 
independent or reason-independent. What he underlined most forcefully was 
that faith originates in our inward certainty. If certainty of faith was grounded 
on a metaphysical scheme then it could sustain till the metaphysical scheme 
lasted and vanish with the withering away of the given metaphysical scheme. 
Such a grounding would patently violate the autonomy of faith. Just as Kant 
advocated autonomy of morals, so does Kierkegaard advocate the autonomy of 
religious faith. Kant's fundamental position about the autonomy of morals is 
transposed unto the religious plane by Kierkegaard. Kant in his advocacy of 
autonomy of morals underlined that any attempted justification or explanation 
of the moral order necessarily meant that it was explained away and reduced. to 
other, non-moral terms. Similarly, Kierkegaard underlined that any explanation 
or justification of the religious order would mean that it was being explained 
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away in non-religious terms. The function of an explanation should not be 
reductionistic, according to Kierkegaard. An explanation should take away the 
obscurity and not explain away the object under explanation. An explanation 
should not culminate into correction, rectification or redirection. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard's account of religious faith appropriated by 
recourse to subjectivity undercuts the long drawn-out theological apologetics. 
Theologians of all doctrinal positions have carried out elaborate disputations 
with regard to correctness or incorrectness of various beliefs pertaining to God, 
Soul and eschatological salvation. These disputations often accentuated 
political polarization and consequent endless violence, pointless bloodshed and 
vast suffering in terms of death and destruction. Kierkegaard's appropriation of 
faith through subjectivity does full justice to practical character of religious 
beliefs. For Kierkegaard religious faith does not entail giving assent to 
doctrines but to act in a certain way. It is to orient one's life in a certain 
direction. Christianity is not sum of certain doctrines for it is radically opposite 
to speculative thought. Christianity is centrally concerned with existence, with 
an act of existing. However, existence is radically opposite of speculation. 
However, Kierkegaard's subjective appropriation of faith has its radical 
disadvantages as well. It throws away the substantial child , with the 
methodological bathwater. By placing faith beyond reason, Kierkegaard cuts 
the religious order completely from both human culture and natural order. It 
cuts religion completely from philosophical interpretations, historical 
investigations and scientific explorations. Such an eventuality is perfectly 
acceptable to Kierkegaard. This immeasurable space-time continuum or 
cosmos with all its philosophical interpretations, historical investigations and 
scientific explorations is irrelevant both to authentication and inauthentication 
of religious faith. The world with all its attractions and beguilements is far from 
being perfect. Citing New Testament, Kierkegaard brings out that this is an evil 
world and direly in need of Divine Message for its continuence and upkeep. 
However, religious faith cannot be completely impervious to rational 
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intervention. Kierkegaard does admit that there are rational limits to what can 
be believed in by recourse to faith. Faith is subject to reason to the extent that 
every irrational whim or nonsensical fancy can not be believed in on the pretext 
of faith. We must have some criterion to distinguish between the paradoxical 
which can be appropriated by faith and the plainly nonsensical and 
contradictory utterances or pronouncements. 
Whatever the enormity and solidity of any critique of reason with 
reference to any segment of culture be it religion or literature or art, it is just 
impossible to completely eliminate and eradicate the role of reason in any 
sphere of our practical and theoretical operations. The role of reason is simply 
ineliminable and ineradicable. L. Dupra's words bring it out so succinctly and 
clearly: 
Since faith is paradoxical, reason is assigned the negative 
but indispensable task of pointing up the 
incomprehensibility of faith. Consequently, reason must 
know precisely what is and what is not outside its 
competence and such knowledge is prerequisite for 
defining with accuracy the sphere of faith. Instead of 
dispelling the mysteriousness of faith, reason must set 
itself the task of bringing it into relief. This requires that it 
be able to distinguish between the contradictory and the 
incomprehensible. (L. Dupra: Kierkegaard as Theologian: 
London, 1964, 146). 
Kierkegaard has provided an insightful and excellent account of the 
practicality of faith. However, the dichotomous and disjunctive 
incommensurability he set between the speculative and subjective, makes it 
impossible to pinpoint the object of faith. Kierkegaard underlines that faith 
signifies passionate engagement and abiding interest, it signifies a way of life 
and it signifies adoption of a particular, existential and personal point of view. 
234 
On the other hand, speculation signifies objective disinterestedness, 
disengagement from the particularity of existence and adoption of a general or 
universal or impersonal point of view. If we accept this dichotomy set up by 
Kierkegaard, then any speculation is impossible and impermissible within the 
realm of faith. Any knowledge of our object of faith would be impossible. We 
can just cultivate infinite passion but cannot understand the object of our 
commitment. Faith is not theoretical understanding or analytical knowledge of
the object of faith. It is acting in certain ways or cultivating certain fundamental 
attitudes to life. Central to subjectivity and faith is `how' and not `what': 
"The objective accent falls on what is said, the subjective 
accent on how it is said... it is the passion of the infinite 
that is the decisive factor, and not its content, for its 
content is precisely itself. In this manner subjectivity and 
the subjective "how" constitute the truth" (Ibid., p. 181). 
What is fundamental, crucial and central to faith according to 
Kierkegaard is truthfulness or spiritual authenticity. A heathen authentically 
praying a false god is superior to a Christian inauthentically praying to the true 
God. The authenticity of the heathen tantamount's to praying to true God 
whereas the inauthenticity of the Christian tantamounts' to praying to an idol. 
However, even such a distinction sounds implausible in view of the fact that we 
just do not know the object of our commitment. Adoption of any attitude 
whatsoever to life entails a modicum of understanding. We cannot say how we 
ought to act without specifying what we are acting for. Faith cannot be 
absolutely divorced from knowledge. The Kierkegaardian faith would be 
completely blind. The believer would be unable to express it to others and, in 
fact, even to himself. If sincere idolator is superior to the insincere Christian, 
then truth is being estimated by the standards of sincerity. However, 
authenticity, sincerity and intensity of faith can not be said to be constituting 
the warp and woof of truth. We can be authentic, sincere and intense in the 
appropriation of and devotion to what is false or even wicked. We need to have 
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some objectively true conception of God. Kierkegaard's subjectivity and faith 
need to have cognitively specificable object. A measure of philosophical 
justification seems to be unavoidable, Kierkegaard's methodologically 
sophisticated and brilliant protestations notwithstanding. 
Kierkegaard's radical espousal of subjectivity does establish his intense 
commitment to Christianity. However, by all commonsense standards, excess 
of everything is bad. Excess of subjectivity is also bad. In view of the same, 
Kierkegaards man of authentic faith is inextricably lost into suffering and 
despair. He is bearing the burden of his existential choice alone. He cannot 
engage in a rational conversation or communication with regard to his 
fundamental existential choice, i.e. appropriation of Christianity subjectively. 
As Kierkegaard is categorically clear to the limitations of rationalism, he 
switches over to religious irrationalism with alacrity. Just as religious 
rationalism is fraught with serious limitation, so is religious irrationalism 
suffering from grave shortcomings. It is true that religious beliefs and values do 
not have a rational validation. There is no logical or demonstrative proof of the 
truth of religion. All scientific and social scientific methods cannot add upto to 
a religious world-view and value-system. However, it does not mean that 
religion is impervious to all rational considerations. Philosophers have cited 
conceptual, causal and teleological considerations with a view to proving the 
existence of God. However, such considerations have not been able to prove 
God. But that should not mean that all such considerations are irrelevant to 
God-debate. For example, the teleological features of the world can be 
perennially cited by theists in support of God's Existence. Such features may 
not be like links of a chain but they can always be like legs of a chair. What is 
important to note is that religious subjectivity should not necessarily land us 
into religious irrationality. 
In order to be authentically religious, we need not necessarily stand as 
lonely individuals before the transcendental God. We need to communicate 
with others, especially with the followers of our Faith. Religious dialogue can 
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open up the possibilities of reasonable conversations. We can agree with 
Kierkegaard, that we can never cite logical or experimental grounds on which 
to anchor our Faith. However, we can definitely forward crucial considerations 
— social, political, ethical — with a view to buttressing up our argument for the 
existence of God. 
Kierkegaard was pathologically concentrated on the `individual'. That 
again indicates the one-sidedness of Kierkegaard. As it happens, man cannot 
help being societal, political and institutional. A mature and judicious 
philosophy will take an integrated view of human condition. It will strive for 
outlining a judicious and balanced socio-political blueprint as well. 
Kierkegaards `individual' cannot even be conceived without a social and 
political order. 
Iqbal has been perhaps the most outstanding Asian exponent of 
`Subjectivity' in modem times. Igbal's rejection of classical proofs for the 
existence of God is in consonance with his emphasis on subjectivity. At best 
the classical proofs can prove the existence of a First Cause or a Necessary 
Being or a Designer, they certainly cannot prove the existence of God in the 
full religious sense. It can be safely maintained that God can be only 
subjectively appropriated through religious faith. He cannot be objectively 
proved through some rational argument or mathematical demonstration or 
empirical research. Such stance of Iqbal is in complete agreement with 
Kierkegaard's radical espousal of subjectivity. 
However, another methodological stance of Iqbal does not accord with 
Kierkegaardian celebration of subjectivity. In his `Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam", Igbal advances the latest findings of-the natural sciences in 
support of religion. He quotes extensively from the writings of numerous 
astronomers, physicists and biologists with a view to buttressing the claims of a 
religious perspective on the universe or imparting plausibility to religious 
world-view. For instance, Iqbal contends that classical scientific assumptions 
have been shaken to their foundations by modern scientific investigations. 
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Classical physicists had assumed matter to be the primal self-existent reality. 
The twentieth century scientific research exploded the myth of the reality of 
matter. It deemed matter-in-motion as the primal stuff of reality. Subsequently, 
motion or energy per se was substituted in place of matter. The Newtonian 
concepts of space and time as absolute and objective were radically critiqued 
by Einsteinian Theory of Relativity. He showed that space and time were 
mutually correlative dimensions of Reality and further brought out that motion 
and time could never be absolute; motion being relative to point of reference 
while time to a particular person. Iqbal points out that this dynamic view of 
reality in which time, motion and the person concerned make all scientific 
knowledge relative, paves the way for the validity of the religious world-view 
as well and imparts powerful plausibility to the doctrines and principles of 
religion. 
The quest for such a plausibility for religion has however dangerous 
implications. Scientific research is paradigmatically incommensurable with 
religious faith. Science is guided by hypothetical guidelines, data collection, 
experimentation, verification and disverification and prediction etc. However, 
with all their technical sophistication and methodological exactitude, scientific 
results are perennially subject to revocation. At times, scientific research may 
seem to be supporting religion and at other times it may well seem to be 
opposing it. While scientific research is self-professedly revocable, religious 
faith appropriates certain perennial dogmas and doctrines. Therefore, a 
religious worldview can not be anchored on switch-on/switch-off scientific 
support. A religious interpretation is essentially an existential interpretation of 
the universe. It is rooted in and motivated by values and ideals. Experimental 
research seems to have no bearing on normative analysis or elucidation. 
Iqbal is a great advocate or votary of "religious experience" or "mystical 
intuition". In his `Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam', Iqbal testifies 
to the epistemic validity of the contents of `religious experience' or `mystical 
intuition'. He has brought out the characterizing features of such an experience 
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or intuition. He claim's that such an experience or intuition is immediate, and 
unanalyzable. It is a moment of intimate association with a unique other self. A 
mystical experience is not communicable for it is more like a feeling than a 
thought. Moreover, the mystical experience for a while results in a sense of the 
unreality of the serial time. Obviously, such an analysis or interpretation of 
religious experience or intuition is highly personal and recommendatory. Such 
an interpretation may be acceptable to some students of mysticism and may be 
unacceptable according to others. 
However, Igbal's interpretation of religious experience or intuition or 
for that matter any other account of such an experience will have to negotiate 
certain formidable methodological challenges. At the beginning one can 
question the epistemic validity of the revelatory content of such an experience. 
Historically speaking, claimants of mystical experience have belonged to 
various cultures, tradition's and religions. All of them have had or do have their 
respective presuppositions, predilections, preunderstandings and prejudices. All 
of them are culture-bound, tradition-bound and history-bound. All of them start 
with their respective culturally conditioned consciousness. None of them starts 
with a clean state. Each one of them has embibed a set of belief's and values. 
Each mystic starts with a set of assumptions and orientations before being 
initiated into exercises leading to mystical experience thereby revealing what is 
really Real. Each mystic participates in his Collective Unconscious. Each 
mystic belongs to some mystical order of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism. Jainism, Taoism or Shintoism etc. Within each religious 
or mystical tradition the disciples are prescribed their respective set of 
exercises which exercises have to be carried out under the supervision of 
respective mentors. The mentors orientate their respective disciples in the light 
of the prescriptions, assumptions and postulates of their respective orders. 
These various mystical orders operate under the overall cultural, ideological 
and theological gestalts of their respective religions. In view of the same, the 
mystical experiences of various disciples, doctored or mentored as they are, are 
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oriented to confirm or substantiate what they are directed, expected and 
inspired to do. Thus a Christian mystic confirms the validity of Trinity in his 
mystical experience. A Buddhist mystic has a flashlight of Nirvana in his 
mystical experience. A Sankarite experiences the dissolution of his Atman into 
Parmatman. A follower of Ibn Arabi experiences the truth of the doctrine of 
`Wandat al-Wujud' . And so on and so forth. 
Paradoxically, some mystics experience that mystical experience is of 
no avail in furnishing its any divulgment of Ultimate Reality. Thus mystical 
experience cannot make any substantial contribution in demonstrating the truth 
of a metaphysical or religious doctrine. Mystical experience cannot resolve 
philosophical, theological or doctrinal disagreement. The mystical experiences 
themselves are the product of the institutional upbringing and social 
conditioning. In view of these vital considerations, Iqbal cannot anchor his 
religious tenents on mystical experience. It is through sheer faith that we can 
approach God or negotiate the realization of His Existence. 
The problem of self or soul or ego has been central to all classical and 
medieval modes of doing philosophy. Ancient Indian philosophers have 
brought out profound insights on the nature and role of soul. The problem has 
been taken up in Vedas, Upanishads Epics, and almost all the systems of Indian 
philosophy. Greek philosophers also advanced profound prognastications on 
the problem of soul. According to Plato and Aristotle, ego is a substance to 
which our activities are referred to. Our activities are related to the ego as 
qualities like whiteness, hardness etc. are related to certain material things. 
However, just as material things are above and beyond their attributes, so is 
soul or ego as a substance beyond its experiences and activities. Furthermore, 
the soul substance was deemed to be unchanging through the perpetual flux of 
its states. Besides soul was an absolute unity, a simple indivisible substance; it 
was also immortal not dissolving at the death of body but continuing to exist in 
a disembodied state. This theory of soul was appropriated by all medieval 
Christian and Muslim philosophers.Even Modern Western philosophers such as 
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Descartes, Lock and Berkeley also held the same theory of soul substance. 
Hume was the first modern western philosopher who questioned the substantial 
theory of soul on psychological and epistemological grounds. Kant advanced 
the view that reality of soul cannot be proved or logically demonstrated. ."I 
think or cogito" of Descartes was only a formal condition of all thinking and it 
is illegitimate to transcend from a purely logical concept to an ontological 
substance like soul. 
The question of soul-substance has also been widely debated within the 
domain of Muslim philosophy. Most importantly, Sufi thinkers have been 
deeply interested in the explication of the soul-substance. For example, Shaikh 
Ali Hujwari in his "Kashful Mahjub", advances several views on the nature and 
role of soul. He says that Sufi view of soul is that it is a substance and not an 
attribute. It is deposited in the body and may be separated from it as insleep. It 
is a subtle body which comes and goes by the command of God. It is corporeal 
and hence visible though only to the eye of the heart. The Asharaite school of 
Mutakallimun, also advances an atomistic and corporeal view of soul. Hallaj 
advanced his philosophy of soul under the impact of Christian and Islamic 
mysticism. According to Hallaj, God created an image of Himself with all his 
Attributes and Names. This image was Adam whom God glorified and exalted. 
Glory to God who manifested his Nasut wherein lay the brilliant light of His 
Lahut. Hallaj regarded man as consisting of two elements, the divine and the 
human. Muslim mystics or Sufi's almost unanimously accepted Hallajian 
account of soul. They cited the Quranic verses underlining that God breathed 
His spirit into the body of Adam and moulded it into shape from mud. Hallaji's 
Anal-Haqq (I am the Creative Truth) , which created a great controversy 
culminating into his death, was also in perfect consonance with the Quranic 
view of man. 
Anal-Haqq (I am the Creative Truth) brought out by Hallaj was 
pantheistically understood and interpreted by many of his contemporary and 
subsequent interpreters. Iqbal did not agree with the pantheistic interpretation 
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of Hallajian dictum. He underlined that such an interpretation of Hallaj was 
highly erroneous. 
Iqbal's doctrine of ego (Khudi), is basically inspired by the Quranic 
view of soul. Iqbal has formulated his conception of ego on the basis of the 
Quranic verse wherein the soul has been defined to be the command of the 
Lord (Qur'an: XVII 85). While interpreting this verse Iqbal says that it 
indicates the directive nature of the soul as it procedes from the directive 
energy of God. It further indicates that human personality is not a thing, it is an 
act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, 
and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. 
The question of the relationship of the self with the physical world 
should not necessarily land us into either dualism of Descartes or parallelism of 
Spinoza. Matter and mind are not too distinct ultimate units which need to be 
brought together. According to Iqbal they are two faces of the same coin. Iqbal 
thinks that according to the teaching of the Qur'an, they do belong to the same 
system "To Him belong Khalq (creation) and Amr (direction)". As "a spiritual 
pluralist Iqbal holds matter to be a colony of egos of a low order out of which 
emerge finite life and consciousness of a higher order, when there association 
and interaction reach a certain degree of complexity , . , , Nor is their such a thing 
as a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality elementally 
incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind and needing 
a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental" 
(Reconstruction, pp. 147-48). 
All this can be fine-spun and can go so far as it goes. However, his 
strident critique of pantheism on the one hand, and strong espousal of 
panagoism on the other, do not resolve our ontocosmological confusions but 
proliferate them. Whether we absorb ourselves into God or absorb God into 
ourselves, it is pantheism all the way. 
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Iqbal's unflinching stress on faith and radical advocacy of love, his 
critique of rational and scientific methods and his emphasis on and 
appropriation of religious or mystical experience together constitute his 
indefatigable espousal of subjectivity. However Iqbal is not categorically clear 
in his espousal and appropriation of subjectivity. Take, for example, his 
approach to Sufism. In his "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam", he 
accepts the validity of the mystical experience or intuition but elsewhere in his 
poetry and miscellaneous writings he assembles a radical critique of what he 
calls non-Islamic mysticism as against Islamic mysticism. For him Islamic 
mysticism is a cognitive-cum-effective experience by recourse to which man 
transcends his personal attitudes, impulses and speculations and willingly 
surrenders to the commandments of Allah. However, theoretical Sufism is as 
good or bad as any system of philosophy or theology and has to face relevant 
tests of validity and its general acceptability will have to be a function of its 
fruitful contribution to human civilization. 
Of all the Sufi philosophers, Iqbal is uncompromisingly critical of Ibn 
Arabi's doctrine of Wahadat al Wujud. He deems the doctrine to be a 
categorical misinterpretation or even violation of Islamic worldview and value-
system. In view of the same, Ibn Arabi's onto cosmological doctrine is utterly 
unacceptable. The fundamental mistake committed by Ibn Arabi is his 
confusion between the concepts of Tawhid (Oneness of God) and Wahadat al-
Wujud (oneness of Being).While the doctrine of "Oneness of God" is of the 
highest religious and moral significance, the doctrine of "Oneness of Being" is 
purely a philosophical interpretation unnecessarily superimposed by Ibn Arabi 
on simple teachings of Islam. The fundamental teachings of Islam are highly 
clear and transparent. Its basic emphasis is on the Ultimate Reality of Allah, 
His Oneness, His Lordship and His Supermacy. The phenomenal universe is a 
creation of God. The Creator can, in noway be identified with the creation. The 
doctrine of "Wahadat al-Wujud" is completely antithetical to the worldview 
and value-system of Quran. The Quranic onto cosmological doctrine is radically 
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creationistic and there is an unbridgeable chasm between Allah, the Creator and 
Universe, the creation.The Creator of the Universe, i.e. Allah, as disclosed 
through intuition is the ultimate Ego, the Perfect Individuality and the 
Complete Personality. Human beings as finite egos are not absorbed into the 
Ultimate Ego. They retain identities and personalities. Therefore, Ibn Arabi's 
contention that the physical world comprising of phenomenal objects and 
human beings has no being or meaning apart from and independently of God is 
unacceptable in the face of the Quranic world-view. What, however, needs to 
be underlined is that the Quranic propositional gestalt is not all that simple as is 
simplistically brought out by exegetes and commentators of the Quran. An 
indepth hermeneutical analysis of the Quranic propositions will reveal that the 
Quran is comprised of informative, expressive and directive propositions which 
can be explained or interpreted multidimensionally, multifunctionally and 
multicontextually. They are amenable to pluriformulations and multiversional 
interpretations. They can be interpreted from various angles and vantage points. 
Thus, historians sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, 
phenomenologists, philologists, scientists, and philosophers can interpret 
Quranic verses from their respective standpoints and perspectives.Within 
Islamic society, the Quran has received various treatments from various angels 
of interpretation, sectarian, ideological, legal, socio-political, philosophical, 
mystical, etc. A jurisconsult can put a legal gloss on the Quranic verses. A 
philosopher can workout his interpretation of the Quran in keeping with his 
philosophical assumptions. So can a sufi bring out an interpretation of Quranic 
verses from his perspective. For example, Ibn Arabi work out as a pantheistic 
interpretation of the Quran with reference to several of its verses. The Quran 
categorically brings out that God is the First and the Last, the Hidden and the 
Manifest. Now such a verse can hardly be understood or interpreted within a 
radical creationistic perspective, so powerfully espoused and endorsed by 
Iqbal. If all that is manifest is also God, then Ibn Arabi's doctrine of wahadat 
al-wujud is clearly vindicated. Similarly, the Quranic verse, "wheresoever you 
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see, there is the splendor of Allah" can also be panthestically appropriated. 
There are other numerous verses of the Quran such as "God is the light of 
Heavens and the Earth", "God is nearer to man than his juglar vein" etc., which 
can be cited by Sufi pantheists in support of their contention. What needs to be 
underlined is that no interpretation of the Qur'an is necessarily worthy or 
capable of graduating to standard-bearer of the truth or wisdom of the Quran. 
The interpretations are not discoveries, they are constructions worked out in 
keeping with numerous intangibles and imponderables of interpreters. There is 
nothing necessarily true about a pantheistic interpretation of the Qur'an; nor is 
a creationistic ontocosmological doctrine necessitated by the Qur'an. It is how 
you marshal the verses of the Quran and repeatedly and powerfully underline 
your contention that an interpretation can be assembled into a necessary 
deduction or a plausible induction. Mutazilites, Asharites, philosophers, Sufis, 
theologians, literalists, liberalists etc. all cite verses from the Qur'an with a 
view to proving their respective contentions. Iqbal like most Muslim thinkers 
sides with the creationistic interpretation because it is accepted or upheld by an 
overwhelming majority of Muslim Ummah. However, that should never be 
seen as lending philosophical validity and dignity to the creationistic dogma. 
Philosophical contentions are never settled by plebscitary mechanisms or 
electoral methods. Popularity or social acceptability of an interpretation or a 
formulation is no guarantee of its philosophical truth. 
Iqbal was not innocent of the hermeneutical strategies employed by 
philosophers to vindicate or justify their contentions. He was fully cognizant of 
the strategy of Tawi'l employed by philosophers of various hues and colours. 
He chastised reason as 'aqli tawi'li' (justificatory or reconciliatory reason). 
However Iqbal had powerful considerations to go in for a radical critique of 
Ibn Arabi's pantheistic interpretation of Islam. He was an outstanding man of 
Islamic Renaissance in twentieth century. He was a powerful ideologue of 
contemporary Muslim Resurgence. He felt that Ibn-Arabi's doctrine negates 
the very freedom of human will and consequently denies the very rationale of 
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our moral struggle. Ibn Arabi's doctrine cannot provide us a criterion of Good 
and Evil. Every action, howsoever good or bad, is ascribed to God and 
consequently human responsibility and accountability are also denied. Such a 
doctrinal formulation cuts at the very roots of our moral commitments. Our 
moral struggle for the establishment of a just and egalitarian social, political 
and economic order can not be reinforced by an appropriation of Ibn-Arabi's 
doctrine. In view of these vital considerations, Iqbal advances a philosophical 
approach diametrically opposite to the pantheistic ontocosmology formulated 
by Ibn Arabi. These vital ethical, socio-political and ideological compulsions or 
imperatives of cultural conditioning pushed Iqbal towards the overwhelmingly 
popular creationistic interpretation. However, it should not be construed as a 
rejection of Ibn Arabi's doctrine in the face of some so-called standardized 
ontocosmological version of the Quran. Some very powerful verses of the 
Quran can be cited in support of Ibn Arabis' ontocosmological position as well. 
In the final analysis, One can say that Kierkegaard and Iqbal have with 
passionate zeal and inwardness attempted the herculean task of bringing out the 
logic of religion against the backdrop of global rush for and celeberation of 
objective, experimental and value-free knowledge. They hae put up valiant 
intellectual struggle against both technologisation of culture and theologisation 
of religion. The debate between `subjectivity' and `objectivity' has been 
historically long drawn-out and we shall never be able to receive the final 
jdugement resolving this debate. `Subjectivity' and `objectivity' are less of two 
epistemological approaches and more of two philosophical mindsets. In times 
to come, every Kierkegaard and Iqbal will have to face a Hegel and a Sir Syed 
and vice-versa. The contribution of great men of philosophy and religion is.to 
uplift the debate unto a higher plane, in the process, leading to our 
methodological clarification as well as existential authentication. 
Art, religion, philosophy and science are the four fundamental 
frameworks within which human mind has been operating during the recorded 
history of man. Philosophers, in their love of wisdom, have been studying art, 
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religion and science for the last three thousand years. In fact, they have been 
studying culture, literature, history, society, polity, economy and what not. 
However, perhaps most importantly, they have been studying the nature and 
function of religion and science with exceptional zeal and gauto; for religion 
and science are two of the most fundamental ways of understanding and 
appropriating reality. Scientific research has been investigating the empirically 
observable physical or phenomenal features of the cosmos by recourse to 
classification, hypothesis formulation, data-collection, experimentation, 
verification/disverificaiton, discovery of causal explanations, prediction of 
results and inductive confirmation and deductive derivation of universal laws. 
While there is nothing final in science and `trial and error' is the perennial 
method and an ineliminable characteristic of scientific research and while all 
scientific truths, explanations and laws are revocable by recourse to some 
extraordinary discovery or paradigm-shift or simply by reconsideration and 
reauthentication of available data etc., yet there is a large body of scientific 
results, principles or laws which stand confirmed or consolidated by 
appropriate methodological strategies. In view of the same, philosophers of 
science can provide a reasonable account of science despite insuperable 
methodological and substantive problems thereof. On the other hand, 
philosophers of religion are all the more pitted against far more complex odds 
and challenges. They can not depend upon explicit methods of hypothesis-
formulation, data-collection, experimentation, verificationldisverification and 
discovery of universal laws. Religions claim to have been inspired, processed, 
appropriated, crystallized and transcribed by recourse to revelation. Their 
raison de'tre, locus standi and modus operandi can be appreciated only by men 
of highest wisdom and scholarship. More fundamentally, almost all religious 
traditions underline that religion is not something to be methodologically or 
philosophically debated or deliberated upon and understood as one of the 
sciences or disciplines of academic interest; rather a minimal understanding of 
doctrines, beliefs, values and injunctions is to be followed by maximum 
247 
possible commitment, righteousness or virtuousness, value-orientation, public 
service and courage of conviction. 
Whether philosophy is distinct from religion and religion irreconciliable 
with philosophy or whether religion ought to be included in philosophy or 
philosophy included in religion or whether both are domains in 
contradistinction to each other etc., are highly debatable questions and have 
generated conflicts, confrontations and polarizations across the history of 
human thought. In ancient Greece there have been philosophical schools such 
as Pythagoreanism and Stoicism which like religions can be deemed to be ways 
of life.Some Asian philosophical schools such as 'Advaita Vedanta'founded by 
Indian thinker Shankara and 'Wahadat al Wujud'advanced by Islamic sufi 
philosopher Ibn Arabi, have maintained that understanding and realization can 
lead to eschatological salvation. However, there is another widely influential 
view that religious doctrines, beliefs and values can not be rationally and 
methodologically proved, understood or demonstrated.The job of philosophy is 
defensive or apologetical one. It has to justify preambles of faith or defend 
articles of faith vouchsafed to Prophets through revelation. A possible rational 
defence of religion too has to emanate from or be anchored upon faith, 
There can be other responses with regard to the relationship between 
philosophy and religion. Again the backdrop of the onslaught of 
multidimensional Western Scientific revolution in post-Enlightenment era, 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal, like Augustine, Ghazali and Kant, chose to critique the 
very rationale of rationality. They especially pointed out the field-confusion of 
rationalist philosophers in trying to disprove religion through reason when it 
cannot be proved through reason even upto eternity. The panrationalists and 
hyperrationalists need to understand that the very human understanding is 
fraught with insuperable limitations. Therefore, human reason itself needs to 
appropriate a less ambitious or more modest a role. Reason can neither prove 
nor disprove religion while it has always nursed the ambition of both proving 
and disproving it. Kierkegaard and Iqbal, once again, brought out, a massive 
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and mighty deconstruction of reason itself, thereby reminding us of the 
perennial need for faith, commitment, love and above all subjectivity. Christ 
and Muhammad, respectively, were the sheet anchors of their faith. They 
inherited the legacy of the Prophets. Without being apologists, they 
appropriated their vision and mission, through intellectual freedom and 
philosophical wisdom. 
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